



AND
THE LEGACY

ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST



THE OFFICIAL MAGAZINE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The mission of ARMY INFORMATION DI-GEST is to keep personnel of the Army aware of trends and developments of professional concern.

The Digest is published under supervision of the Army Chief of Information to provide timely and authoritative information on policies, plans, operations, and technical developments of the Department of the Army to the Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. It also serves as a vehicle for timely expression of the views of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff and assists in the achievement of information objectives of the Army.

Manuscripts on subjects of general interest to Army personnel are invited.

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COVER: Their gruelling struggle ended, the Blue and the Gray discover in their common humanity the elemental strengths which enabled their nation, reunited, to grow to greatness in the century to follow. This Centennial issue examines the factors of leadership, tactics, strategy, which were fused in the crucible of Civil War.



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
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Interpretations and views expressed by the authors are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army.



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CONSULTANTS — THIS ISSUE Dr. John Miller, jr. Margaret E. Tackley A Special Issue
Commemorating the
Centennial of the
U.S. Army
In the Civil War
1861-1865

THE OFFICIAL ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

U. S. ARMY MAGAZINE

AUGUST 1961



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON



E VER SINCE the opening shot was fired on Fort Sumter in April of 1861, the campaigns of the Civil War have provided a rewarding field of research for the military student. From the grand strategy and major operations of both North and South, on down to the hasty plans and moonlight maneuvers of obscure guerrilla bands, the history of the war is rich in examples of military theory in action, of gradual improvements in weapons and equipment at a time when modern technology was in its infancy, and of slowly evolving change in the employment and leadership of great masses of troops over broad areas.


To the historical and military scientist, the Civil War is the portal between old ways of waging war and the new means and methods that were soon to burst upon us with unprecedented rapidity.

As long as fire and maneuver, supply and transportation, and command and communication remain important, military thinkers of every nation will continue to study that bloody, transitional struggle with intense personal interest and professional benefit.

As long as the ultimate weapon—the individual soldier—remains essential to warfare, and as long as men value courage, sacrifice, devotion to principle, and gallant leadership, the Civil War will provide both inspiration and instruction.

Besides its obvious value to military students, the great struggle of 1861-1865 is such an integral part of American history that every citizen should seek to understand its causes and events, thereby increasing his knowledge of the historic forces which so profoundly shaped—and are still affecting—our Nation's growth.

Secretary of the Army



THE American Civil War means many things to many people. To the student of government it is the final crucible that proved the validity of the Federal system. To the sociologist it is the story of the end of a social structure that was destroyed by its own excesses. To the student of literature, the narratives of the sorrows and heartaches of that time represent some of our attempts to reach the best in the written word. To others its stirring scenes were the first to be recorded as they occurred. No longer need man depend upon the memory of an artist to depict the scenes of combat.

Each individual American today approaches the Civil War with a feeling that reflects much of his train-



Brigadier General William H. Harris Chief, Military History


ing and his heritage. To the student of military history it signifies the unfolding of new techniques in communications, command control, or reconnaissance; it illustrates the problems created by politically adept but ill-trained officers and by short terms of service; and it affords an evaluation of the professional versus the amateur man-at-arms.

For many years the Regular officers in the armies of our present Allies studied intently the campaigns of this war as a means of developing their own skills. During the Thirties it was often said "If you want to know the strength and weaknesses of the American commanders in the period 1861-65, consult the British officer." These same campaigns were the object of study and analysis by our own service schools.

The interest in this era is not limited to any single stratum of our society. The fact that many people spend hours of labor and personal funds to keep alive the uniform, equipment, tactics, and military customs of this bloody fratricidal war is unparalleled in this country. Traditionally our people try to forget as rapidly as possible the existence and results of each war. Yet not only the historian, but the novelist, scenarist, and playwright have kept the memory of this time fresh in the minds of the American people.

We as a nation have progressed from isolationism to the point where we have allies in every quarter of the globe. These friends usually have histories that stretch over centuries—where we stand as infants in the panorama of time. Yet it is with pride that we celebrate the centenary of a great struggle.

The pages that follow present the vista of a great conflict on this continent. The articles that illuminate this vista bear the stamp of historical truth and have been chosen to whet the appetite of varied tastes. Through all of them you will find the underlying greatness of the American individual. Here is devotion to ideals; strength of character and body; ingenuity; humor and pathos; good and bad—all those things which make up the story of a people engaged in a war that remains living history.



THE Civil War Centennial, which began in January 1961 and extends to April 1965, will be observed by millions of citizens throughout the Nation in solemn commemoration of the many historic events and valorous deeds of America's greatest struggle. Schools, colleges, patriotic, religious and civic groups will join with agencies of Federal, State and local government to stage parades, pageants, ceremonies, re-enactments of battles and other commemorative events.

Keynote for the Centennial was sounded in a Presidential Proclamation of December 1960 which cited the "heroism and sacrifice by men and women of both sides, who valued principle above life itself and whose devotion to duty is a proud part of our national inheritance." In a later message, the President called upon all Americans "to participate in this effort to re-learn the lessons gained from this country's greatest test, the war that gave her the political pattern by which she has become the strongest and most united nation on earth."

COORDINATION and planning for the Centennial is exercised by the Civil War Centennial Commission which was established by joint resolution of Congress on 7 September 1957. The Commission is composed of twenty-five leading citizens headed by the President of the United States. Its Chairman is Major General U. S. Grant, USA-Retired, and its Executive Director is Karl S. Betts.

The Department of Defense has lent its support to the overall planning for the many centennial activities contemplated throughout the United States. In general, the Armed Forces will, to the extent feasible, cooperate with the Centennial Commission at the national level, and through that Commission with state and local sponsors of anniversary programs, to include arrangements for participation by military bands, troops, and exhibits. Limited logistical support also will be provided when feasible.

PERHAPS the most colorful event to date was the re-enactment of he

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Battle of First Manassas, near Mana sas, Virginia, on 22-23 July. Members of the North-South Skirmish Association, numbering some fifteen hundred, re-enacted the battle in which the Confederate forces achieved their first victory against the North.

The battle was reproduced as authentically as possible, employing uniforms of North and South, artillery, small arms, carriages, limbers, caisdrums, bugles, ammunition, horses, bridles and saddles of the period. The large-scale panorama, witnessed by more than 50,000 spectators. was organized and financed by the First Manassas Corporation, under its Executive Director, Major General James C. Fry, USA-Retired, in collaboration with the Virginia Civil War Commission and the First Manassas Committee.

The State of Virginia invited each of the 22 other states represented in the original battle to send contingents, each dressed in authentic copies of the uniforms worn by the respective state

regiments. Participating state contingents carried copies of their regimental flags and were armed with appropriate rifles and muskets.

Army support for the Manassas battle was coordinated under the Military District of Washington. Together with the other services, it provided signal equipment and communications, medical assistance. surface and air transportation and messing facilities.

As other ceremonies, parades, reenactments and observances materialize, the Army will provide what support it can in keeping with its military commitments. In the main, such participation will be limited to color guards, honor guards and bands provided by units stationed nearby. It is the rule of the Commission and of the Department of Defense that all requests for such participation be submitted to the Civil War Centennial Commission in Washington for approval before any action can be taken.

ARMY PARTICIPATION IN CENTENNIAL

OFFICIAL GUIDANCE for participation by Army units in Civil War Centennial observances is provided in an Information Plan issued by the Office, Chief of Information, Department of the Army, on 19 August 1960. The document prescribes ways in which the Army may support the Centennial:

1. Commanders are to bring the Centennial and its events to the attention of Army personnel through Troop Information chan-

2. The history of units which had distinguished service on either side during the war will be publicized, both internally and exter-

3. Civil War history will be used to teach lessons in military strategy and tactics at the U. S. Military Academy.

4. Civil War displays will be featured at museums on military posts and installations.

5. Experts on the Civil War serving with the Army will be made available for public apparances and lectures.

The U.S. Military Academy will schedule xhibits in its museum and publicize the

Centennial to an appropriate extent. The Academy will encourage articles and books about the Academy during the Civil War.

7. Commanders will publicize the participation of Army personnel in observances.

REQUESTS by state or local groups for Army participation will be processed through the Civil War Centennial Commission in Washington, D. C. prior to approval. However, limited support such as providing color guards may be given under the authority granted for participation in community relations events. General coordination of Department of Defense participation is exercised by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs.

National Guard support of the Civil War Centennial will include the construction of a mobile display portraying the role of the various state militias in the war, and containing weapons, uniforms and medals of the period. National Guard units will participate in the various events under the supervision of respective National Guard State Headquarters.



was a blunt, rough-hewn commoner
with an uncommon compassion,
a broading wisdom,
shot through with
the saving savor of salty humor,
who saw his house divided,
its inhabitants spilling blood.
Amid the bitterness,
he could look to the uplands,
toward the day of the assuaging of wounds,
the restoration of union
and return to the ways of peace—
He was indeed

A MAN TO REMEMBER



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August

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

A tribute by Carl Sandburg, Pulitzer-Prize laureate and pre-eminent Lincoln biographer, delivered before the First Session, 86th Congress on the 150th anniversary of Lincoln's birth, 12 February 1959.

CARL SANDBURG



NOT OFTEN in the story of mankind does a man arrive on earth who is both steel and velvet, who is as hard as rock and soft as drifting fog, who holds in his heart and mind the paradox of terrible storm and peace unspeakable and perfect. Here and there across centuries come reports of men alleged to have these contrasts. And the incomparable Abraham Lincoln born 150 years ago this day, is an approach if not a perfect realization of this character.

In the time of the April lilacs in the year 1865, on his death, the casket with his body was carried north and west a thousand miles; and the American people wept as never before; bells sobbed, cities wore crepe; people stood in tears and with hats off as the railroad burial car paused in the leading cities of seven States ending its journey at Springfield, Illinois, the hometown.

During the 4 years he was President he at times, especially in the first 3 months, took to himself the powers of a dictator; he commanded the most powerful armies till then assembled in modern warfare; he enforced conscription of soldiers for the first time in American history; under imperative necessity he abolished the right of habeus corpus; he directed politically and spiritually the wild, massive turbulent forces let loose in civil war; he argued and pleaded for compensated emancipation of the slaves.

The slaves were property, they were on the taxbooks along with horses and cattle, the valuation of each slave written next to his name on the tax assessor's books. Failing to get action

on compensated emancipation, as a Chief Executive having war powers he issued the paper by which he declared the slaves to be free under military necessity. In the end nearly \$4 million worth of property was taken away from those who were legal owners of it, property confiscated, wiped out as by fire and turned to ashes, at his instigation and executive direction. Chattel property recognized and lawful for 300 years was expropriated, seized without payment.

In the month the war began he told his secretary, John Hay:

"My policy is to have no policy."

Three years later in a letter to a Kentucky friend made public, he confessed plainly:

"I have been controlled by events."
His words at Gettysburg were sacred, yet strange with a color of the familiar:

"We cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far beyond our poor power to add or detract."

He could have said "the brave Union men." Did he have a purpose in omitting the word "Union"? Was he keeping himself and his utterance clear of the passion that would not be good to look back on when the time came for peace and reconciliation? Did he mean to leave an implication that there were brave Union men and brave Confederate men, living and dead, who had struggled there? We do not know, of a certainty. Was he thinking of the Kentucky father whose two sons died in battle, one in Union blue, the other in Confederate gray,

the father inscribing on the stone over their double grave, "God knows which was right"? We do not know. His changing policies from time to time aimed at saving the Union. In the end his armies won and his Nation became a world power.

In August of 1864 he wrote a memorandum that in view of the national situation, he expected to lose the next November election. That month of August was so dark. Sudden military victory brought the tide his way; the vote was 2,200,000 for him and 1,800,000 against him. Among his bitter opponents were such figures as Samuel F. B. Morse, inventor of the telegraph, and Cyrus H. McCormick, inventor of the farm reaper. In all its essential propositions the southern Confederacy had the moral support powerful, respectable elements throughout the North, probably more than a million voters believing in the justice of the southern cause. While the war winds howled he insisted that the Mississippi was one river meant to belong to one country, that railroad connection from coast to coast must be pushed through and the Union Pacific Railroad made a reality. While the luck of war wavered and broke and came again, as generals failed and campaigns were lost, he held enough forces of the north together to raise new armies and supply them, until generals were found who made war as victorious war has always been made, with terror, frightfulness, destruction, and on both sides, North and South, valor and sacrifice past words of man to tell.

In the mixed shame and blame of the immense wrongs of two crashing civilizations, often with nothing to say, he said nothing, slept not at all, and on occasions he was seen to weep in a way that made weeping appropriate, decent, majestic. As he rode alone on horseback near Soldiers Home on the edge of Washington one night his hat was shot off; a son he loved died as he watched at the bed; his wife was accused of betraying information to the enemy, until Cenials from him were necessary. An Indiana man at the White House heard him say, "Voorhees, don't it seem strange to you that I, who could never so much as cut off the head of a chicken, should be elected, or selected, into the midst of all this blood?"

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He tried to guide General Nathaniel Prentiss Banks, a Democrat, three times Governor of Massachusetts, in the governing of some 17 of the 48 parishes of Louisiana controlled by the Union armies, an area holding a fourth of the slaves of Louisiana. He would like to see the State recognize the Emancipation Proclamation:

"And while she is at it, I think it would not be objectionable for her to adopt some practical system by which the two races could gradually live themselves out of their old relation to each other, and both come out better prepared for the new. Education for the young blacks should be included in the plan."

To Governor Hahn, elected in 1864 by a majority of the 11,000 white male voters who had taken the oath of allegiance to the Union, Lincoln wrote:

"Now you are about to have a convention which, among other things, will probably define the elective franchise, I barely suggest for your private consideration, whether some of the colored people may not be let in—as for instance the very intelligent and especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks."

Among the million words in the Lincoln utterance record, he interprets himself with a more keen precision than someone else offering to explain him. His simple opening of the "house divided" speech in 1858 serves for today:

"If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending we could better judge what to do, and how to do it."

To his Kentucky friend, Joshua F. Speed, he wrote in 1855:

"Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a Nation we began by declaring that 'all men are created equal, except Negroes.' When the know-nothings get control, it will read 'all men are created equal except Negroes and foreigners and Catholics.' When it comes to this, I shall prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty."

Infinitely tender was his word from a White House balcony to a crowd on

the White House lawn:

"I have not willingly planted a thorn in any man's bosom."

Or to a military Governor:

"I shall do nothing through malice; what I deal with is too vast for malice."

He wrote for Congress to read on December 1, 1862:

"In times like the present men should utter nothing for which they would not willingly be responsible through time and eternity."

Like an ancient psalmist he warned Congress:

"Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. We will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation."

Wanting Congress to break and forget past traditions his words came keen and flashing:

"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present. We must think anew, we must act anew, we must disenthrall ourselves."

The people of many other countries take Lincoln now for their own. He belongs to them. He stands for deceasy, honest dealing, plain talk, and funny stories. "Look where he came from—don't he know all us strugglers and wasn't he a kind of tough struggler all his life right up to the finish?"

Something like that you can hear in any nearby neighborhood and across the seas. Millions there are who take him as a personal treasure. He had something they would like to see spread everywhere over the world. Democracy? We cannot say exactly what it is, but he had it. In his blood and bones he carried it. In the breath of his speeches and writings it is there. Popular government? Republican institutions? Government where the people have the say-so, one way or another telling their elected leaders what they want? He had the idea. It is there in the lights and shadows of his personality, a mystery that can be lived but never fully spoken in words.

Our good friend, the poet and playwright Mark Van Doren, tells us:

"To me, Lincoln seems, in some ways, the most interesting man who ever lived. He was gentle but this gentleness was combined with a terrific toughness, an iron strength."

And how did Lincoln say he would like to be remembered? Something of it is in this present occasion, the atmosphere of this room. His beloved friend, Representative Owen Lovejoy, of Illinois, had died in May of 1864, and friends wrote to Lincoln and he replied that the pressure of duties kept him from joining them in efforts for a marble monument to Lovejoy, the last sentence of Lincoln's letter, saying:

"Let him have the marble monument along with the well-assured and more enduring one in the hearts of those who love liberty, unselfishly, for all men."

Today, we may say, perhaps, that the well-assured and most enduring memorial to Lincoln is invisibly there, today, tomorrow, and for a long time yet to come. It is there in the hearts of lovers of liberty, men and women—this country has always had them in crises—men and women who understand that wherever there is freedom there have been those who fought, toiled, and sacrificed for it.



THE STUDY of the strategy and tactics used in the American Civil War has been basic to military education everywhere for years. Because this is the beginning of the Centennial observance of that four-year struggle, I thought it would be particularly appropriate to discuss some of the principles of leadership as recorded in American military history, and particularly as exemplified by leaders in the

Confederate Army. In this, I shall rely fairly heavily upon the writings and speeches of the late Dr. Douglas Southall Freeman, the South's greatest historian, whom I was privileged to know personally, and who was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his definitive four-volume study on General Robert E. Lee.

What can we learn from a brief look at General Lee, an individual wor-

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Through the years, soldiers of all nations
have benefitted from

LEADERSHIP

Lieutenant General Robert J. Wood

shipped by his troops and considered by all students of military history as one of the great leaders of all time?

Dr. Freeman felt that his study of history had revealed to him three simple maxims which represented the whole duty of a soldier in terms of leadership. The first of these was STUDY. It wasn't enough, he felt, for one to study only while in school. He felt that no military man could be a competent leader unless he dedicated himself to a whole life of study.

General Lee had that peculiar quality of study which is one of the tests of the great soldier. He would take his battle plan; he would work it out carefully; he would labor over his supply problems; he would survey his map with the most critical care; and when he had developed his own plan, he had that almost unique mental gift of being able to lay his plan down and then go over, figuratively, to the other side of the hill and consider his plan critically in terms of what the enemy might do.

These basic criticisms of his own strategy took time and energy, but I don't doubt they gave General Lee

just as sound an evaluation of his plan as all the expensive computers and other gear which we rely on to come up with answers to what we call our "war games" today.

Study—one of the first duties of the military leader—means balanced study. Yesterday and today are the only two fixed points by which we can project tomorrow. But if you look always over your shoulder, you are apt to stumble. On the other hand, if you don't look over your shoulder, sometimes you are apt to lose your way. The balance between his technical and cultural study, between his military and sociological study, is something that a leader always must keep in mind.

Character

THE second maxim which Dr. Freeman deduced from his studies was CHARACTER.

We assume that the character of the individual consists of certain positive attributes. It is easy to tick off such things as principle, dedication, integrity, judgment; but there is another side to it. Just as surely as a man of character avoids intrigue, so he cannot

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be indolent. I have seen very few able men of character who were indolent, and I have seen very, very few historical figures of any importance who were lazy.

In this day and time, when there is a premium on military operations involving all three services, there is an equal premium on cooperation. Character eliminates selfishness, it eliminates false pride, and in their place it inspires cooperation.

With General Lee, principle was a matter of the utmost importance. "Duty," he said, "is the sublimest word in the English language."

There came a time in 1864 when the loss of Jackson and Longstreet, the capture of Johnson and a succession of calamities, including the illness of A. P. Hill and the death of Jeb Stuart, put upon General Lee a burden of leadership he never had been compelled to carry before.

During the latter phases of the withdrawal from the Rapidan to the James River, he got up at three o'clock in the morning and worked usually until ten at night. I think at that time he never had more than five hours sleep. Why did he do this? Because he felt the responsibility was his; because he was dedicated to principle; because he was a man of character.

He was critical, too, of the lack of these capabilities in lesser men. When asked why he didn't promote an individual who was magnificent in attack, but between operations was as likely as not drunk in quarters, General Lee said, "I cannot trust with higher command, with command of others, a man who cannot command himself. Discipline of self, as well as of others, is the soul of an army."

Dr. Freeman records that when he was young, he had queried many old soldiers: "What was it about General Lee that you men appreciated most? What was the greatness of Lee?"

That was the equivalent of asking what was the secret of the morale of the Army of Northern Virginia. The answer was, with incredible frequency, and yet according to no pattern or design, "He always looked after his men."

And Lee's lieutenants followed his example. The story is told of General John R. Cooke who commanded a brigade consisting of a North Carolina regiment and an Arkansas regiment at the Battle of Sharpsburg (Antietam) in September 1862. He suddenly found himself with Jackson knocked down on his left. Longstreet forced back on his front, Hill in confusion on his right. And here he was, with two little regiments stuck out as a wedge in the Federal line of attack, faced by superior force on three sides. He put up such a fight that the corps commander sent him a message asking how he could hold his position without help.

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Cooke sent back a reply in language so sulphurous and picturesque that it stands unrivaled to this day. He did not want any help, he said, and by the eternal gods he was going to stay there until every damn Yankee who tried to take his position was burning in hell. That's the sum and substance—suitably sanitized.

Why were Cooke's men loyal to



LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT J. WOOD, Commanding General, United States Army Air Defense Command, included these remarks in an address on "Leadership" at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, England, 4 May 1961.



General Lee, shown here with his famed band of "Lee's Lieutenants," possessed the great qualities of leadership, exemplified them to many of his subordinates.

him? Why didn't they turn and run?

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The secret stemmed from Cooke's care of his men, well illustrated by an incident in the battle of Malvern Hill three months before. His troops were green. They had been out in front that day and were scared to death. They had been caught in a thunder shower. They had been subjected to enfilade from 12-inch shells from a gunboat in the river. That night when they withdrew through the rain to their bivouac they found that General Cooke-he was a colonel then-had ridden ahead and had fires built so they could warm themselves and cook their food. Now that seems trivial enough, doesn't it? But it built morale and loyalty and it paid dividends that day at Sharpsburg when the whole of Lee's line depended for an hour and a half on the resistance offered by Cooke's brigade.

Strategy and Tactics

THE third maxim which Dr. Freeman deduced from his studies he called STRATEGY AND TACTICS. A more meaningful expression today would be professional know-how, because what he sair was "You can't fight yesterday's battle over again tomorrow." What he me at was that you cannot rely on yes-

terday to solve tomorrow, that imagination and flexibility are as essential as dedication and historical study.

It is the disposition of man to approach new war in terms of old. This is inevitable. A man always brings to bear his own experience, but the danger is that the military leader approaching a new conflict generally will think of the first stages of that conflict in terms of the full equipment of the last stage of the war in which he previously had fought.

It used to be said that tactics change every five years, and strategy changes never. That may be true enough, but there is always that border line of what the old writers used to call "grand

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tactics." We should never distain—i.e., discolor or tarnish—the border line between tactics and strategy, and yet we ought never to be so tied to the tactics we employed when we won that we think they are the tactics that are certain always to win.

Look backward for strategical instruction and spiritual inspiration. Look forward and visualize new tactics for new situations.

Cadet Robert E. Lee, at West Point (he ranked second in the class of 1829) lived in the afterglow of the Napoleonic tradition, as did all military students of his day. Lee was reared in that tradition. The military language, engineering books, every text that was used at West Point, was French in its origin.

But mark this: In the 1840's the United States got into a scrap with Mexico. It didn't last very long, but it proved to astute students such as Lee—and Grant who was there, too—that the tactics of Napoleon were no longer applicable. By 1861, Lee was con-

vinced that the war he was about to fight could not be fought according to his West Point textbooks. He realized that in addition to some improvements in weapons, two incalculably valuable changes had occurred: This was the first war where commanders were to have railroads at their command; and it would be the first war in which commanders were to have telegraphic communications.

In this day of scientific and technological revolution, the changes which young men face and the evolving form of battle will require studious application. Time marches on; it never turns backward. You must keep your own professional education in step with the weapons and equipment of the times.

In this process, awareness and application of the three principles of leadership as exemplified by Robert E. Lee and as deduced by a great historian from the study of American military history are indispensable—Study, Character, Professional Know-How.

Generous surrender terms were given to Lee at Appomattox Court House by General Grant, who also possessed the qualities that made a great wartime leader.



Generals and generalship in the Civil War an insight into the

Impact of Leadership on Planning and Strategy



From standpoint of leadership, it was primarily a professional's war. Sheridan at left and Custer at right are typical of those who rose to prominence during war.

T. Harry Williams

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NE of Abraham Lincoln's more bitter jests was about a brigadier general who had got himself captured along with some horses and mules. "I don't care so much about brigadiers," the Commander in Chief was reported to have said. "I can make them. But horses and mules cost money."

Lincoln may have meant the remark

to be only a humorous reflection on the situation or he may have made it in a moment of passing irritation with an incompetent officer. But more probably he was uttering some kind of verdict on the quality of Civil War generalship.

There is an undertone to the comment that suggests more than a laugh.

Lincoln, of course, was not the only personality in the Civil War who permitted himself the luxury of gibing at generals. Thus Assistant Secretary of War Watson once advised another official: "Be as patient as possible with the Generals; some of them will trouble you more than they will the enemy."

Jefferson Davis is not on record as having voiced any jest on the subject—it would have been alien to his character—but his criticisms of generals with whom he disagreed were more violent than anything said by Lincoln.

A large part of all this firing at the qualities of the military leadership of the war, even when emanating from such eminent characters as Lincoln and Davis, has to be discounted. Jumping on generals is an old and honored sport and has been practiced by high and low and perhaps in the democracies more so than in other systems. The people of a popular governmental system are perhaps too prone to find in denunciation of their military leaders an easy escape from the frustrations of war.

And yet it would be a mistake to write off the criticisms of Civil War generals as only the mouthings of ignorant democrats or designing politicians. There has been too much of a tendency in Civil War writing to assume that the military art of the time was something pretty mysterious and technical and that, ergo, the men who practiced it should have been immune from derogation or interference by lesser people, whether they

may have been Presidents, Congressmen, or editors.

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Surprisingly enough, in all the voluminous literature of the war there is relatively little analysis of the qualities of generalship; just what is it that makes a general great or just good-or even bad? Scant attention has been paid to the educational system that produced the Civil War generals, to the sources of their knowledge on such matters as strategy, or to the influences of their regional cultures on their notions of war. Too many writers tend to slice the Civil War off from the nexus of American and world military history and to treat it as an isolated episode. The result has been to lose much of the real picture of the military leadership of the war.

In evaluating this leadership we will do well at the very outset to cast off another tendency of writing about the war-what may be described as the "if" school. Would Joe Johnston have emerged as a great general if he had done something other than he did at Cassville? Would R. E. Lee have won at Gettysburg if he had had 20,000 more men? Would George B. McClellan have captured Richmond if Lincoln had let him have McDowell's corps? Would Stonewall Jackson or W. S. Hancock have been great commanders if they had led armies instead of corps?

These are truly intriguing questions, and it is beneficial as well as interesting to let the mind play on them. But in the process of speculation there are dangers. We may be led



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asive from the events that were realities and the men who were successes.

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is probable that Johnston and McClellan did not succeed because there was something in their temperaments that prevented them from dominating a situation. Jackson and Hancock were fine corps commanders. but we cannot say with certainty that they could have been anything more. Lee could not, under the existing conditions, have had a substantially larger force at Gettysburg than he had. There are enough successful officers and known events in the Civil War to occupy all our attention. We do not have to hunt up might-have-beens or noble failures.

West Point Tutelage

ONE characteristic of the generalship of the war stands out at first sight. This was pre-eminently a professional's or West Pointer's war. In the sixty biggest battles, West Point graduates commanded both armies in fifty-five. In the remaining five a West Pointer commanded one of the opposing armies. It is easy, however, to draw some wrong conclusions from these statistics. They do not mean that the professionals consistently acted with skill while the few amateurs who came to lead armies blundered. Any blunders committed by the amateurs—N. P. Banks, Ben Butler, J. A. McClernand—can be matched by acts of the professionals—Ambrose Burnside, W. S. Rosecrans, Joe Hooker. Nevertheless, it is true that no general from civilian life showed sufficient ability to warrant placing him in a high command post.

It is evident that the education received by the Point graduates gave them a basis of competence that no amateur could make up for in the relatively short period of the war. At the same time it must be noted that by the end of the war the bulk of the subordinate command positions in the armies of both sides—regimental, brigade, and even division commands—were held by men from the civilian life. Indeed, without such men, capable of learning the military art and of exercising the responsibility of com-

Massed charges in close formations were led by officers whose personal bravery and leadership impelled men to follow them into withering enemy fire.





President Lincoln meets with military leaders, who came to understand the political aspects of waging modern warfare.

mand, the Civil War armies could not have operated.

Jomini's Influence

BECAUSE the West Point influence is so dominant in the war, any analysis of the generalship must start with the education served up at the Academy.

Just what notions of war and strategy were presented to the young men who would later lead the Civil War armies? What cultural and intellectual influences had formed their concepts of war?

I have treated this subject elsewhere in some detail—in "The Military Leadership of the North and South" in the Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History at the U. S. Air Force Academy, and in Why the North Won the Civil War (Louisiana State University Press, 1960)—and will but summarize it here.

Essentially, the strategy taught at the Point derived almost completely from the writings of the brilliant Swiss officer who served with Napoleon—Antoine Henri Jomini. In the first half of the nineteenth century Jomini was the writer on the art of war. (Clausewitz was unknown in the United States.)

Every West Pointer in the war had been exposed in some way to Jomini's ideas, either by reading him in translated or abridged versions or by hearing him expounded in the classroom by such American disciples as Dennis Hart Mahan. There is little exaggeration in General J. D. Hittle's remark that "many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini's Summary of the Art of War in the other."

In his writings, Jomini was trying to introduce rationality and system into the study of war. He sought to formulate a set of basic principles for the guidance of commanders, using as his examples the campaigns of Napoleon. He laid down four general principles—many Civil War generals had memorized and could recite them

 but all of them were concerned with the principle of mass or concentration.

Although Jomini talked much of the offensive and the new Napoleonic ways of war, he was in reality an advocate of eighteenth century warfare-leisurely, conducted for limited objectives, and emphasizing maneuver rather than battle. He stressed places instead of enemy armies as objectives, and deplored the destructiveness of the warfare of his time.

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Actually, Jomini, while affecting to look forward, set military thought backward. At least, this was the effect he would have to American military men, although it is possible some Americans carried his ideas farther than he intended.

For a combination of reasons, all of which cannot be accurately charted, professional soldiers in the United States, and for that matter in Europe too, found the Jominian presentation attractive. There was something humane and rational about it that appealed to the nineteenth century mind. It appealed to the soldiers for the additional reason, we may suspect, that it seemed comfortable and secure. Why this should be so, why the concepts of an earlier age should be so fashionable at the time when the Industrial Revolution and the democratization of government were about to transform the nature of war-to make it more total and terrible-we cannot with certainty say.

It is not enough to ascribe the military attitude to the traditional conservatism of military men. The probable explanation is that in this period the military profession for some reason and in some way was insulated and isolated from the mainstream of American culture. Certainly it is of great significance that officers who had come into the army from the world of business, where they had held high executive positions, could compare generals like Grant and Sheridan, with their driving, ruthless zeal for success,

only to businessmen.

This ruthless zeal for victory was not noticeable with many of the generals who had starring roles in the first half of the war. Civilian critics of such generals as McClellan or D. C. Buell or H. W. Halleck complained that these men did not have "their hearts in the war," meaning that they had a secret sympathy for slavery. The critics were right for the wrong reason. The generals were unaggressive, halting, slow, but not because they had any feeling for the South. They acted the way they did because they were the victims of Jominian thought.


They conceived of war as bloodless strategy, as a series of maneuvers. Buell once said that it should be possible to conduct an entire campaign without fighting a single big battle. McClellan boasted that his brightest accomplishments were the occupations of Manassas and Yorktown, both accomplished without loss of life.

Again reflecting a Jominian influence, most of the early generals manifested no understanding that there was a relation between war and politics, that wars were waged to achieve political objectives of the state. They acted as though war was a kind of game, an exercise to be carried on by professionals without any relation to the society which the army represented. This attitude was present with many generals but was most strikingly exemplified in McClellan, who seemed to have no realization at all that it was part of his job to counsel with his civil superior, President Lincoln.

Southern Aspects

IT IS apparent that heretofore we have been talking about Northern generals. Immediately the thought occurs: Were the Southern generals different? Had they freed themselves from traditional doctrine? The answer is no. If anything, the Southern soldiers were more conservative than their Northern counterparts.

We see the most frequent, and the



"It was relatively easy for Lincoln and Grant (here meeting with his staff) to grasp new methods of war, install centralism in the Northern war effort."

most brilliant, demonstrations of Jomini's principle of concentration in the campaigns of Southern generals and particularly in the battles of Lee and Jackson. But Southern application of Jominian dogma took a particular turn. Whereas the Federals took from Jomini the objective of places, the Confederates took that of the offensive. And they were fortunate in that their government's policy did not contemplate the acquisition of enemy territory; hence they could direct their blows at enemy armies.

But Confederate generalship never grew beyond the original limits of traditional dogma. Southern generals developed no new ways of war. The best of them were good within their limits at the beginning of the war. They were good at the end, but still within the same limits.

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The North, on the other hand, after some terrible blunders, finally brought forward, notably in the persons of Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, men who burst the confines of traditionalism, who developed new ways of war, who realized, as the finest of the Southern generals never did, that there was a connection between war and politics.

Jominian strategical concept stressed destruction of places rather than armies.



Why this difference in development? The answer must lie in the cultures of the two peoples. We should never forget Clausewitz's dictum that the kind of war a nation fights will reflect its social system. The North was a modern society, looking to the future, capable of change, and supported by the principle of centralism. The South was a conservative society, looking to the past, resistant to change, and handicapped in a modern war by the concept of localism.

Inevitably the systems of the two societies influenced the way they made war and the way their civil and military leaders thought about war. It was relatively easy for Lincoln and Grant to grasp new methods of war, to install centralism in the Northern war effort. It was difficult if not impossible for Davis and Lee to do the same thing for the South.

All of this is not to contend that the one factor of a particular doctrine determined the qualities of Civil War generalship or controlled the outcome of the war. Many factors, some of

them purely personal, formed the pattern of generalship, and many factors, some of them as impersonal as economics, decided the outcome of the war. Nor is it meant to suggest that a knowledge of doctrine and military history is not desirable in an officer corps at any time.

But it is suggested here that the importance of the whole educational and cultural backgrounds of the Civil War generals has been neglected in evaluations of what they were like. It has been assumed that in 1861 they came from nowhere, so to speak, and began fighting.

If there is a lesson here, it is that military history must be related to all history. And if there is a lesson about the value of a knowledge of theory, it is in the words of U. S. Grant, who could toss off a pretty good maxim himself when he wanted to. Admitting that doctrine had value, Grant warned that soldiers must not become slaves to it: "War is progressive, because all the instruments and elements of war are progressive."

Seated on pews from a ruined church, Union officers hold council of war to plan a new move in May 1864.

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
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
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STRATEGY of the Civil War has been less clearly understood than, say, that of World War II. Before 1942 the Axis, and after 1942 the Allies, devised complicated plans and then executed them, so that the course of events followed directly from an intellectual process.

It was not always so in the Civil War. The relationship of strategic ideas to events does not become wholly clear until 1864, although in the earlier years there was more correlation between ideas and events than has met the eyes of some writers.

Four major factors explain the divergence between strategy and events.

 First, the valiant and skillful Confederates frequently frustrated the best-laid plans of Union leaders.

 Second, the scope of the war was not immediately foreseen by anyone save perhaps the aged but brilliant Lt.
 Gen. Winfield Scott, so that early strategic concepts tended to stop with the capture of Richmond. an

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
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• Third, in the absence of a modern general staff, no formal administrative machinery for strategic planning existed anywhere in the United States government. Planning was ad hoc.

 Fourth, although President Lincoln soon foresaw the massive operations that victory required, execution of strategy depended on raising and training large armies, building or acquiring a large number of warships



Union Strategy...

and manning them, and upon the character, intellect, and military prowess of the high commanders. Lincoln's strategy could not be carried out until he had found a general with the ability to command all the armies of the Union successfully.

Basic to Union strategy was Confederate geography. As long as the Confederacy intended to fight a defensive war, Northern geography was largely irrelevant except as it influenced routes of approach and intertheater movements. As strategy unfolded, operations of the United States Army and Navy were directed toward blockade of the coastline, seizure of ports, control of or destruction of railways, control of waterways that

led into the Confederacy, and destruction of armies.

The 3,550 - mile - long Confederate coast embraced 189 harbors and navigable river mouths. Sealing off such a long and sharply indented stretch of seacoast posed a tremendous problem to the Navy, and constituted its primary mission throughout the war.

Inland, the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountains divided the Confederacy into three major theaters of operation. The Eastern Theater stretched from the mountains to the Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. The Western ran from the mountains to the Mississippi. The Eastern and Western proved to be the decisive theaters. The Trans-Missis-

sippi West was vitally important to both sides, and four years of war saw constant campaigning. But except for drawing off troops which could have been used elsewhere, the fighting west of the Mississippi had no decisive effect on the outcome of the war.

In the Eastern Theater the 100 miles of rolling country that separated the rival capitals of Washington and Richmond tended to complicate the strategic problem. Yet the frequent criticisms of Presidents Lincoln and Davis for showing undue concern for the safety of their capitals are not entirely justified. The prestige value of a capital city is great. Lincoln could hardly persuade foreign powers that the Confederacy was not a nation worthy of recognition as a sovereign power if a Confederate Army captured Washington. And Richmond was politically important as capital of the Confederacy, and militarily important as a railroad center and location of the largest iron works south of the Mason-Dixon Line.

In war potential the Union had tremendous advantages; yet some major advantages, besides its ports and long coast line, lay with the Confederacy. It could win its political independence if the Union did nothing. To maintain the Union, the armies of the United States would be forced to invade the Confederacy and defeat its armies.

That the Union possessed great advantages in manpower and industrial capacity no Confederate denied, but these advantages were believed offset by several factors. First, many able officers joined the Confederate Army.

Second, a higher proportion of the men of the rural Confederacy were familiar with firearms and horses than were those of the Union. But it is easy to overstress this point. Most Union soldiers were either farmers or else trained in other outdoor occupations. It is doubtful that experienced soldiers such as Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee, or Joseph E. Johnston were ever so optimistic as to underestimate their opponents' fighting qualities.

A major miscalculation was the belief entertained by Jefferson Davis that Britain and France might aid the Confederacy by diplomatic recognition or armed intervention. When President Lincoln declared the blockade, Britain and France recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent, but not as a de jure or de facto government, by declaring neutrality. Throughout the war French and British governments respected the blockade, although some individual firms did business with the Confederacy. Napoleon III considered recognition, mediation, and intervention, but would not move without British support. But most leaders of Britain's political parties refused to consider premature recognition, only vaguely considered mediation, and never seriously considered forcible intervention.

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1861—The Beginning

WHEN on a cold and blustery day in March a sober and earnest Abraham Lincoln took his oath to support, protect, and defend the Constitution and execute the laws, seven states had passed Ordinances of Secession. A



DR. JOHN MILLER, ir., Deputy Chief Historian, Office of the Chief of Military History, is author of Guadalcanal: The First Offensive and CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul in the OCMH series, "The U.S. Army in World War II." He is co-author of the OCMH publication, Korea 1951-1953 and contributed five chapters including those on the Civil War to Department of the Army ROTC Manual 145-20, American Military History, 1607-1958 (Government Printing Office, 1959).

p ovisional Confederate government, established under Jefferson Davis at Montgomery, Alabama, had seized all important federal property except Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor and Fort Pickens near Pensacola, Florida. Sumter's supplies were running low, and it was menaced by a growing Confederate force in Charleston. Further, Davis had called for 100,000 volunteer soldiers to serve for one year.

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Lincoln was determined to protect Federal property; he also was determined to avoid war with the seceded states and to avoid antagonizing the eight slave states—Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas—which were still in the Union.

When President Lincoln sent an expedition to succor Fort Sumter, the Confederates began bombarding the fort on 12 April and forced its surrender. Meanwhile, Fort Pickens was

successfully reinforced.

President Lincoln acted at once. On 15 April he called upon the governors of the loyal states to furnish 75,000 militiamen for three months, the length of time fixed by the Militia Act of 1795. The response was so enthusiastic that services of nearly 100,000 men were offered. On the other hand, Kentucky refused and the call for militia triggered Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas into joining the Confederacy.

With war practically inevitable, President Lincoln undertook several drastic steps to get ready. He called a special session of the Congress for 4 July, established 40 regiments of Volunteers, and increased the Regular

Army and Navy.

To strangle the Confederacy, Lincoln on 19 April declared the entire coast from South Carolina to Texas under blockade. When Virginia and North Carolina seceded, he extended the blockade to their coasts as well.


By May, with both sides making ready to fight, no comprehensive

strategic plans had yet been prepared. But General in Chief Scott had a clear concept for victory. He recommended that time be taken to train an army, and that the Southern coastline be blockaded in order to strangle the South economically. The army should advance down the Mississippi to divide and conquer the Confederacy. The old general emphasized that this would in all probability take several years. This plan to squeeze and strangle the South was promptly dubbed the "Anaconda Plan" by the press.

First Land Operations. The well known, but exaggerated, Union reverse at Bull Run (Manassas) in July 1861 came about only partly in fulfillment of strategic plans. The strategic objective was destruction of the Confederate force at Manassas which protected the land approaches to Richmond. In addition, President Lincoln was eager to use the militiamen before their three-months terms expired, and both he and Scott were misled by faulty estimates which indicated that the Confederates were about to attack Washington, The Union soldiers advanced from Washington, but the Confederates skillfully transferred troops from the Shenandoah Valley by rail to Manassas in time to turn back the Union assaults. Bull Run, a drawn battle at Wilson's Creek, Missouri, and some small but heartening victories in what became West Virginia were the only significant ground operations in 1861.

After Bull Run, command of the forces around Washington was entrusted to a dashing, dapper young general named George B. McClellan who had just won some cheering victories in West Virginia. Scott, too infirm to take active command, retired in the autumn. Lincoln replaced him as General in Chief with McClellan, who also retained his command of the Army of the Potomac.

Blockade and Amphibious Operations. Strategically, the most impor-



Successive stages in strategy of war are graphically demonstrated. Mississippi River was opened to split South, coast was blockaded, western armies pushed eastward, Sherman cut off Lee's supply lines by march to sea, Grant pushed on Richmond.

tant contributions to victory in 1861 were made by the naval blockading squadrons, and by joint Army-Navy expeditions which seized ports on the Atlantic coast as bases for the blockading squadrons. The U. S. Navy, although it fought some engagements, never had to batter a Confederate fleet into submission in order to command the sea. Its task was to exercise control of the sea it already possessed.

When the war began, the U. S. Navy possessed 90 warships, some ready, others in various stages of completion, in addition to eight Navy Yards. In April, withdrawing Union forces burned the Norfolk Navy Yard but the Confederates managed to put out the fire and salvage the remains of the *Merrimac* as well as more than a thousand cannon.

When Lincoln declared the blockade in April 1861 there were far from enough warships to blockade 3,550 miles of seacoast, but many more

ships, including iron-clads, were to be provided by new construction in Navy Yards and river boat yards inland. tl

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By December 1861 the U. S. Navy numbered 264 vessels. More than 200 vessels were assigned to the blockade during the first year of war, but light, swift blockade runners kept slipping through. How many did, and how much they carried, is not known, but the Union Navy captured 150 in 1861, and its total bag for the four years of war reached nearly 1,500. But the only sure way to seal off the South was to combine blockade with capture of the ports themselves.

1862—Promise and Frustration

McCLELLAN drilled and trained the Army of the Potomac in the vicinity of Washington but undertook no offensive action. The harassed Lincoln, growing impatient, issued his famous General War Order Number 1 on 27 January 1862. In it he directed the land and sea forces to conduct a general movement against the enemy on Washington's Birthday, 22 February 1862.

Whole bottles of ink have been used by Lincoln's critics in scoffing at this order. He is criticized for issuing orders at all, as though the Constitutional provision which specifies that the President shall be Commander in Chief of the armed forces does not really mean what it says. He is also criticized for issuing an order for an offensive several weeks in advance without considering the state of the weather and the roads.

But there is another side. As Department of the Army ROTC Manual 145-20 puts it,

... the modern student, who takes in his stride the massive advance planning that characterized World Wars I and II, will not think a directive calling for future operations is unusual, although issuance of tactical orders is not normally a function exercised by the President. If the President had had a modern staff officer to advise him, he probably would have ordered the General in Chief to advance 'at a time and a date to be announced later' and specified that 'D-day for planning purposes will be 22 February 1862.'


Lincoln doubtless issued the order to get McClellan in action. This order, and part of a letter he had written to Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell a few days before, show that Lincoln had grasped the key to victory: . . . I state my general view of this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail, unless we can find some way of making our advantage an over-match for his; and that this can be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points, at the same time; so that we safely attack one, or both, if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize, and hold the weakened one, gaining so much.

In this way the Union could bring its superior strength to bear through coordinated attacks that would wear down the Confederate armies and thus win the war. But the precise operations by which this concept could be carried out had not yet been fully developed, nor was the supreme commander with sufficient ability yet available for high command.

River Campaigns. The main Union armies west of the Appalachians were organized into two commands. The first was under General Buell and included Kentucky and the strongly pro-Unionist but Confederate-occupied eastern Tennessee. The second, under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, embraced Missouri and Arkansas.

The great rivers—the Ohio, Tennessee, Cumberland, and Mississippi—provided the best and most permanent lines of communication. Thus the Navy Department, in 1861, had started buying and building gunboats and mortar boats to create river forces that

Any hopes of compromise faded when firing started on Fort Sumter. Interior of fort is shown in artist sketch.



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A beardless Lincoln presides over a council of war at White House, 1861.



Direction of Civil War armies emanated from the old War Department building.

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would defeat Confederate forces, give fire support to Union troops ashore, and transport and supply them.

Facing Buell and Halleck on land were Confederate troops under General Albert Sidney Johnston whose mission was to hold the rivers, defend Tennessee, and if possible keep the Union troops out of Kentucky. Johnston's forces had built a line of forts and camps extending from Cumberland Gap in western Virginia through Bowling Green, Kentucky, to New Madrid, Missouri, and Island Number 10 in the Mississippi River. Rivers and railways formed Johnston's main lines of communications in winter, as the roads were just muddy tracks. Two strong positions-Forts Henry and Donelson—protected a lateral railroad as it crossed the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers where they flow northward almost parallel to each other, and about ten miles apart.

Group of Union soldiers guards a ponton bridge over an approach at Bull Run.

The sour-faced Halleck-known as "Old Brains," a master of the theory and literature of warfare-in early 1862 launched the great campaign that had as its strategic objective the reclaiming of Tennessee, reopening of the Mississippi, and splitting of the Confederacy, by attacking the center of Johnston's long, vulnerable line. Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson in February by Ulysses S. Grant's army forces and Comdr. Andrew H. Foote's river craft, coupled with Buell's advance toward Bowling Green, cracked the Confederates' line and freed Kentucky and much of Tennessee. Johnston withdrew up the Tennessee River to Corinth, Mississippi,

President Lincoln, naturally elated at the recent successes in the west, on 11 March unified command of all army forces west of middle Tennessee and gave the command to Halleck, placing more than 100,000 men under

Retreating Federals burned fleet as Confederates seized Norfolk Navy Yard.







Yorktown, Virginia, served as jumping off area for Peninsular Campaign.



Headquarters of General Magruder, defending Yorktown, lay in ruins.

has direction. These were organized into four armies: Brig. Gen. Samuel Curtis' Army of the Southwest in Missouri and Arkansas; Grant's Army of the Tennessee; Buell's Army of the Ohio; and Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of the Mississippi.

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
Halleck sent Pope, supported by most of Foote's gunboats, against New Madrid and Island Number 10 to begin the opening of the Mississippi River while he concentrated Buell's and Grant's armies and advanced up the Tennessee against Johnston in Corinth. The Army of the Tennessee moved up the river to Pittsburg Landing near a little country chapel called Shiloh Church about 22 miles from Corinth. Buell meanwhile moved from Kentucky to Savannah, Tennessee, about 10 road miles from Pittsburg Landing.

Johnston meanwhile slipped secretly through the forests from Corinth to Shiloh and launched a surprise attack on the morning of 6 April. (He was mortally wounded and replaced by General Pierre G. T. Beauregard.) As the day ended Buell's army began arriving from Savannah; next morning Grant counterattacked and Beauregard pulled back to Corinth.

Shiloh was the largest battle of the Civil War up to now; indeed, it was the biggest and bloodiest battle fought in North America up to 1862. The casualty rate was shocking. The 63,000 Union troops lost 13,000; the 40,000 Confederates, 11,000. As Grant retained the field and Beauregard withdrew, Shiloh was a strategic and tactical victory for the Union.

While Grant and Buell had been moving south, Pope and Foote were attacking Island Number 10 in the Mississippi near Tennessee's northwest corner, New Madrid having fallen to Pope on 14 March. Pope forced the surrender of Island Number 10 on 7

Although Federals failed to take Fredericksburg, the town was wrecked.









Intricate defenses studded with strong forts, as Fort Totten, ringed Washington.



Key strategical spot in Lee's first invasion of North was Harpers Ferry.

April, the same day that Grant regained his lost ground at Shiloh.

Making Grant his second in command, Halleck now took over the armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio in person. He launched an offensive aimed at destruction of Beauregard's army, which was the main Confederate force between the Appalachians and the Mississippi. Remembering Shiloh, he carefully entrenched every night; his great host moved slowly; the Confederates delayed skillfully. It was 30 May before Halleck got to Corinth, and Beauregard had pulled out.

Opening the Mississippi. Meanwhile the high command in Washington had prepared to capture New Orleans, the Confederacy's greatest port, by sending an expedition up river from the Gulf. Starting 16 April, a fleet under Capt. David Glasgow Farragut bombarded Confederate forts, cracked a great boom that stretched across the river, defeated a Confederate flotilla of gunboats and rams in a wild melee, and silenced land batteries nearby. By 25 April he had worked his way upriver to New Orleans. Soldiers under Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler took over on the 26th.

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
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Many and powerful were the effects of this bold stroke. The Confederacy lost one of its greatest and wealthiest port cities. Nearly all the Mississippi River was now open to the Union, and an adequate base had been gained to continue naval operations upriver.


Farragut moved up to Vicksburg in May but could do little against its 26 guns situated on a bluff 250 feet above the river. But on 28 June the dauntless sailor ran past the batteries to make contact with the Union gunboats which had come down river. The Union now controlled all the Mississippi except the 150-mile stretch between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Louisiana, near the

Bloodiest battle of war to that date was fought at Shiloh chapel, 6 April 1862.









Heavy mortars, such as these at Yorktown, hurled a tremendous weight.



Cavalry usually dismounted to fight but sometimes charged in European fashion.

mouth of the Red River.

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Fighting in 1862 was not over in the Western Theater. A Confederate counteroffensive in the fall, resulting in the battles of Perryville, Kentucky, in October, and Murfreesboro (Stone River) on the last day of the year, partly undid the earlier work of Halleck and Grant. Eastern Tennessee, though containing many pro-Unionist elements, was still in Confederate hands. But Missouri, Kentucky, western Tennessee, and New Orleans were in Union hands, and the Union controlled 600 miles of the Mississippi River. The Confederates still controlled rail and water communications to Texas, and thus could still get beef, mutton, cereals, and men over the river to their armies, as well as some foreign munitions through Mexico.

Amphibious Action and Blockade. Just as the victories at Henry, Donelson, Island Number 10, and New Orleans had cheered the Union, so did a series of amphibious operations under Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside and Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough, who seized Roanoke Island and gained control of Albemarle Sound and tributary waters which penetrated deeply into North Carolina.

Naval forces took Amelia Island and Jacksonville, Florida, and reoccupied Pensacola. These operations gave the Union virtual control of the Atlantic seaboard, and together with Farragut's seizure of New Orleans, helped partially seal the Gulf coast to blockade runners. By mid-year however, blockade-running was being conducted as quickly as fast, low ships could be built abroad. Nearly 200 were now in service. But they could not carry much cargo, and much of what they did carry included luxury items to be sold to civilians at enormous prices, rather than munitions.

From spot overlooking Antietam battlefield, artist sketched charging troops. Later a photographer took picture of results of assault by Hooker's division.







Accurate, devastating artillery fire was brought to great intensity by both sides.




Behind wall at Marye's Heights, Confederates withstood fierce charges.

Virginia and Maryland Campaigns. The heartening victories in the West and on the Carolina and Florida coasts were not matched by decisive gains in the Eastern Theater, although 1862 saw bloody campaigns, all of which ended in frustration for the Union. The first of these campaigns were fought in Virginia.

McClellan, then General in Chief and also Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac, prepared plans in early 1862 in accordance with President Lincoln's General War Order Number One. These tended to be directed toward capture of Richmond rather than the destruction of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan urged moving the Army of the Potomac by water to Urbana on the Rappahanock, from there to drive against Richmond before Johnston could move from Manassas to stop him. McClellan ar-

Strategic objective of First Battle of Bull Run was destruction of Confederate forces guarding approaches to Richmond.



gued that the Washington fortifications would adequately protect the capital while the army was gone, while Lincoln favored an overland advance against Richmond which would always keep the Army of the Potomac between the Confederates and Washington. Johnston meanwhile abandoned Manassas and withdrew to Fredericksburg, about midway between the two capitals, and squarely athwart the route from Urbana to Richmond.

On 11 March, when McClellan marched his army out to the abandoned camp at Manassas to give it field experience, Lincoln relieved him of his duties as General in Chief, doubtless because he could not adequately command an army in the field and at the same time exercise strategic direction over all armies of the United States, Lincoln and Edwin McM. Stanton, who had become Secretary of War in January, took over the functions of General in Chief themselves. To advise them they appointed an Army Board, which included the heads of the War Department Bureaus under chairmanship of the elderly Maj. Gen. Ethan A. Hitchcock.

McClellan now advocated another seaborne campaign, this time by water to Fort Monroe, which Union troops had continued to hold, at the tip of the peninsula between the York and the James Rivers. This would be followed by an overland march to Richmond. The President, while not heart-

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Pickett's famous charge at Gettysburg is termed Confederacy "highwater mark."



A cavalry column crosses the Rappahannock to attack Confederate stronghold.

ily in favor of the Peninsular plan, approved it with the understanding that McClelland leave enough men to protect Washington and continue to hold Manassas.


But before wooden ships could be risked on the Virginia rivers, the Merrimac had to be disposed of. The Confederates had salvaged her at Norfolk. renamed her the Virginia, cut her down to the waterline, built a wooden citadel covered by iron plates and slanted inwards like the river gunboats, and installed ten heavy guns. In New York John Ericsson was hurriedly building the Monitor, a low, flat, almost wholly unseaworthy craft. She sailed with decks awash, and only her revolving turret, with its two 11inch guns, and pilothouse were above water. Neither armor nor the revolving turret was new, but the impending clash would be the first between two armored warships.

The wooden Federal warships that were blockading off Norfolk and Newport News proved exceptionally vulnerable when the *Virginia* sortied on 8 March; she sank two with gunfire and ram, and ran a third aground inshore. Union guns, though registering numerous hits, inflicted little damage.

In a climax which in fiction would be regarded as artificially contrived, the *Monitor* arrived from New York the next day after a gruelling passage. For four hours on the morning of 9 March the two iron clads fought each other without giving or receiving significant damage. The *Virginia* then returned to Norfolk for repairs. (She never came out again, and when the Confederates later abandoned Norfolk they destroyed her.) With the threat to the local blockade thus neutralized, the Union could proceed with the Peninsular campaign, but was compelled to operate on the north side of the Peninsula with the York River as a line of communications as long as the *Virginia* remained a threat.

By 4 April the leading elements of McClellan's army had landed and moved against the Confederate garrison at Yorktown. But on 3 April the Washington defense commander reported his strength insufficient to protect Washington. McClellan, in listing forces he had left behind, had counted some men twice, included some troops in Pennsylvania that were not his, and assumed, but only im-

The strange craft Monitor engaged Merrimac, revolutionizing naval warfare.





Valiant efforts by Burnside's engineers to bridge river at Fredericksburg came to nought as entrenched Confederates repulsed efforts to assault across water barrier.

plicitly, that Federal troops in the Shenandoah Valley were also covering Washington. Further, Maj. Gen. Thomas Jonathan ("Stonewall") Jackson had begun offensive operations in the Valley. Lincoln therefore directed Stanton to hold at Alexandria one of two corps then making ready for the Peninsula.

On 13 March Jackson had attacked Federal troops at Kernstown and was defeated. This move called attention to Jackson's threat to Harpers Ferry, and to a possible threat to Washington. Lincoln and Stanton thereupon devised plans to trap and destroy Jackson. They failed. Union forces were not under a unified command; some marched too slowly; orders were not strictly obeyed; and the President and Secretary did not always consider time and distance factors. Further, the elusive and capable Stonewall Jackson combined rapid movement, surprise, deception, and hard fighting to march the length of the valley 2½ times from 23 March to 9 June, and to fight six battles, five of which he won.

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Jackson's valley campaign also resulted in further detachments from the Peninsula. When Johnston hurried his army overland from Fredericksburg to the Peninsula to intercept McClellan, Lincoln sent Maj. Gen. Irwin A. Mc-Dowell with 40,000 men overland to Fredericksburg. He reached there on 14 May, whereupon McClellan asked Lincoln to send this force by water to join him on the Peninsula. Lincoln acceded in part; he told McDowell to move overland and cooperate with McClellan. As McDowell was about to move on 25 May, Lincoln ordered half his force to the Valley in the effort to destroy Stonewall Jackson. McDowell's troops got there too late to be effective.

McClellan's advance up the Peninsula, begun on 4 April, was slow and laborious. Altogether about 155,000

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Union troops were committed against 95.481 Confederates, but McClellan consistently overestimated his opponents' strength and moved with extreme caution. The terrain was tangled and swampy; the roads were but muddy tracks. Heavy rains washed out most of the bridges McClellan built and weakened the others. Fighting was hard. In the major battles-Williamsburg. Fair Oaks (Seven Pines). Mechanicsville. Gaines' Mill. Savage Station, Frayser's Farm, and Malvern Hill, plus innumerable unrecorded patrol actions and skirmishes —the Union troops suffered 15,849 casualties; the Confederates, who did most of the attacking, lost 20,614. McClellan on 25 May was within sight of Richmond, but fell back.

The Peninsular Campaign was notable for the armies' improvement in training and discipline as compared with Bull Run. Union artillery was grimly efficient, as was the muzzle-loading, single-shot rifle, so that frontal assaults against prepared positions usu-

ally ended in bloody failure.

Johnston had suffered a severe wound on 31 May and was replaced by General Robert E. Lee, who ordered Jackson out of the Valley to join him on the Peninsula with all possible speed. But even the great names of Lee and Jackson did not guarantee smooth operations. None of the commanders' staffs on either side was able to throw a whole army into a coordinated attack. Timing was off;

units were slow; battles tended to be conducted by corps commanders.

By 3 July McClellan with nearly 100,000 men was holding a strong defensive position at Harrison's Landing on the James River (the Virginia had been destroyed), while Lee's exhausted army pulled back to defensive positions in front of Richmond. At the same time the Union 45,000-man Army of Virginia was occupying portions of western Virginia. Lincoln had consolidated all forces there under Pope, the victor of New Madrid and Island Number 10, and first directed him to threaten the Confederates in the Valley. When Jackson went to the Peninsula, Lincoln ordered Pope to advance up the Shenandoah Valley and turn east against Richmond. This was the general situation in July 1862 when President Lincoln, abandoning personal command, named Henry Halleck as General in Chief. In this capacity he did not exercise field command in person, but acted more as military adviser to President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton.

The first question facing Halleck was disposition of the forces on the Peninsula, an unhealthful area where the sick rate was high. McClellan, urging another crack at Richmond, meanwhile continued to over-estimate Confederate strength by about 100 percent. (Actually, McClellan's and Pope's armies vastly outnumbered Lee's, and a coordinated attack might have bottled up Lee in Richmond, to end the

Shortly after Lincoln visited McClellan in field near Antietam, President issued Emancipation Proclamation.





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offensive power of the Army of Northern Virginia.) Lincoln and Halleck decided their forces were too dispersed. On 3 August Halleck ordered McClellan to withdraw by water from Harrison's Landing to Acquia Creek on the Potomac, and to join Pope near Fredericksburg. Embarkation began on 14 August.

Lee and Jackson had not been exactly spectacular on the Peninsula, but now they showed their skill. Before Pope and McClellan could concentrate, they maneuvered brilliantly and, together with Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, severely defeated Pope's Army of Virginia in the Second Manassas Campaign in July and August. In consequence they forced Pope's army back to Washington before the Army of the Potomac could bring its crushing weight to bear. Lincoln sent Pope off to Minnesota. Units of the Army of Virginia were assigned to McClellan, who took over all forces in the

area of the Nation's capital.

Up to autumn of 1862, Confederate strategy had been mainly defensive, aimed at holding the entire area of the Confederacy. But now Davis and Lee resolved to invade the North. Several factors governed this decision. It was believed that a successful invasion would win advocates to the peace party in the Union, and would find adherents among Northern sympathizers. Maryland was expected to secede. Davis and Lee also hoped that invasion might induce Britain and France to recognize the Confederacy, and perhaps intervene forcibly to break the blockade.

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Militarily, such a march northward through Maryland would threaten Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, and would probably present an opportunity to defeat or destroy the Army of the Potomac. Thus Lee did not halt after Manassas, but with 55,000 effectives crossed the Potomac

near Leesburg on 4 September. He divided his army, sending Jackson to seize Harpers Ferry while the main body crossed South Mountain en route to Hagerstown.

McClellan followed, and by a stroke of luck obtained a lost order of Lee's which gave his dispositions, strength, and intentions. But McClellan moved too slowly to defeat Lee's units in detail. He attacked in a series of assaults on 17 September at Antietam Creek near Sharpsburg, but Lee had managed to concentrate in time and held his ground. In this bloody encounter the Army of the Potomac lost 13,000 killed, wounded, and missing out of 70,000 engaged; Lee lost 8,000 out of 40,000. Like its predecessors, Antietam also indicated tactically that the defense was much stronger than the offensive, although none of the tactical leaders seems to have taken that lesson immediately to heart.

Antietam affected many more people than the survivors of McClellan's assaults. The effect was Lincoln's announcement of impending emancipation of Negro slaves in the Confederate states. He had earlier stated that the war was being fought to save the Union and not to free the slaves, and had overruled several generals who were premature emancipators. But now, on 22 September, desiring to weaken the economies of the rebellious states and to appeal to antislavery sentiment abroad as well as at home, he issued the Emancipation Proclamation. This move anticipated the economic and psychological warfare of the Twentieth Century.

Lincoln now decided to dispense with McClellan's services and gave command of the Army of the Potomac to Burnside on 7 November. Burnside resolved to march rapidly to cross the Rappahannock at Frederickshurg on ponton bridges before Lee could get there, and then advance along the railway line toward Richmond. Such a move by the Army of the Potomac—120,000 strong—would

cut Lee off from his main base.

Burnside's advance elements reached the north bank of the Rappahannock on 17 November, well ahead of Lee. But a long series of minor failures delayed the pontons, and Lee moved his army to high ground on the south bank of the river behind Fredericksburg before Burnside could cross. Lee's positions were strong, but Burnside attacked anyway on 13 December and was beaten back with the loss of 12,-600 to Lee's 5,300 casualties. His army then withdrew to winter quarters on the north bank of the Rappahannock.

Thus 1862, which saw impressive victories in the West and successes along the coast, ended in bitter frustration in the Eastern Theater. Ten full-scale and very costly battles had been fought, but no decisive result had yet been attained.

1863-Turning the Tide

Vicksburg and Port Hudson, President Lincoln regarded opening the Mississippi as the most important of all Union operations. When he made Halleck General in Chief, he did not name a new commander for all the western armies. Grant remained directly under the General in Chief, in command of the District of West Tennessee. In the fall of 1862 he threw himself with his customary vigor into a joint Army-Navy offensive against Vicksburg in order to open the Mississippi. Rear Adm. David D. Porter now commanded the naval forces supporting Grant. Halleck ordered Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, who had replaced Butler in New Orleans, to open the Mississippi by advancing northward jointly with Farragut. The offensives against the Vicksburg-Port Hudson complex thus developed into a double envelopment by joint forces.

Grant sent a land and water expedition under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman against Vicksburg in December 1862, but by January the Confederates had cut the line of communications and repulsed Sherman. Grant there-

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General Grant and group of officers look over rugged terrain at Lookout Mountain, newly seized in a fierce battle above the clouds.

upon determined to lead a campaign down the river in person. Reinforcements during the ensuing months brought his total strength to 75,000 and his command was redesignated the Army of the Tennessee. Opposed were some 30,000 Confederates under Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton in the Vicksburg area, while Johnston, supreme Confederate commander in the Western Theater, was concentrating additional troops at Jackson about 40 miles east of Vicksburg.

Vicksburg on its bluff was almost perfectly situated for defense. Confederate guns dominated the Mississippi which bent in a great horseshoe. A gloomy stretch of swamps and streams rendered the town almost invulnerable from north and south. The only good approach route lay to the east along the railroad and highway, and here an attacking force would be operating between two Confederate forces. The determined Grant tried to dig canals to by-pass the Confederate

batteries at Vicksburg so the troops could safely sail to dry ground on the east bank of the river south of the swamp. All these attempts failed. re
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Grant and Porter now tried a new tack. With spring rains about to lessen, overland movement became easier. While Sherman demonstrated above Vicksburg, Grant moved his main body southward along the west bank of the Mississippi. On the nights of 16-17 and 22 April, Porter's river fleet of gunboats and transports slipped past the batteries. Porter and Grant crossed the Mississippi on 25 April without opposition.

Grant then abandoned his line of communications, struck out overland to cut Pemberton's line of communications. He drove the Confederates out of Jackson and then, leaving Sherman to deal with Johnston, swung his army westward against Vicksburg on 18 and 22 May but the Confederates repulsed every attack. Grant then set to work to besiege the town, which sur-

rendered on Independence Day. Since 1 May Grant had lost 9,362 men—1,514 killed, 7,395 wounded, and 453 captured or missing—or less than McClellan had suffered at Antietam. Port Hudson surrendered the next day to Banks. In Lincoln's phrase, the Father of Waters could now flow unvexed to the sea.

The results of these campaigns were impressive. Indeed, Grant's bold campaign against Vicksburg, a model of military efficiency, was probably the most decisive single land campaign of the entire war. The Confederacy was now sliced in two.

Virginia and Pennsylvania Campaigns. As in 1862, Eastern campaigns were arduous and bloody but less conclusive than those of the west. With Burnside's Army of the Potomac on the north bank of the Rappahannock, Lee's main body held Fredericksburg. The unhappy Burnside was replaced as army commander on 25 January by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, who had won an enviable reputation as a valorous and skillful tactical commander. He prepared a plan to advance up the Rappahannock, cross, and, having maneuvered Lee out of his Fredericksburg defenses, destroy the Army of Northern Virginia.

Hooker began well but faltered in

the presence of the brilliant, skillful Lee. That general, with 60,000 men, used deception, rapid maneuver, and surprise to defeat Hooker's 134,000 in the great battle of Chancellorsville, 27 April-6 May 1863. Hooker fell back across the Rappahannock.

Now the future looked bright for the Confederacy. If 60,000 men could defeat 134,000, surely the Confederate deficiency in manpower was not an absolute deficiency. In early June the Army of Northern Virginia started north through the Shenandoah Valley into Pennsylvania. Hooker suggested that he seize this opportunity to take Richmond. But Lincoln told Hooker that destruction of Lee's army and not capture of a city was his major objective; he ordered him to move north between Lee and Washington and Baltimore, and to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia.

Much advice had reached Lincoln after Chancellorsville, and all to one effect—get rid of Hooker. Lincoln had kept him, saying he would not throw away a gun because it had missed fire once. But when the fiery Hooker lost an argument with Halleck over control of Harpers Ferry, he requested relief and was replaced by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade at 0300, 28 June. Meade went on to win his great de-

On retreat from Gettysburg, Lee destroyed rails to slow pursuit and allow him to recross Potomac into Virginia.



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Contemporary print depicts Union troops in a typical charge of massed riflemen at Second Battle of Bull Run. Action ended in a sweeping Confederate victory.

fensive victory at Gettysburg, a victory which forced Lee to call off the invasion and return to Virginia.

Lincoln was jubilant over the inspiring series of victories—Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Port Hudson—and thought the war could be won right then if Meade pursued resolutely and destroyed the Army of Northern Virginia before it could get over the Potomac. But Meade let Lee pull away from the battlefield almost unmolested, and made only feeble efforts to destroy the battered Army of Northern Virginia as it crossed the flooded river. Nothing more was accomplished east of the mountains that year.

After Gettysburg, with Lee and Meade maneuvering indecisively in Virginia, the West remained the area of decisive accomplishment.

Campaigns in Tennessee. After Vicksburg Grant proposed that he move overland against Mobile. Mobile had earlier been listed as an objective for Banks, but Lincoln had to settle other matters first. He detached some of Grant's troops to Banks who led an expedition into Texas to insure it against possible aggression by Maximilian, Napoleon III's puppet emperor in Mexico.

Meanwhile Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, who now commanded the Army of the Cumberland, began a move in Tennessee. In July he started from Murfreesboro toward Chattanooga, whose strategic location made it one of the Confederacy's most important cities—a natural gateway or invasion route to either Ohio in the North or Atlanta, Savannah, and Richmond in the Confederacy.

After Gettysburg, Davis acceded to a proposal by Longstreet that the West be strengthened. Thus, starting 9 September, Longstreet took 10,000 men and six field artillery batteries by rail from Virginia to Tennessee via Augusta and Atlanta. This round-

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Siege of Petersburg marked beginning of end for hard-pressed Lee, endeavoring to hold on in Richmond.



about route was necessary because Burnside, now commander of the Department of the Ohio, had led a corps to penetrate the Cumberland Gap and drive the Confederates out of Knoxville. Longstreet reached Tennessee on 18 September.

By then Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee River and started southward with his force widely dispersed so as to make use of all the mountain passes. His opponent, General Braxton Bragg, commanding the Army of Ten-

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nessee, in the battle of Chickamauga (18-20 September) hit Rosecrans so hard that the latter retired to Chattanooga. By establishing positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, Bragg bottled Rosecrans up in Chattanooga, where rations and forage quickly ran short.

Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck now decided to reinforce Rosecrans. They detached two corps of 20,000 men from the Army of the Potomac, placed them under Hooker, and swiftly trans-

Battle of Seven Pines was one of series in Peninsular Campaign that brought McClellan into sight of Richmond, only to be pushed back by brilliant Lee.



ferred them by rail to Tennessee. Lincoln had lost confidence in Rosecrans. He appointed Grant commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi, which stretched over the whole region from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi, but excluded Banks' Gulf Department.

Hooker arrived, cleared the Confederates from the line of communications, and enabled Grant to resume regular supply shipments into Chattanooga. The opening of the Mississippi had freed the Army of the Tennessee for operations farther east. Sherman brought that force to Chattanooga to give Grant a total strength of 60,000 men against Bragg's 40,000.

Starting 24 November, Grant attacked and drove Bragg's forces from Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Bragg retreated, Longstreet returned to Virginia, and Tennessee was reclaimed for the Union. With Chattanooga secured as a base, the way was open for an invasion of the lower South.

The year 1863 was, in retrospect, a year of decision. The opening of the Mississippi and the victories at Chattanooga were profoundly important, although no decision had yet been reached in the Eastern Theater. But only in hindsight was 1863 decisive. The Confederates were far from admitting defeat, and many battles were yet to be fought.

1864-1865—The Termination

Strategic Plans. Congress revived the grade of lieutenant general in early 1864, and Lincoln decided to overhaul the system of command. He relieved Halleck as General in Chief, gave the post to Grant, and promoted him to lieutenant general. Halleck loyally accepted his demotion and took over a new post, that of Chief of Staff.

Grant decided, on Lincoln's insistence, to establish headquarters in the East, and to accompany Meade's Army of the Potomac in its campaigns against Lee. Halleck remained in Washington and served as liaison with Lincoln and Stanton.

Halleck's post should not be confused with that of the modern Chief of Staff; he did not command the War Department bureaus. They were directly under the exacting, irascible, efficient Secretary Stanton, and their work was coordinated by Stanton and Halleck. Halleck also served as channel of communication between Grant and sixteen field commands other than the Army of the Potomac. He prepared digests of the army commanders' reports and letters so that Grant did not have to spend all his days reading.

Grant assumed his new post in March 1864, when he and President Lincoln worked out strategy for the remainder of the war. In Grant's view, strategic direction of the war up to then had not been sufficiently centralized and effective to coordinate the movements of all the armies and bring the great might of the Union to bear against the Confederacy. The armies had not pulled together, but had acted like a balky team. Lincoln had long wanted to see all Union strength coordinated against the Confederacy, and in Grant he had a trusted commander with ability to do the coordinating.

Grant ordered the Army of the Potomac to advance southward and bring unremitting pressure against Lee, always seeking a chance to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia, but to wear it down by attrition if other methods did not succeed. At the same time Butler, commanding the Army of the James at Fort Monroe, was to advance up the Peninsula, capture Richmond if possible, and block the railroads south of the capital to cut Lee's supply line. Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel would lead a force up the Shenandoah Valley to divert the Confederates and possibly get at Lee's rear. In the West, where Sherman had succeeded to Grant's command, three

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armies were to advance southward from Chattanooga to destroy Johnston's Army of Tennessee.*

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The main outlines of the Lincoln-Grant final plan are clear and simple. As events unfolded, the Army of the Potomac delivered a holding attack which pinned Lee to Virginia while Sherman made a vast swinging movement which enveloped the entire southeastern Confederacy.

May-December Campaigns. Sherman's and Meade's great armies advanced simultaneously southward on 4 May 1864. The Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and tried to envelop Lee's east flank while Butler went for his line of communications. But Lee attacked the Army of the Potomac with ferocity in the Battle of the Wilderness on 5-6 May. The imperturbable Grant, though getting somewhat the worse of it, pushed on, trying to outflank Lee and interpose the Army of the Potomac between Lee and the defenses of Richmond.

The two armies clashed at Spotsylvania from 9 through 20 May, whereupon Grant sideslipped south again. Lee retired to fortify positions on the North Anna River; Grant decided they were too strong and moved farther south. Butler meanwhile failed to accomplish his mission; in May Beauregard outgeneralled him and bottled him up at Bermuda Hundred, whereupon Lee easily made his way into the Richmond defenses, established his right flank on the Chickahominy, his center at Cold Harbor, and efficiently repulsed a frontal assault at Cold Harbor on 3 June.

So far the constant fighting had cost 55,000 to 60,000 Union casualties, as against 25,000 to 30,000 for Lee. But Grant had pinned Lee to Virginia, and the Union could make up heavy losses while Confederate manpower

was becoming scarce. With Lee strongly entrenched in front of Richmond, Grant now decided to cross the James River east of the capital and advance against Petersburg to cut the roads and railways leading into Richmond. Thus he could starve Lee, or force him out of his trenches.

Grant's engineers threw a 2,100foot-long ponton bridge over the James—the longest up to that time in the modern world. Unknown to Lee, the whole army crossed the river. Its advance elements got to the outskirts of Petersburg on 15 June, but moved too slowly, giving Lee time to collect troops and defend the town. Grant assaulted on 18 June but failed. Union troops then tunneled a great mine under the Confederates' line and blew a huge breach in it at the end of July. But the infantry attacks which followed were poorly planned and badly led, and they failed.

Grant then started siege operations, and extended his lines to his left (west) to get around Lee's right, or to force Lee to stretch his line thin or abandon Richmond. Lee countered by maneuvering his fortifications to the right. In this way, the two armies spent the winter of 1864-65.

Lee's army, though greatly weakened, was still intact. Indeed, the Petersburg lines had been strong enough for the bold Lee to attempt a spectacular diversion in July. He sent a corps under Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early northward through the Shenandoah

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^{*}Grant intended that Banks move against Mobile at the same time that Sherman moved south. This part of the plan failed because Banks, acting on vague orders from Halleck, advanced up the Red River toward Shreveport and met defeat.

Valley. Maj. Gen. David Hunter, who had replaced Sigel as Union commander, withdrew up the Valley and turned west. Seeing his chance, Early advanced east through Maryland and on 11 July skirmished briskly in front of Fort Stevens, which was part of the ring of forts around Washington. An interested spectator behind Stevens' parapet was Abraham Lincoln himself.

Grant had not been paying close attention to Early's advance and to Union preparations to meet it. But when Lincoln prodded him he acted. A Corps from the Army of the Potomac began arriving in Washington on 11 July and engaged Early who pulled back to the Valley. Grant now placed Washington, western Maryland, and the Valley under Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, who spent the rest of the year in the Valley, defeated Early, and devastated the farms so they could no longer provide food for Lee's army. Sheridan's objectives were thus fully as economic as they were military.

Advance to Atlanta. Starting 4 May, Sherman with about 105,000 men—three armies and a cavalry corps—advanced southward from Chattanooga, repairing the railroads behind them as they moved. Opposing Sherman was the Army of Ten-

Stubborn defense of Vicksburg foiled attempts by Grant to open Mississippi.



nessee under Johnston reinforced to a total of about 65,000 men. Sherman's mission was destruction of the opposing forces and capture of the rail and industrial center of Atlanta. Georgia. Seriously outnumbered, Johnston skillfully took up defensive positions, forced Sherman to maneuver widely in preparation for attack, and then withdrew, leaving Sherman to start the entire process over again. Sherman, usually an apostle of maneuver and flank attack, launched one frontal assault against Johnston's prepared positions at Kenesaw Mountain on 27 June, but was beaten off. Sherman then maneuvered again, and forced Johnston back to positions in front of Atlanta.

Although Johnston had demonstrated great skill in his withdrawal, so that Sherman had gained but 100 miles in 74 days, Jefferson Davis grew impatient, and expressed doubt whether Johnston could repel or defeat the invaders. Actually, in terms of time and distance, Johnston had done as well against Sherman as Lee had done against Grant. Nevertheless Davis replaced Johnston with Maj. Gen. John B. Hood on 17 July.

Hood promptly played into Sherman's hands. Three days later, while Sherman was maneuvering around the northeast side of Atlanta, Hood left strong positions and attacked in two great assaults which failed. Sherman began extending his fortifications; Hood, his striking power greatly weakened, withdrew into northwest Alabama. Sherman's armies marched into Atlanta on 1-2 September.

Port Operations. Besides blockading, and cruising against Confederate commerce-raiders, the Union had continued operations against major ports. Charleston held out, using forts, channel obstructions, and torpedoes.

Mobile was no longer important as a port; the Union blockade was too tight. But the Confederate iron clad Tennessee was there. Farragut, invoking Divine aid rather than damn-

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ing the torpedoes, used eighteen vessels to force his way into Mobile Bay on 5 August 1864. In January 1865 an attack against Fort Fisher—which controlled access to Wilmington, North Carolina, the Confederacy's last port—succeeded, and fitted in with Sherman's overland march.

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March to the Sea. With the fall of Atlanta, Sherman proposed a bold move. He suggested that he send two corps of 30,000 men back to Nashville under Thomas, who would raise and train more men and defend Tennessee if Hood moved north. Sherman did not intend to pursue Hood himself, but would abandon his own line of communications, and with 62,000 men advance through the Confederacy and reach a port. His objective was not to destroy any Confederate army but, by marching through Georgia, demonstrate that the South had lost the war. Again, this was economic and psychological warfare which anticipated that of the Twentieth Century. Lincoln and Grant had doubts about the plan, but they had confidence in Sherman and told him to go ahead.

Departing Atlanta on 12 November, Sherman's troops advanced on a 60mile front. Carrying twenty days' rations against emergencies, they foraged liberally, and enthusiastically burned and destroyed railways, cotton gins, and everything of military value on Sherman's orders. In addition, and in violation of Sherman's orders, there was a good deal of looting and unauthorized destruction. Sherman's army appeared before Savannah on 10 December; when Confederate forces evacuated on the 21st, Sherman marched in and presented the city as a Christmas gift to the nation.

Meanwhile, Hood had invaded Tennessee, but suffered defeat in the battles of Franklin (30 November 1864) and Nashville (15 December 1864). Thomas pursued resolutely with his cavalry. Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson led a 17,000-man cavalry invasion into Alabama and Georgia in early



Running of blockade by Porter's fleet enabled Grant to get below Vicksburg.

1865 to keep Hood down and as added proof that the Confederacy had lost the war. This was the longest independent cavalry movement of the whole struggle.

The Final Campaigns. As the bloody year 1864 concluded, war's end was clearly in view. Just as the victories of 1863 had placed the Union armies in position to start decisive offensives, so 1864 saw those offensives carried through to partial completion. Upon resolute completion of those offensives victory now depended.

In January 1865 Sherman struck north from Savannah to march through the Carolinas toward Lee and Grant. Again the troops advanced on a wide front, and again they foraged and looted freely. This march through swamps and along muddy trails was a remarkable military achievement. Corduroving the roads as it moved along, and fighting innumerable patrol actions and cavalry skirmishes, the army marched an average of over ten miles a day. The Confederates withdrew skillfully but were unable to slow Sherman down very much. Save at Bentonville, North Carolina, on 21 March, there were no stand-up fights. The Confederates simply did not have enough men for all-out battle.

Once the Virginia mud had dried slightly, Grant on 29 March moved

again at Petersburg, still attempting to get around Lee's right flank, which now extended to the west. Sheridan had returned from the Valley, and his cavalry pushed on in the lead. With his line stretched too thin. Lee abandoned Richmond and Petersburg, and lunged westward with the intention of breaking loose from Grant's grip and joining forces with the Confederate army in North Carolina. But Grant never let go. He pursued Lee with troops behind him and on his right flank while Sheridan raced ahead. A Confederate corps was cut off and captured; rations were exhausted; soldiers were straggling and deserting by the thousand. And when Sheridan got his cavalry to Appomattox Court House, he squarely blocked Lee's escape route.

Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia on 9 April 1865, and Grant paroled the entire force to go home. Davis and some other die-hards had wanted to continue the war at all costs, but the principal field commanders on both sides were eager to avoid irregular or guerrilla warfare which could only degenerate into banditry. All other Confederate commanders soon surrendered. The grim fighting was over.


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In strategy, as in weapons and tactics, the Civil War differed markedly from its predecessors and anticipated the world wars of the Twentieth Century. It was fought according to a strategic concept which was developed early but took years to execute. Psychological and propaganda appeals were used by each side. Sherman's and Sheridan's depredations, like the strategic bombing of World War II, were economic rather than primarily military in their impact. And the close coordination of widely separated movements that characterized the latter phases was made possible by the telegraph and the skill of the high command, representing a new departure in warfare.

In the McLean house at Appomattox Court House, Lee met with Grant to sign the surrender, marking the end of Civil War.



Strategy's grand design still depended on battlefield decisions achieved by



Men, Weapons and Tactics

John Miller, jr.

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Deputy Chief Historian,
Office of the Chief of Military History

THE generality that strategic and tactical principles do not always keep pace with the improved capabilities of weapons is well illustrated by the Civil War. Even so, in that conflict there were numerous instances of tactical principles being altered in an effort to meet the new conditions brought about by improved weapons.

Infantry

IN THE great struggle of 1861 to 1865, the most important arm was the infantry. It took and held the ground, and its location after a battle spelled

the finality of victory or defeat.

Its organization had changed but little since the 18th Century. With the exception of several Regular Army regiments which were authorized three battalions but never recruited up to strength, practically all the U. S. Regular Army and the Volunteer Infantry Regiments were one-battalion regiments of ten companies each, with 878 officers and enlisted men in ten of the Regular regiments, 1,046 officers and enlisted men in the Volunteer regiments.

This strength was supposed to be

small enough to be controlled by one man's voice, large enough to withstand a cavalry charge. But with the exception of the Regular and the Wisconsin Volunteer regiments, which were kept almost up to strength by a replacement system, none of the U. S. regiments was ever up to its T/O strength once it took the field. As casualties thinned the ranks, the regiment dwindled down to company size.

Before the Civil War weapons proved so effective, men in battle tended to spread out and seek safety in dispersion. In consequence, the system of control of a regiment by the sound of one man's voice worked only because the regiments were very small.

Regiments were tactically grouped, two or more, into brigades. Two to four brigades, sometimes plus artillery, formed a division. A corps consisted of two to four divisions, plus perhaps artillery. Union formations were smaller and more numerous than their Confederate counterparts. A Union corps, with a paper strength of 20,000 men, was often closer to 10,000, whereas the Confederate infantry corps which fought at Gettysburg were over 20,000 men each.

Except for the swords, sabers, and pistols of officers and senior noncommissioned officers, the basic arm of practically all the Union infantrymen became the single-shot, muzzle loading, rifled musket, caliber .58—nearly twice the caliber of the U. S. Rifles, Model 1903 and M1. To load this weapon the soldier bit open a paper cartridge which contained powder and

ball, poured the powder down the barrel through the muzzle, then pushed the ball home with the ramrod.

Normally the soldier stood up to load; it was a difficult operation in a prone position. To fire, he pulled back the hammer with his thumb and placed a percussion cap in position. The hammer exploded the cap which detonated the powder and sent the ball on its way. The ball was the famous Minié ball, actually a spherical-conoidal bullet shaped about like a modern bullet, which the force of the explosion expanded to fit the rifling in the barrel. It went on its way with deadly accuracy.

The Civil War rifle, although obsolescent and soon to become obsolete, was much closer in range and accuracy to the '03 or the M1 rifles than it was to the Eighteenth Century rifles upon which Civil War tactical formations were based. It could fire accurately at ranges varying from two to four hundred yards and it could kill at eight hundred to a thousand yards. Furthermore, introduction of the percussion cap greatly increased the rate of fire.

Attack Formations

EVERY man armed with the rifle carried a bayonet, but very few wounds were ever inflicted by that weapon. Because tactical doctrine had not kept pace with weapons and technology, commanders attempted to hurl the infantry formations of earlier days against men armed with these rifles and with excellent artillery.



Artists' concept shows Sheridan's charge at the battle of Winchester but cavalry most often fought dismounted. Thes heav Ju

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"Field artillery was used to attack and defend fortifications, destroy obstacles and means of cover and thus prepare way for success of other arms."

These assaults usually failed with heavy casualties.

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Just as today, attack formations varied with the terrain and the circumstances. Troops marched in column and attacked in line, or in a column of lines, and defended in line. The tactical manuals of the day were close order drill books which gave a variety of methods by which a commander could quickly deploy from column to line, change front to either flank, reform after an assault, rally after a retirement, or switch from line to column to move quickly.

The basic unit of maneuver was the brigade, which in the attack normally formed part of a division column. A division usually attacked in column of brigades. The leading brigade would form a 2-rank line of two regiments abreast, with skirmishers deployed in front to drive in the enemy outposts and, using cover and concealment, put fire on the enemy positions to cover the approach of the brigades in formation. The second brigade would deploy in line 150 to 300 yards behind the first, the third a similar distance behind the second, and so on. Natural features, skirmishers, or cavalry were used to protect the flank if there were no units on either side.

Two factors caused the density that was typical of Civil War formations. First, the brigade was pretty large, and although the fire-team or half-squad concept appeared in print in

1863, the existing doctrine coupled with the age-old problem of battle-field communication did not provide for regiments and companies to maneuver separately but required men to advance almost shoulder to shoulder in long lines.

Second, as the attack progressed the skirmishers and the leading brigade tended to merge, and when the leading brigade sought cover or was halted by enemy fire, the other brigades bunched up behind it. Thus phrases in Civil War literature about hails of bullets, great gaps torn in the ranks, and the dead men piled in heaps are not mere figures of speech. They were literally true.

Frontal assaults, flanking movements, and combinations of the two were employed. But the communications problem and the broken terrain of most battlefields made coordination of intricate maneuvers very difficult.

During the latter part of the war, intervals between men and between units were increased. Attacks were begun in close order, but the troops scattered when they came under fire and, using cover, concealment, and short rushes supported by fire from neighboring units, made their way forward. The fire fight, as distinguished from the volleys of previous wars, appears to have emerged at this time.

But even with these modifications a Civil War battlefield was a dangerous place for everyone from general officer to private. It is not surprising that the use of field fortifications became general. They ranged from the stone walls of Gettysburg to the earth and log trenches, abatises, traverses, and rifle pits of Spotsylvania and Petersburg. By 1864, the troops, using bayonets, bare hands, mess gear, and anything else handy, entrenched with enough enthusiasm and skill to inspire the admiration of foreign observers.

Field Artillery

THE most immediate support for the infantry in attack and defense was provided by the field artillery, which was used to attack and defend temporary fortifications; destroy or demolish obstacles and means of cover and thus prepare the way for the success of other arms; breach enemy lines or prevent them from forming; crush enemy masses; dismount enemy batteries; follow and support pursuits; and cover and protect retreats. Field artillery was divided into horse artillery, attached to and maneuvering with the cavalry, and mounted artillery which maneuvered with infantry.

With some variations, Federal artillery was organized in batteries of 4 to 6 guns each, and was attached by batteries to the infantry divisions or by brigades to the corps. In the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, by the time of Gettysburg, all the artillery was organized into battalions of four batteries each. The battalions were attached to infantry divisions, and in each corps the chief

of artillery commanded the battalions.

There had been no recent spectacular improvements in Field Artillery but Civil War ordnance was effective. These included 6- and 12-pound smooth-bore, muzzle-loading guns (Napoleons, made of bronze), 3.64 inches and 4.62 inches in caliber, respectively, with ranges of from 300 to 1600 yards; 12-pound light guns or gun-howitzers (4.62 inches in caliber, 325 to 1,680 yards range); and 10 and 20 pound wrought-iron, rifled, Parrott guns of greater range.

Troops generally preferred the smooth-bores to the rifled guns because they were lighter and easier to maintain; moreover, the rifled weapons had a flat trajectory whereas the higher trajectory of the smooth-bores enabled the gunners to hit reverse slopes.

Projectiles were of four types: solid shot or shell for long-range work against infantry, cavalry, and artillery; canister or shrapnel for closer work against infantry and cavalry. Grape shot was not used.

Artillery was emplaced in whatever good locations could be found in the front lines. Artillery positions were necessarily exposed, and during preliminary bombardments the infantry would retire to defiladed positions. Supporting artillery fire usually ceased when the infantry moved out to attack, although on several occasions overhead fire was used when configuration of the terrain allowed it. Moves to the front and rear in the presence of the enemy were normally accomplished by half-batteries—half of the

Troops of 14th Infantry strike a pose as they enjoy a meal "somewhere in the field" in 1864.



A sharpshooter on picket duty with the Army of the Potomac draws bead on an enemy soldier.



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Cavalry

ON BOTH sides the cavalrymen, usually armed with saber, pistol, and breech-loading carbine and supported by horse artillery, were dragoons who rode to the scene of battle but normally fought on foot. It was next to impossible for mounted cavalrymen to attack infantrymen armed with rifles.

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With their superior speed, cavalrymen were especially useful in advance guard actions, in riding rapidly to seize important hills, river lines, and road junctions before the infantry could come up. In these actions they fought dismounted; there were very few actions between mounted men. Even with breech-loading carbines, cavalrymen were usually overmatched by the infantry, and whenever the cavalrymen held their own against foot soldiers they received well-deserved praise.

In addition cavalrymen were used as pickets, outposts, and in long-range reconnaissance and all too often in dramatic but ineffective raids. In battle they were supposed to enter at the decisive moment and pursue the enemy. But this seldom happened because the battles were so intense and so costly that successes were almost never exploited. Pursuits were rare.

Discipline and Combat Efficiency

IT IS a truism to state that weapons and tactical doctrine can be no better than the discipline and combat efficiency of the soldier, and the Civil War armies on both sides were deficient in these respects. Among the soldiery, foraging and straggling were all too common. Outpost duties were often slackly carried out, and fire discipline was poor.


Whereas the armies were apparently capable of carrying out their military duties efficiently when they wanted to, the whole business seems



3d Massachusetts Artillery mans heavy guns at Fort Stevens, one of forts guarding Washington.

to have been more voluntary than in modern armies. A commander could not count on immediate, unswerving obedience from his subordinates, even general officers. Although some exceptional marching records were set, nearly every defeat in the Civil War can be charged to the fact that someone was in the wrong place at the wrong time because he was slow, lost, resting, or had misunderstood his orders.

While all units spent long periods at close order drill which had a tactical function, some phases of training were patently deficient. When the commander of the Army of the Potomac learned that, at Gettysburg, many men had loaded their rifles two, three, and even four times without ever firing them, he ordered that every rifleman was to fire ten rounds under supervision of an officer. That this order should be issued by an Army commander after more than two years of war shows that basic training had been seriously inadequate.



PROBLEMS of Civil War mobilization in the United States and in the Confederate States were those of modern warfare. The solutions provided solutions to similar problems in World Wars I and II.

The important role that state governments played in the Civil War distinguished it from the World Wars. Both the Union and the Confederacy used State governments to recruit and equip men in the early phases. In the Confederacy this reliance on the states was due primarily to States' Rights theories, while in the Union it was due more to inability to devise a better system. Oddly, centralized control over mobilization was asserted first by the Confederacy.

The United States land force in being in early 1861 was the Regular

Army. The Militia was largely a paper force. The Regular Army on 1 January 1861 included 1,098 officers and 15,259 enlisted men organized in 19 regiments (10 infantry, 4 artillery, 2 dragoon, 2 cavalry, and 1 mounted rifles). Of 198 company-sized units in these regiments, 183 were scattered at 79 posts along the frontiers. The other 15 manned posts along the Atlantic Coast and the Canadian border, and the arsenals. Even after the firing on Fort Sumter it was impossible to concentrate the Regular Army without stripping the frontier of its defenses against the Indians.

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
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The Army was weakened by the decision of 313 of its officers to resign or accept dismissal to join the Contederacy. Even more serious than the number of officers who went South

Lessons of enduring value were taught by wartime efforts at



was their high caliber. For example, Robert E. Lee, Albert Sidney Johnston, Joseph E. Johnston, and Samuel Cooper resigned and became full generals in the Confederate Army. Four of the five regimental commanders of mounted regiments left the Army. But few, if any, enlisted men turned against the government.

The Regular Army was not capable of suppressing a major rebellion or even of waging sustained warfare. It was small and dispersed over the West where roads were primitive and communication slow and difficult. It was untrained for large-scale operations, and commanded at first by old men.

Theoretically the Militia was still a force in being. The Militia's failure duting the War of 1812 and disuse during the Mexican War had not de-

stroyed its paper existence. Of the 3,163,711 Militiamen reported in 1861, 2,471,377 were from Union states and 692,334 from Confederate states. The totals were impressive but some of the returns dated back to 1827. Only a few states had militia regiments worthy of the name. When war began, each side had to start almost from the bottom.

War and Mobilization

NO plans existed in the Union for mobilizing large bodies of men or for waging war. When the President consulted with his cabinet, Scott, and other advisers, all had ideas, but none had any considered plans except Scott. His preliminary plan for the conduct of the war estimated that a Regular Army of 25,000 men and 60,000

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three-year volunteers would be necessary. The major weakness in this plan was the small size of its manpower estimates.

The statutory basis for increasing the military forces was the Militia Act of 1795. Term of service for individuals was limited to three months. Thus on 15 April Lincoln called out 75,000 Militiamen for three months and convened a special session of Congress to meet 4 July 1861. Both the call for only 75,000 Militia and the delay of over eleven weeks for the convening of Congress have been criticized. But Scott's plan had called for only 85,000 men, and the President may have hoped that one of the attempts at reconciliation might still succeed. In any event, the loyal states furnished 93,-526 men.

In the hope Congress would ratify his action, the President on 3 May 1861 increased the Regular Army by 22,714 men, the Navy by 18,000, and called for 42,034 Volunteers to serve for three years.

When Congress met it not only approved the President's action but also authorized him to call up to 500,000 Volunteers to serve for from six months to three years. Quotas were to be apportioned among the states according to population. The same Act prescribed the organization for the Volunteer regiments—ten companies like the old Regular Army. [New Regular Army regiments had three battalions of eight companies each.] Pay, pension, and other benefits were essen-

tially the same for Volunteers as for the Regular Army.

The President was given authority to appoint general officers, but the governors were to commission company and field grade officers. The President was given power to use military boards to examine the qualifications of all officers appointed by the governors and to remove the unqualified.

Subsequent laws provided authority for calling additional Volunteers, and eventually the Enrollment Act of 1863 removed statutory limits on the size of the Army. In addition to Regulars and Volunteers, the President was empowered to call out Militia units whose period of service was limited to 60 days after Congress convened unless specifically extended.

Although there were more than 2½ million enrollments in the Union Army throughout the war, heavy casualties, discharges for physical disability, desertion, and short terms of enlistment kept effective strength at less than half that number. Peak strength of just over one million was reached on 1 May 1865.

As in 1846 the Regular Army was kept intact. Its officers and enlisted men were not used as cadres for the Volunteer forces. This departure from the expansible army concept was due to General Scott's insistence. Remembering the Mexican War, he desired to keep intact the only force he believed completely dependable.

Confusion began with the call for Militia on 15 April. After the Presi-



Col. Kreidberg

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"WAR meetings were designed to stir lagging enthusiasm. Musicians and orators blew themselves red in the face with their windy efforts. Choirs improvised for the occasion, sang 'Red, White and Blue' and Rally 'Round the Flag' till too hoarse for further endeavor. The old veteran soldier of 1812 was trotted out, and worked for all he was worth, and an occasional Mexican War veteran would air his nonchalance at grimvisaged war. At proper intervals the enlistment roll would be presented for signatures.

"Sometimes the patriotism of such a gathering would be wrought up so intensely by waving banners, martial and vocal music, and burning eloquence, that a town's quota would be filled in less than an hour. The complete intoxication of such excitement, like intoxication from liquor, left some of its victims on the following day, especially if the fathers of families, with the sober second thought to wrestle with; but Pride, that tyrannical master, rarely let them turn back."

From "Hardtack and Coffee" by John D. Billings, 1887.

dent's subsequent call for 500,000 Volunteers, Militia quotas and the three-year Volunteers became inextricably mixed. Many regiments mobilized under the Militia call later volunteered for three years. Authority granted to private citizens to recruit regiments outside state control added to the confusion and harassed the governors who were the chief cogs in the mobilization machinery of 1861.

Accounting became so chaotic after the President's call of 3 May 1861 that for the rest of the year the War Department discontinued formal assignment of quotas to states. With no long-range mobilization plan in 1861, the governors were requisitioned for units as circumstances dictated. Sometimes governors mobilized units without any Federal call for them.

In September the War Department took a step toward bringing order and system into mobilization. All units being recruited independently of the governors were placed under state control. This was a forward step eliminating competition, but control of competition within a state depended on the governor.

The Replacement Plan

THE second step in systematizing mobilization came with establishment of a replacement program. On 3 December 1861 the War Department provided that replacements would be recruited from central depots on requisition from the War Department. Creation of new units was halted and the governors were to be eased out of the system. Primary responsibility for manpower procurement would have passed to the Federal Government.

But the replacement plan was never really used. Simon Cameron was succeeded as Secretary of War on 15 January 1862 by Edwin McM. Stanton. The new Secretary abolished it. To Stanton in April 1862 it appeared that the Army was large enough to do its job. He grossly underestimated the losses that would be caused by disease and battle casualties. Further, he was eager to economize and eliminate waste in War Department operations.

Except for Wisconsin troops and the Regulars, the Union armies never had an efficient, automatic replacement system. As battle losses mounted and the ranks of veteran regiments thinned, they were forced to send men back to their home states on recruiting duty or face disbandment. Governors preferred to raise new regiments rather than fill the ranks of old ones. Thus new regiments were regularly raised during the war while old battle-tested units declined to company strength.

Heavy casualties at the Peninsula and Shiloh and losses from disease and desertion greatly reduced the Union Army in spring of 1862. Many replacements were needed at once. On 1 May 1862 the War Department directed Army commanders to requisition recruits from governors to keep their regiments up to strength. This was only a temporary expedient, and the Federal recruiting service was reopened on 6 June 1862.

President Lincoln appealed to the governors again in July for 300,000 more men. Although early payment of part of the \$100 discharge bonus was authorized, the response fell far below the Army's needs.

Draft Plan of 1862

THE War Department had two alternatives: increase bounties or draft men. There was no direct Federal statutory authority for a draft, but a clause in the Militia Act of 17 July 1862 provided that for *states* without adequate Militia laws "the President is authorized . . . to make all necessary rules and regulations." Interpreting this broadly, the President on 4 August called for a draft of 300,000 Militia to serve for nine months.

Protests from governors, riots and threats of riots quickly followed, and the draft call was rescinded. But the threat of the draft and increased bounties helped to increase recruiting for the time being. The attempted draft of 1862 was significant in that it affirmed the principle of a direct compulsory Federal draft of men for military service.

The 1863 Enrollment Act

THIS principle was reaffirmed by Congress on 3 March 1863 when it passed "An Act for enrolling and calling out the National Forces." This draft law made all male citizens and resident aliens between 20 and 45 years of age liable to service. It excepted Federal and state officials, felons, those physically and mentally unfit, several other obvious categories, and those able to hire substitutes or pay \$300 for exemption.

Recruiting Methods

"THE methods by which volunteer regiments were raised were various. In 1861 a common way was for some one who had been in the regular army, or perhaps who had been prominent in the militia, to take the initiative and circulate an enlistment paper for signatures. His chances were pretty good for obtaining a commission as its captain, for his active interest, and men who had been prominent in assisting him, if they were popular, would secure the lieutenancies.

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"On the return of the 'three months' troops many of the companies immediately re-enlisted in a body for three years, sometimes under their old officers. A large number of these short-term veterans, through influence at the various State capitals, secured commissions in new regiments that were organizing. In country towns too small to furnish a company, the men would post off to a neighboring town or city, and there enlist.

"In 1862, men who had seen a year's active service were selected to receive a part of the commissions issued to new organizations, and should in justice have received all within the bestowal of governors. But the recruiting of troops soon resolved itself into individual enlistments or this programme:—twenty, thirty, fifty or more men would go in a body to some recruiting station, and signify their readiness to enlist in a certain regiment provided a certain specified member of their number should be commissioned captain. Sometimes they would compromise, if the outlook was not promising, and take a lieutenancy, but equally often it was necessary to accept their terms, or count them out.

"In the rivalry of men to fill up regiments, the result often was officers who were diamonds in the rough, but liberally intermingled with veritable clodhoppers whom a brief experience in active service soon sent to the rear."

From "Hardtack and Coffee" by John D. Billings, 1887.



Bounty payments were offered for recruits.
Bounty costs were almost as much as the total pay for army.

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The country was divided into enrollment districts; the President was to set quotas for each. To enforce its provisions, the law created the office of Provost Marshal General of the Army. Under him a provost marshal with the rank of captain was appointed for each district, wherein a local board consisting of the provost marshal and two members (one a physician) did the actual drafting.

The draft law had several serious defects. Administration and enforcement were charged solely to military officers. Those liable to service were not required to register as a civic duty; instead, officers walked from house to house enrolling men. Its provisions for hiring substitutes or avoiding service by payment of \$300 were unjust and undemocratic.

Even with its defects, the Enrollment Act provided for raising armies by Federal administrative machinery, ignored the state governments, and thus fundamentally changed the system for military mobilization.

Enrollment began on 25 May 1863. Drafting started the first week in July and continued into August, but spondic resistance to the draft throughout the country culminated in riots in New York City. Police, Militia, and the Regular Army finally restored order after four days of rioting and an estimated 1,000 casualties and \$1,500,

000 in damages had resulted.

Results of the draft of July 1863 were meager. Of the whole number drawn—292,441—only 35,883 were raised, while 52,288 paid commutation. As a result, the President was forced to call for more volunteers in 1863 and 1864.

Of more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ million men raised by the Union during the Civil War, only 6 percent were raised directly by the draft. The net results of the four applications of the Enrollment Act of 1863 were:

Status

Held to service	249,259
Men raised	162,535
Held to personal service	46,347
Substitutes furnished	116,188
Paid commutation	86,724

The indirect effects of the draft in encouraging enlistments cannot be accurately assessed, but that those effects were important seems certain. The principal importance of the Enrollment Act lay not in the number of men it raised but in the fact that it established the principle that the Federal Government could impose a military obligation directly on the citizen. Of almost equal importance was the fact that the experience gained guided the carefully planned Selective Service drafts of World Wars I and II.

Bounties

AS IN previous wars, bounties were an integral part of the Volunteer system. Bounty payments came to staggering totals for that day—\$300,233,500 by the Federal Government, and \$285,941,036 by the states. This total includes only a minimum estimate of the amount paid by the states and entirely omits bounties paid by towns, cities, and counties. It has been estimated that the total amount paid exceeded \$750,000,000—or about as much as the pay for the Army during the entire war.

The bounty became not a reward for volunteering but a price for mercenaries. When bounties soared as high as \$1,500, the substitute bounty broker racket became big business. The high desertion rate was attributable in part to the bounty system, for some men deserted time and again to enlist elsewhere and collect additional bounties.

Negro Manpower

THE question of whether Negroes should serve in the armed forces of the United States was settled after more than a year of hot argument. At the beginning of the war the Regular Army limited enlistments to free white males. The first authority for using Negroes in the Army was contained in a law of 17 July 1862 which empowered the President to accept them for labor and other military service. Congress did not include Negroes in the draft until 24 February 1864.

The first recruiting of Negroes took place in captured areas of the South beginning in Louisiana in September 1862. With the exception of a few units organized by states, Negro units were formed and filled by the Federal Government. The Bureau for Colored Troops, created 22 May 1863, was charged with the organization and supervision of Negro units. By the end of the war 139 Negro regiments had been mustered into Federal service—including 120 infantry, 13 artillery,

and I cavalry. Of the 186,017 Negroes in the Union Army, some 134,000 came from slave states.

Negro units were used principally as labor organizations and for garrisoning forts along the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, along lines of communication, and in coastal regions.

Officer Procurement

SOURCES of trained officer material at the outset were meager. U. S. Military Academy graduates in the Regular Army numbered 684. Of the 1,098 officers in the Regular Army, 313 served with the Confederacy. The 785 who remained loyal were for the most part kept in their Regular Army units during the early months of the war. This deprived the mobilizing armies of the men best qualified to lead and instruct them, and the decision to keep Regular Army units intact made it impossible to commission enlisted men.

The war brought back into the service many resigned graduates of the Military Academy. They proved invaluable, but there were too few to meet the need.

There had been an increase in private and state military schools since the Mexican War, but most of them were in the South. The most important private military school in the North was Norwich University in Vermont which furnished 523 men to the Union and 34 to the Confederacy.

THE call for 75,000 Militia included 3,549 officers, all of whom were appointed by the governors. The May 1861 call for Volunteers directed the governors to appoint company and regimental officers but reserved to the President the appointment of generals.

When militarily experienced men were available, the governors gave them commissions, but with the passage of time the governors had to commission the untrained, and inevitably political considerations exercised some influence. In most cases officers of Vol-

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unteer units were elected. The military boards authorized by Congress removed some of the Volunteer officers by direct action. Others resigned rather than face a board, and indiscriminate appointments were discouraged.

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Mobilization in the Confederacy

PROBLEMS of mobilization were essentially the same in the Confederacy as in the Union, but on a different scale. No complete compilation of the size of the Confederate Army has ever been made. According to the 1861 Census, the South's military manpower totaled 1,064,193 as contrasted with 4,559,872 in the Union. Estimates of the total strength of the Confederate Army throughout the war range from 600,000 to 1,650,000 men. About 1,000,000 is probably the most accurate.

The Provisional Congress of the Confederacy, on 28 February 1861, authorized President Davis to take charge of military operations and to receive into service units tendered by the states for a period of 12 months. A 6 March 1861 Act of Congress authorized the President to call out the Militia for six months and to accept 100,000 Volunteers for one year. Another law provided for establishment of a Regular Army of 10,600 men. Thus Congress provided for some mobilization even before the war began. After the shooting started the forces were increased and the term of service lengthened.

ENTHUSIASM began to wane as it became apparent that the war would be long and arduous. On 8 August 1861 Congress provided that the President could call up to 400,000 Volunteers for three years, and later made efforts to induce the original 12-months' men to reenlist. But by spring of 1862 things were going badly for the Confederacy. As the one-year Volunteers were not reenlisting in appreciable numbers, Congress abandoned States' Rights and on 16 April 1862 passed a conscription law. It em-

powered the President to draft all white males between 18 and 35 for 3 years, and extended the term of service for all men already in the army. Persons not liable for service could substitute for those who were.

Exemption was provided for Confederate and state legislative, executive, and judicial officials and their clerks and employees; ferrymen; pilots, and all engaged in river and railroad transportation; workers in iron mines, foundries, and furnaces; telegraph operators; clergymen; printers; educators; hospital employees; druggists; and some cotton and woolen workers. This law, and later acts which widened the age range, controlled the exemptions, forbade substitutions, and authorized use of slaves as soldiers, made the Confederate system a truly selective one.


Principles Taught

JUST as the Civil War was instructive in tactics, logistics, strategy, and leadership, it also taught the Nation a great deal about military mobilization, and completely changed the system for raising armies in major wars.

It demonstrated the need for careful planning well in advance of mobilization and for vesting responsibility for planning in a particular staff section. It indicated the necessity for control of mobilization at the War Department level. It showed once more that the Militia, as then organized, could not provide a reservoir of trained men. It demonstrated that the Volunteer system produced excellent material but was too haphazard to support full-scale mobilization.

Civil War experience indicated that national conscription based on selective service principles is the most efficient and democratic method of raising armed forces, and that the drafting should be done by civilian rather than by military officials. Fortunately for the United States, these lessons were learned well, and out of Civil War experience came the Twentieth Century's system of national mobilization.

The beginnings of heraldry in the Civil War-



Symbols Rally the Spirit

Colonel Ralph R. Burr

MISTAKE in identification by a A general early in the Civil War started the system of shoulder patches that now is common in the U.S. Army. The use of these distinctive unit emblems to identify soldiers as members of organizations with proud traditions all started when General Philip Kearny, in the summer of 1862, mistook some officers for stragglers from his own command. As described by General E. D. Townsend, Adjutant-General of the United States Army in his "Anecdotes of the Civil War," the resulting explosion was "emphasized by a few expletives."

"The officers listened in silence," recounts General Townsend, "respectfully standing in the 'position of a soldier' until he had finished, when one of them, raising his hand to his

cap, quietly suggested that the general had possibly made a mistake, as they none of them belonged to his command. With his usual courtesy, Kearny exclaimed 'Pardon me; I will take steps to know how to recognize my own men hereafter.'"

The result was an order that officers of his command should thereafter wear "on the front of their caps a round piece of red cloth to designate them." Thus was born the famed "Kearny Patch." There is some evidence that General Kearny did not actually designate the shape of the patch, for at first almost any piece of red cloth was acceptable. General Kearny even donated his own red blanket to be cut up by his officers. Some covered their entire caps with red cloth.

Although Kearny had designated the patch to distinguish his officers, enlisted men of his command very soon adopted the red patch, often cutting up their overcoat red lining

COLONEL RALPH R. BURR, Quartermaster Corps, is Commanding Officer, Quartermaster Activities, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia. to mi Kearn themse mand, duced federa specia wearin nized Fro spreace By Ma

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to make them. The men idolized Kearny and were anxious to identify themselves as members of his command. The practice is said to have reduced straggling—and even the Confederates are reputed to have given special attention to wounded and dead wearing the patch because they recognized the valor of Kearny's troops.

From that beginning, the idea spread to other divisions and corps. By March 1863, Major General Joseph Hooker had provided the first systematic plan for the entire Army of the Potomac. It is said that General Daniel Butterfield, Hooker's Chief-of-Staff, had much to do with designing the patches. At any rate, General Hooker ordered that the First Corps should wear a sphere, the Second Corps a trefoil, Third Corps a crescent and Twelfth Corps a star.

By the time the war ended almost all of the corps wore some sort of identifying mark. Usually they were, as with Hooker's first order, quite simple. The Fifteenth Corps, however, wore a patch that told something of a story—which is what heraldic symbols and insignia have done since the early middle ages.

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The story goes that in the fall of 1863 the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps under General Hooker were sent to aid in the relief of Chattanooga. It became apparent that the eastern soldiers were better dressed. Corps badges were a novelty in the western units. This caused some sharp words between the men.

One day an enlisted man in the corps of Major General John A. Logan was asked where his corps patch was. Clapping his hand on his cartridge box, he said "Forty Rounds. Can you show me a better one?" Shortly thereafter General Logan issued General Order No. 10 prescribing that the badge for the Fifteenth Corps should be "a miniature cartridge box and above the box will be inscribed the words 'Forty Rounds.'"

The badge of the Fourteenth Army

Corps also told a story. Members had often referred to themselves as "acorn boys" because at one time when rations were scanty, the men roasted and ate acorns. In 1864 their badge was designed in the form of an acorn.

Other deviations from simple designs included the Ninth Corps whose men wore "a shield with the figure nine in the center crossed with a foul anchor and cannon"; The Seventeenth Corps, an arrow; the Sixteenth Corps four miniè balls with the points towards the center.

Not to be outdone, the Engineer and Pontonier Corps adopted a badge of "two oars crossed over an anchor, the top of which is encircled by a scroll surmounted by a castle; the castle being the badge of the U. S. Corps of Engineers." The Signal Corps was two flags crossed on the staff of a flaming torch. The Department of West Virginia adopted a spreadeagle. The Pioneers wore a pair of crossed hatchets. Both General Sheridan's Cavalry corps and Wilson's Cavalry wore distinctive badges featuring the crossed saber.

In most instances the badges were adopted by a General Order, often after competitions for designs. However, several Corps adopted badges without any order at all—they apparently just grew out of popular demand. One or two, on the other hand, never adopted any sort of insignia.

To a considerable extent the adoption of these corps badges was a morale building factor, and often the enlisted ranks contributed materially to design. From a humble beginning the wearing of the patch spread. The drives for unit identification, *esprit de corps* and pride in organization—factors in leadership, in discipline, in battle efficiency—made themselves felt.

A general rule was that within each corps the first division patch would be red, the second white, the third blue. When a corps had a fourth division, as was sometimes the case, an-

other color would be designated. In the Ninth Corps it was green; in the Fifteenth, yellow.

It is obvious that the colors of the National Ensign influenced this choice of colors for the divisions. As a matter of fact, even before the first glimmerings of the patch insignia idea had manifested themselves, General George B. McClellan, as early as March 1862, had issued orders directing that various kinds of flags should designate corps, divisions and brigade headquarters.



To the soldier who served in blue. . .

The First Division Flag was to be red, six feet by five, the Second Division blue, the Third red and blue. Army regulations already had prescribed colors of Artillery regiments, Infantry regiments, camp colors, standards and guidons of mounted regiments.

Not long after, the men themselves sought to have on their flags the names of the battles in which they participated. Authority for recognition of battle on the regimental flag came as a result of a joint resolution of Congress on 24 December 1861. By February 1862, such a high regard was placed on colors for regiments and batteries that General McClellan ordered that names of the battles in which units bore a meritorious part would be inscribed on the colors of guidons of all regiments or batteries thus engaged.

It must be remembered that in the type of fighting of the time, when men were usually massed in line, the sight of the flag, whether national ensign or regimental standard, was a positive factor in leadership. The ranks could fellow the flag. As long as it floated above the battle line it was a factor in advance—as well as a rallying point in a retreat. Great store was set on keeping the flag from even touching the ground. Conversely, to capture an enemy flag was highly regarded.

Units that were not yet entitled to battle honors were not to rest satisfied until they had won them by their discipline and courage. Here again is another example of proper motivation for further exemplary achievements by units. An example of the symbolism of the flag and its role in inspiring achievement was the action taken by the Chief Signal Officer in 1862 when he issued the order

"... any officer who distinguishes himself in battle and skillfully uses his flag (that is, the signalling flag) shall hereafter while serving as a signal officer bear upon his service flags a star and the name of the action in which the star was won,

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Thus the flag was used in prompt recognition of meritorious service—in effect, the same as presenting a medal—in an invaluable expression of leadership technique.

Still another incentive for superior performance was evolved by General J. C. Douglas, commanding general of the Third Division, Seventeenth Corps. He awarded a flag to the units judged best in battalion drill, soldierly appearance, camp condition, discipline. The unit could keep the flag only by continuous winning of it; it was to be carried on parades and on the battlefield—and on the battlefield the commander could withdraw it from a unit that failed to demonstrate its right to retain it.

While heraldry in the modern Army embraces medals, in the Civil War period the various medals extant today had not been adopted. Congress, it is true, had issued several for various special reasons and many of the States issued medals as well. But it was during this conflict that the highest award that can be given an individual for heroism beyond the call of duty came into being. This was the Medal of Honor.

At first it was to be issued only to men in the ranks, but later it was changed to include officers and finally was changed in design. The original medal was designed by Anthony C. Paquet, and was later redesigned by Major General George L. Gillespie.

Although not in the same category, the idea of using identification tags was first suggested during the Civil War by one John Kennedy. Not until 44 years later, however, was this idea adopted as an aid in identification and disposal of the dead and wounded.

Even after the war, veterans cherished their badges, and they were frequently seen in parades of the Grand Army of the Republic. Many veterans had models of their badges made in enamel, silver or gold, and wore them


pinned to the breast or suspended from a ribbon around the neck during the parades or at meetings or encampments of the G.A.R.

As it developed amid the exigencies of Civil War, symbolism took on added significance as a practical tool of leadership. Through the use of badges, flags and medals, military leaders were able to communicate a pride in organization to their men. The resulting responsiveness manifested itself in heightened esprit de corps which has been time-tested to the present day.



. . . or in gray, his flag was a symbol.

The Civil War soldier trained and griped and marched and scrounged and did the job required



HEY didn't have many things that modern soldiers take for granted, these Yanks and Johnny Rebs who served in the ranks on both sides of the Civil War. They had no USO entertainment, no travelling libraries, no well-stocked PX. They entertained themselves, read what the folks from home sent them, patronized the sutler when they had a few extra coppers. They didn't have the benefits of specialized protective clothing or of wellorganized messes. Hospital care was rudimentary by today's standards. Their pay of \$13 a month wasn't always ready for them on the first of each month.

But they did many things and lived in many ways that today's soldier would find familiar—or into which he would slip with very little difficulty if he were transported back to the conditions of a century ago.

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They lived in dog tents (almost no different from today's pup tents); they shaved out of makeshift utensils and they stood Saturday inspections; they had their share of misfits (they called them "beats" or "shirks"); they trained and they marched through mud; and they went into battle and served valorously as American soldiers always have.

Their training, tactics and methods of fighting differed from those of today but they fitted the weapons and the doctrines of the time—and they pointed the way and laid out lessons

Always Have

to serve future generations of United States soldiers.

Soldiers of both armies shared, probably more closely than armies do today, the common hardships of life in the field. They marched in close order, moved in long, slow, dusty columns, and mostly fought shoulder to shoulder. They saw their ranks thinned by musket fire and blown to shreds by shrapnel. They knew well the meaning of the old command—"Close ranks and carry on." It was not uncommon for units to take over 50 percent losses in a day's fighting.

Out of all this came a sense of solidarity and comradeship that had a deep influence on the postwar political life of the Nation. In the North the G.A.R.—Grand Army of the Republic—was not merely an organization of blue-clad veterans marching at the head of every patriotic parade until after World War I. It was a power in the life of the reunited nation until well into the early years of this century. While the Confederate veterans lacked the same national influence, their role was also preeminent in the Southern States.

From letters and diaries written in the field, and later from books written by soldiers who had served during the war, the daily life of the soldier may be relived today. Of the many books now long out of print, perhaps one of the most enlightening is *Hardtack and Coffee* written by John D. Billings, who served in the artillery of

Sickles' Third and Hancock's Second Corps, Army of the Potomac, and who later was a Department Commander of the Massachusetts G.A.R.

The book long has served as an authentic source for writers on Civil War topics dealing with the life of the soldier. It is illustrated by Charles W. Reed, also an artilleryman from Massachusetts, who was a topographical engineer on General Gouverneur Warren's staff. Besides having lived through most of the things he described, the author recorded with great exactness many vivid details of the soldier's daily life.

Clothing and Shelter

UPON entering the service, whether by enlistment or later by being conscripted, the recruit was supplied with a clothing issue. The government allowed \$42 per year. If the man did not overdraw this allowance, he received the balance in cash at the end of each year.

"The articles included in his outfit were a cap or hat (usually the former) blouse, overcoat, dress coat, trousers, shirts, drawers, socks, shoes, a woollen and a rubber blanket. This was the wardrobe of the infantry," Billings relates.

"The artillery and cavalry had the same except that a jacket took the place of the dress coat, boots that of shoes, and their trousers had a reenforce, that is, an extra thickness of cloth extending from the upper part

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Except for the flag, a camp scene on either side followed a familiar pattern as shown by Confederate sketch.

of the seat down the inside of both legs, for greater durability in the service required of these branches in the saddle.

"The infantry made way with a large amount of clothing. Much of it was thrown away on the march. A soldier burdened with a musket, from forty to eighty rounds of ammunition, a haversack stuffed plump as a pillow, but not so soft, with three days rations; a canteen of water, a woollen and rubber blanket, and a half shelter tent, would be likely to take just what more he was obliged to. So, with the opening of the spring campaign, away would go all extra clothing. When a campaign was fairly under way the average infantryman's wardrobe was what he had on.

"The knapsack, haversack, canteen, and shelter-tent, like the arms, were government property, for which the commanding officer of a company was responsible. At the end of a soldier's term of service, they were to be turned in or properly accounted for."

As the regiments were formed and accepted into Federal service, they were placed in camps for training or to wait their assignment to some Army corps. Since in those days there were few if any large Army posts with barracks, most of these were of necessity tent camps.

Early in the war years the Sibley tent was common. Invented in 1857 by Henry Sibley (who later joined the Confederate cause) they much resembled an Indian wigwam. Because of their shape they were often called bell tents. The Sibley was 18 feet in diameter and 12 feet high, supported on a single pole resting on an iron tripod. The canvas could be tightened or slackened by manipulating the tripod. A cone-shaped stove stood beneath the tripod, and the stove-pipe went up through an opening at the apex of the canvas. A small piece of canvas called a cap, worked by two long guy ropes, covered the opening in stormy weather.

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"It was not an unusual sight in the service to see the top of one of these tents in a blaze caused by some one having drawn the cap too near an over-heated stove-pipe. A chain depended from the fork of the tripod, with a hook, on which a kettle could be hung; when the stove was wanting, the fire was built on the ground.

"In the daytime these twelve-man tents were ventilated by lifting them up at the bottom. Sibley tents were out of field service in 1862, partly because they were too expensive, but principally on account of being so cumbrous."

The "A" or wedge tent, a simple affair pitched over a ridge pole, usually accommodated four men—"but they were often occupied by five, and sometimes six. When so occupied at night, it was rather necessary to comfort that all should turn over at the same time, for six or even five men were a tight fit in the space enclosed, unless 'spooned' together. In winter they were pitched above a 'stockade' of logs or rough lumber. In summer they were often pitched as a sort of open canopy."

The hospital or wall tent was the still-familiar type, varying in size according to use to which it was put. But the tent most in use in the field, just as in modern times, was the *Tente d'Abri*—the Dog or Shelter Tent.

"I can imagine no other reason for calling it a dog tent than this, that when one is pitched it would only accommodate a dog, and a small one at that. This tent was invented late in 1861 or early in 1862. This was the tent of the rank and file. Each man was provided with a half-shelter, as a single piece was called, which he was expected to carry on the march if he wanted a tent to sleep under."

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When the troops went into winter quarters, they built stockades, raised from two to five feet, with the tent pitched over it for a roof. Sometimes the men dug out a sort of cellar above which they raised logs. Such a shelter was warmer than one built entirely above ground. The logs were chinked with mud and a chimney was built outside, usually opening into a fire-place, used for warmth and cooking.

Still another shelter came into use during the Civil War—one which was actually a fortification as well as living quarters. This was the bomb-proof, made of logs heavily banked with earth and a roof covered with earth, sometimes several feet deep. These were used during siege operations or inside fortifications. A doughboy accustomed to the trench life of World War I would have been very much at home in them—and so would many a veteran of Korea, for these bomb-proofs were the direct ancestors of those so recently in use.

Hardtack and Coffee

THE Federal government was able to supply better and more generous rations than the Confederacy. The food was not as diversified, of course, as that available today. Yet even then canned milk had been made available and experiments were being conducted in dessicated foods—the men often

called them "desecrated." During campaigns, the men carried their rations, and usually cooked them in the field. Often they did their own cooking in their huts in winter quarters as well.

"When company cooks prepared the food, the soldiers, at the bugle signal, formed single file at the cookhouse door in winter, or the cook's open fire in summer, where, with a long-handled dipper, he filled each man's tin with coffee from the mess kettles and dispensed to him such other food as was to be given out at that meal."

The coffee ration was undoubtedly the most relished. Although authorized, tea was seldom provided but it was usually well received.

On the other side of the lines, however, there was little such solace for the Confederate soldier. Inability to get coffee through the blockade forced him to go without the solace of the bean. He had, perforce, to seek substitutes in chicory or even roasted acorns boiled into as palatable a brew as possible.

In still another respect the Union soldiers probably had it a good deal better than their counterparts in the southern lines, for there was no pinch of food or clothing at home, and parcels were often forthcoming.

"The boxes sent were usually of good size. As to the contents, I find on the back of an old envelope a partial list of such articles—"Roundheaded nails" (for the heels of boots), "hatchet" (to cut kindlings, tentpoles), "pudding, turkey, pickles, onions, pepper, paper, envelopes, stockings, potatoes, chocolate, condensed milk, sugar, broma, butter, sauce, preservative (for the boots)."

"The boxes came, when they came at all, by wagon-loads—mule teams of the company going after them, and a happier, lighter-hearted body of men than those who were gathered around the wagons could not have been found in the service."



Their Daily Bread

WHILE hardtack served as the butt of many a joke, the soft bread baked in loaves was universally well received. "For a time, in 1861, the vaults under the broad terrace on the western front of the Capitol were diverted into bakeries, where sixteen thousand loaves of bread were baked daily. The chimneys from the ovens pierced the terrace and for months smoke poured out in dense volumes.

"The greater part of the loaves supplied to the Army of the Potomac up to the summer of 1864 were baked in Washington, Alexandria, and at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The ovens at the latter place had a capacity of thirty thousand loaves a day.

"When the army reached the vicinity of Petersburg, the supply of fresh loaves became a matter of greater difficulty and delay, which Grant immediately obviated by ordering ovens built at City Point. A large number of citizen bakers were employed to run them night and day, and as a result 123,000 fresh loaves were furnished the army daily."

From "Hardtack and Coffee" by John D. Billings, 1887.

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Camp Life

THE soldier's day began with reveille at 0500 in summer, at 0600 in winter. In the field "a common mode of washing was for one man to pour water from a canteen into the hands of his messmate, and thus take turns. In settled camp, some men had a short log scooped out for a washbasin. Some were not so particular about being washed every day, and in the morning would put the time required for the toilet into another "turn over" and nap. As such men always slept with their full uniform on, they were equivalent to a kind of Minute Men, ready to take the field for roll call, or any other call, at a minute's notice."

After roll-call came the various work calls—stable call for artillery-

men and cavalry, breakfast call, sick call, watering call, fatigue call.

"Yes, there were a few individuals to be found, I believe, in every company in the service, who, to escape guard or fatigue duty, would feign illness, and if possible, delude the surgeon into believing them proper subjects for his tenderest care. Too often they succeeded and threw upon their own intimate associates the labors of camp, which they themselves were able to perform.

"The genuine cases went with a different air from the shams. The proverbial prescription of the average army surgeon was quinine, whether for stomach or bowels, headache or toothache, for a cough or for lameness, rheumatism or fever and ague.

Wartime Rations

THE Union soldier's ration per man per day while on the march consisted of: "one pound hard bread; 12 oz salt pork or 20 oz fresh meat; sugar, coffee and salt. Beans, rice, soap, and candles were not issued when on the march. Unless troops went into camp before the end of the month where a regular depot of supplies might be available, these items were forfeited, rather than piling up to a company's credit. Company commanders could receive the equivalent of the remaining rations in cash from a brigade commissary. This was put in a company fund.

"Commissioned officers had a cash allowance, and purchased their supplies from the Brigade Commissary, Allowances were: Colonel, six rations worth \$56 and two servants; Lieutenant Colonel, five rations worth \$45 and two servants; Major, four rations worth \$36 and two servants; Captain, four rations and one servant; First and Second Lieutenant, jointly, the same as a Captain. Field officers also had an allowance of horses and forage proportionale to rank."

From "Hardtack and Coffee" by John D. Billings, 1887.

Quinine was always and everywhere prescribed with a confidence and freedom which left all other medicines far in the rear."

The fatigues of the army camp of the day were much like those to be found today—except that care of horses and mules was of course prevalent. One of the fatigue duties universally disliked was to be detailed to bury a horse or mule that had died during the night.

Following the assignment of various fatigue duties and posting of guards came drill call. Infantry drill was largely in the school of the soldier and the prevalent close-order drill. The men marched in squads of eight, in a somewhat intricate set of movements. Squads went into line of pla-

toons and companies in keeping with the linear tactics of the times.

The artillery and cavalry had their own drill maneuvers. Artillerymen spent many hours practicing to place their pieces into position quickly. The infantryman, too, had to learn the intricacies of loading his rifle—eleven separate motions were necessary, and three shots a minute was considered fast firing.

At about 1745 hours, the bugle sounded Attention, followed shortly by Assembly, and then came the Retreat roll-call. After supper the men, except those on guard duty, were free for the evening. Another call to Attention came at 8:30, again followed by the Assembly and the final roll-call of the day, known as Tattoo, after which the companies were dismissed.

Taps sounded at 1100 hours. "At its conclusion a drummer beat a few single, isolated taps, which closed the army day. At this signal all lights must be put out, all talking and other noises cease, and every man, except the guard, be inside his quarters."

Recreation and Morale

FOR their recreation in camp, the men were practically entirely on their own. Many spent much of their time writing home. Others visited with friends, organized song-fests, or even bands, played cards, or studied for advancement.

In the early months of the war silver money became so scarce that postage stamps were used as a medium of exchange. Later the government issued scrip in values from three to fifty cents, to take the place of silver. "Many an old soldier can recall his disgust on finding what a mess his stamps were in either from rain, perspiration, or compression, as he attempted, after a hot march, to get one for a letter."

Later the postmaster-general issued an order allowing soldiers to send letters without prepayment if marked on the outside "Soldier's Letter." The

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Temporary aid to wounded was given as close to fighting lines as possible.

"Just before an engagement, a field hospital for each division was established under the charge of a surgeon who was selected by the surgeon-in-chief of the division. With him was an assistant surgeon whose duty it was to pitch the tents, provide straw, fuel, water, and, in general, make everything ready for the comfort of the wounded. The hospital stewards and nurses of the division were placed under his charge, and special details made from the regiments to assist.

"Another assistant surgeon was detailed to keep a complete record of patients, with name, rank, company, and regiment, the nature of their wound and its treatment. He was also required to see to the proper interment of those who died, and the placing of properly marked head-boards at their graves.

"Then, there were in each of these division hospitals three surgeons selected from the whole division whose duty it was to perform all important operations or, at least, be responsible for their performance. Three other medical officers were detailed to assist these three. The remaining medical officers of the division, except one to a regiment, were also required to act as dressers of wounds and assistants generally. In addition a proper number of nurses and attendants were detailed to be on hand. The medical officers left with the regiments were required to establish themselves during the fighting in the rear of their respective organizations where they could give such temporary aid to the wounded as they should stand in need of."

From "Hardtack and Coffee" by John D. Billings, 1887 t

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Seriously injured men were often carried to permanent hospitals in trains.



Christian Commission also furnished envelopes gratuitously to the armies, bearing their stamp and "Soldier's Letter" in one corner.

Besides card games, many men played checkers. Some played backgammon. Chess was less popular than

it has become today.

"There were some soldiers who rarely joined in any games. In this class were to be found the illiterate members of a company. Of course they did not read or write, and they rarely played cards. They were usually satisfied to lie on their blankets, and talk with one another, or watch the playing. Yes, they did have one pastime—the proverbial soldier's pastime of smoking. A pipe was their omnipresent companion, and seemed to make up in sociability for whatsoever they lacked of entertainment.

"Evenings were the time of sociability and reminiscence. It was then quite a visiting time among soldiers of the same organization. It was then that men from the same town or neighborhood got together and exchanged home gossip. Each one would produce recent letters giving interesting information about mutual friends

or acquaintances.

"In some tents vocal or instrumental music was a feature of the evening. There was probably no regiment in the service that did not boast at least one violinist, one banjoist, and a bone player in its ranks. The usual medly of comic songs and negro melodies comprised the greater part of the entertainment, and if the space admitted, a jig or clog dance was stepped out on a hard-tack box or other crude platform."

AS with armies since time immemorial, the soldier spent considerable time just keeping vermin out of his clothing. "This was the historic 'grayback' of Union and Confederate soldiers alike. The soldier soon realized the utter impossibility of keeping free from them, and the privacy with

which he carried on his first 'skirmishing' was soon abandoned, and the warfare carried on more openly. In fact, it was the mark of a cleanly soldier to be seen engaged at it, for there was no disguising that everybody needed to do it."

The soldiers found that boiling their clothing was one good way to rid themselves of insect life. Washing and mending indeed occupied a large part of the off-duty time of many. "If troops were camping near a brook, that simplified the matter somewhat: but even then the clothes must be boiled; and for this purpose there was but one resource—the mess kettles. While it might at first interfere somewhat with your appetite to have your food cooked in the washboiler, you would soon get used to it. It was not necessary, however, for every man to do his own washing, for in most companies there was at least one man who, for a reasonable recompense, was ready to do such work in the time he had off duty."

"In the department of mending garments each man did his own work, or left it undone, just as he thought best; but no one hired it done. Every man had the necessary needles, yarn, thimble, furnished him by some mother, sister, sweetheart, or Soldier's Aid Society, and from this came his materials to mend or darn with."

While there were no travelling libraries, and no army-wide educational program as such, that still did not keep some of the more ambitious men from studying tactics. "Some were doing it, perhaps, under the instruction of superior officers; some because of an ambition to deserve promotion. Some were looking to passing a competitive examination with a view of obtaining a furlough; and so these men, from various motives, were 'booking' themselves."

Pay and Allotments

JUST as in today's Army, a system of allotments was in vogue. Although



In winter quarters, the company kitchen required plenty of wood to cook hot meals for the men.

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the pay was only \$13 a month for privates, "this plan was a great convenience to both the soldiers and their families. The calculation of the soldier was to save out enough for himself to pay all incidental expenses of camp life, such as washing, tobacco, newspapers, pies and biscuits, cheese and cakes bought of the sutler. But in spite of his nice calculations the rule was that the larger part of the money allotted home was returned, by request of the sender, in small amounts of a dollar or the fraction of a dollar."

This gave rise to the always familiar practice of the type of man referred to by soldiers of the Union armies as "beats" or "shirks"—that is, they always had cash coming from home but it hadn't arrived and couldn't they borrow a dollar or so? It seldom was returned, of course "and such is the lack of honesty and manliness on the part of these men that they can meet the old comrades of whom in those trying war days they borrowed one, two, five, or ten dollars, and in some cases more, without so much as a blush or betraying in any manner the slightest recognition of their long standing obligation. Some are so worthless and brazen-faced even as to ask the same

victims for more at this late day."

The beat or shirk had reduced to a science the entire business of trying to get along without doing his share. He had a dozen dodges for getting out of guard duty, including having to go to the company sink—latrines were so known then; playing sick, having a sore back on wood detail or water-hauling chores, and so on. He never had water in his canteen; his hardtack always ran out along with his coffee, and he borrowed unhesitatingly from those of his more provident comrades.

"Many of these shirkers would waste a great deal of time and breath, indignantly declaring that 'they enlisted to fight and not to chop wood or dig sinks.' But it was noticeable that when the fight came on, they appeared just as willing to bind themselves by contract to cut all the wood in Virginia, if they could only be let go just that once. These were the men who were 'invincible in peace and invisible in war.'"

Akin to the beat and shirk was the "jonah"—an old term applied to unlucky persons. This was the type of man who always managed to upset his messkit in his neighbor's lap or

down his neck, step on the meat frying in the fire, stumble and knock over a whole row of coffee pots, which often quenched a campfire as well as ruined the coffee, awaken everybody in the tent by his awkwardness on goin to or returning from guard duty.

MANY such men were frequently in trouble for infractions or breaches of military discipline-although most of them were too sly to get into any deep trouble. Maintaining discipline in the Civil War armies was often difficult enough. Many men came from backgrounds of frontier independence; others resented having to serve under men they considered would be their social inferiors back home; still many others found it difficult to respect any authority.

"The most common offences were drunkenness, absence from camp without leave, insubordination, disrespect to superior officers, absence from rollcall without leave, turbulence after taps, sitting while on guard, gambling, and leaving the beat without relief."

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Punishment was not as uniform as it has become under the present system of military justice. Often it was arbitrary and harsh; and the punishments themselves showed considerable imagination. The habitual offender soon found himself on his organization's black list. "When there was any particularly disagreeable task about camp to be done, the black list furnished a quota for the work. The galling part of membership was that all of the work done as one of its victims was a gratuity, as the member must stand his regular turn in his squad for whatever other fatigue duty was required. A favorite treat meted out in the artillery and cavalry was the burying of dead horses or cleaning up around the picket rope where the animals were tied.

"A more severe punishment was to knock out both heads of a barrel, then make the victim stand on the ends of the staves; some would be compelled to wear an inverted barrel for several hours; some culprits were compelled to stand a long time with their arms extending horizontally at the side, lashed to a heavy stick that ran across their backs; others were lashed to a tall wooden horse which stood perhaps eight or nine feet high; some underwent the knapsack drill, that is, they walked a beat with a guardsman two hours on and two or four hours off, wearing a knapsack filled with bricks or stones."

Although armies usually went into winter quarters, considerable campaigning was done during cold months. Here Army of Potomac stages march in January, 1863.



"Whenever a man's courage gave out in the face of the enemy, at the earliest opportunity after the battle he was stripped of his equipments and uniform, marched through the camp with a guard on either side and four soldiers following behind him at 'charge bayonets,' while a fife and drum corps brought up the rear, droning out the Rogue's March. He was sure of being hooted at and jeered at throughout the whole camp. After he had been thoroughly shown off to the entire command, he was marched outside the lines and set free. He was liable to the death penalty if found in camp afterwards. Few soldiers were put out of the service by this method."

The death penalty was invoked for desertion. Usually the entire camp was drawn up to witness the execution by firing squad. Hanging was imposed for desertion to the enemy. "The report of the Adjutant-General, made in 1870, shows that there were one hundred and twenty-one men executed during the war—a very insignificant fraction of those who, by military law, were liable to the death penalty."

In the Field

DURING the Civil War the campaign season began when spring made the winter-bound roads passable. "There was one orderly from each brigade headquarters who almost infallibly brought marching orders. The men sensed the nature of his tidings, and very often they would goodnaturedly rail at him as he rode into and out of camp, thus indicating their dislike of his errand; but the wise ones went directly to quarters and began to pack up."

This meant, of course, that the soldier discarded all the accumulations of a winter spent in camp. Around the campfires on the last night the men would frequently burn the furniture they had made for their rude huts, take down the tent coverings, and often spend the night singing the many marching or patriotic songs that were

Dividing the Coffee Ration

"THE coffee ration was usually brought to camp in an oatsack, a regimental quartermaster receiving and apportioning his among the ten companies, and the quartermaster-sergeant of a battery apportioning his to the four or six detachments. Then the orderly-sergeant of a company or the sergeant of a detachment must devote himself to dividing it.

"One method of accomplishing this purpose was to spread a rubber blanket on the ground—more than one if the company was large—and upon it were put as many piles of the coffee as there were men to receive rations. The sugar was spooned out at the same time on another blanket.

"When both were ready, they were given out, each man taking a pile, or in some companies, to prevent any charge of unfairness or injustice, the sergeant would turn his back on the rations, and take out his roll of the company. Then, by request, some one else would point to a pile and ask, "Who shall have this?" and the sergeant, without turning, would call a name from his list of the company or detachment, and the person thus called would appropriate the pile specified. This process would be continued until the last pile was disposed of."

From "Hardtack and Coffee" by John D. Billings, 1887.

popular — "John Brown's Body," "Marching Along," "Red, White, and Blue," "Rally 'Round the Flag" and others. As so frequently has happened before and since, sometimes the actual marching order might not come for another day or two.

Once on the move, however, the regiments marched with their flags at the head of the columns. Some used the national colors for a battle-flag, some the flags of their individual states.

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would discard all unnecessary items—and often much that they later would regret. When they came to a river a ponton bridge would be thrown across, although frequently the men forded it, carrying their equipment overhead. When they went into camp at night they scrounged whatever wood they could find to light their camp fires, for cooking and warmth.

Travelling along with the army went the fresh beef rations in the form of a herd of cattle. The butchers in charge slaughtered enough of the herd for the day's food ration, and parcelled

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IF the Jeep is the mainstay of modern armies, the ubiquitous Army mule was that of the armies in Civil War times. Except for being nervous under fire, the mules could stand hard usage, little or no feed, and neglect generally. Horses, of course, were used for the artillery.

"An educated mule-driver was, in his little sphere, as competent a disciplinarian as the colonel of a regiment. He was a terror to his subjects. I have seen mules, but now most obdurate, jump into their collars the next moment with the utmost determination to do their whole duty when one of these Gatling guns of curses

opened fire upon them."

On the march, the soldier frequently engaged in foraging. Frowned upon early during the war, commanders later came to wink at it; and General Sherman's forces lived off the country during his march to the sea. Even so, Sherman ordered that "In all foraging of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance."


Foraging often had its repercussions, however, and sometimes the men seeking a bit of extra meat,

poultry or eggs would run into a hornet's nest. Sometimes they would be killed in an ambush. Many of the men refused to engage in the practice—or even to share when others brought in the loot.

AS with all men who have served together for a time, new accessions to the ranks were regarded with considerable disdain until they had proven themselves. This was perhaps more true during the Civil War than in later wars because of the methods of recruitment. The volunteers who had joined regiments when they were first raised considered that they had gone to war because they wanted to serve—but that the conscripts had held back.

"The lot of the recruit in an old company was, at the best, not an enviable one, and sometimes was made very disagreeable for him. It is to be remembered that he was utterly devoid of experience in everything which goes to make up the soldier, the details of camping, cooking, drilling, marching, fighting, which put him at a disadvantage on all occasions. For this reason he easily became the butt of a large number of his companynot always, for there were some men who were ever ready to extend sympathy and furnish information to him. But many of the veterans seemed to forget how they themselves obtained their army education little by little . . . "

But usually it did not take long to make good soldiers out of the recruits. Soon they were slipping into the daily life of the soldier of the time-cooking their own meals, darning their own socks, trying to get out of horse-burying details, stockading their tents, learning the intricacies of drill. And after their first baptism of fire, they considered themselves just as hardened a soldier as the next man in the ranks. Together, the former recruit and the man who had volunteered in 1861 went down the road to history. Together they all now rest in honored glory.



THE Civil War provoked the greatest flood of letter writing that this country had ever known. About three and a half million men donned the uniform of one side or the other, and this represented a far greater mobilization than any prior American war. Most of the men who joined the Civil War armies wrote letters to their homefolk, and many thousands of these personal documents have been preserved in private possession and in public depositories.

The majority of Civil War soldiers were country folk between the ages of 18 and 30 and only a few of them had traveled far beyond the limits of their neighborhoods. Some of them indicated that the initial letter penned in camp was the first that they had ever written.

Travel, contact with strangers, and other new and exciting experiences stimulated rustic soldiers to an unusual degree of expressiveness.

In sharing their novel and wonderful experiences with their homefolk. Rebs and Yanks sometimes drew unfavorable comparisons between the places they visited and their native localities. William B. Gaskins of the First Massachusetts Regiment wrote in his diary on 20 September 1861, after a tour of the Nation's capital: "We . . . had a fine view of Washington and the neighborhood, but I was struck with the mean appearance of the city of Washington with the exception of the Government Buildings there is not a building in the whole city which can be called a good one in comparison with the Stores and dwelling houses in Boston. I had thought that Washington was the finest looking city of or in the country, but it is not."

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J. B. Lance, a Tar Heel rustic who went from his native Buncombe County, to the environs of Charleston, South Carolina, wrote after his arrival in South Carolina: "Father I have saw a rite smart of the world Since I left home but I have not Saw any place like Buncombe and Henderson yet."

Many of the soldiers had their first train ride when they moved from neighborhood training camps to the seat of war. This experience usually was described in some detail. An Ohio soldier, after making the long trip from his home state to Maryland, wrote a friend: "Frank since I seen you last I hav seen the elephant. We started from Urbana [Ohio] at three oclok p.m. we past within 4 mils of Whelling virginia. We past through some of the damdes places ever saw by mortel eyes. We run under som of the dames hills it was dark as the low regeons of hell. We past through one tunel too miles long. . . . As we was passing from tunelton to New Crick the cars run onto a stone that would weigh 500 lbs it was put on the track by rebels it was just whair the track runs close to the river if the engen had not bin so hevy we would have all went to hell in a pile or some other seaport."

THE typical common soldier on either side was a man of little education. Hence, most of the letters are poorly written from standpoints of spelling, handwriting, and grammar. Spelling was frequently phonetic. One soldier wrote: "The boys hant used wright we have not drawed a cent of pay yet. . . . we have to take it ruff and tumbel." Shortly after the Army of the Potomac was divided into corps, a Yank wrote to his homefolk: "They are dividing the Army up into Corpses."

THE letters of the common soldiers are rich in humor. Indeed, no riches humor is to be found in the

whole of American literature than in the letters of the semi-literate men who wore the blue and the gray. Some of their figures of speech were colorful and expressive. A Confederate observed that the Yankees were: "thicker than lice on a hen and a dam site ornraier." Another reported that his comrades were "in fine spirits pitching around like a blind dog in a meat house." A third wrote that it was "raining like poring peas on a rawhide."

Yanks were equally adept at figurative expression. One wrote: "[I am so hungry] I could eat a rider off his horse & snap at the stirups." A second reported that the dilapidated houses in Virginia "look like the latter end of original sin and hard times." One Yank parodied the familiar bedtime prayer:

"Now I lay me down to sleep, The gray-backs o'er my body creep; If they should bite before I wake, I pray the Lord their jaws to break."

Charles Thiot, a splendid Georgia soldier, differed from most of his comrades in the ranks in that he was the owner of a large plantation, well-educated, and nearly fifty years of age. But he was very much like his associates in his hatred of camp routine. Near the end of his service he wrote that when the war was over he was going to buy two pups, name one of them "fall-in" and the other "close-up," and then shoot them both, "and that will be the end of 'fall-in' and 'close-up'."

IN THE South, after the first year of the war, paper and ink were very poor. Scarcity of paper caused many Southerners to adopt the practice of cross-writing, i.e., after writing from left to right of the page in the usual manner, they gave the sheet a half turn and wrote from end to end across the lines previously written.

Sometimes soldiers wrote letters while bullets were whizzing about their heads. A Yank writing from

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Vicksburg, 28 May 1863, stated: "Not less than 50 balls have passed over me since I commenced writing. . . . I could tell you of plenty narrow escapes, but we take no notice of them now."

A Reb stationed near Petersburg informed his mother: "I need not tell you that I dodge pretty often . . . for you can see that very plainly by the blots in this letter. Just count each blot a dodge and add in a few for I don't dodge every time."

THE most common type of letter was that of soldier husbands to their wives. But fathers often addressed communications to their small children; and these, full of homely advice, are among the most human and revealing of Civil War letters. Rebs who owned slaves occasionally would include in their letters admonitions or greetings to members of the Negro community. Occasionally they would write to the slaves.

Early in the war it was not uncommon for planters' sons to retain in camp Negro "body servants" to perform the menial chores such as cooking, foraging, cleaning the quarters, shining shoes, and laundering clothes. Sometimes these servants wrote or dictated for enclosure with the letters of the soldier-masters messages to their relatives and to members of their owners' families.

Unmarried soldiers carried on correspondence with sweethearts at home. Owing to the restrained usages characteristic of 19th century America, these letters usually were stereotyped and revealed little depth of feeling.

Initiation into combat sometimes elicited from soldier correspondents choice comments about their experiences and reactions. A Federal infantryman wrote to his father shortly after his first skirmish in Virginia; "Dear Pa. . . . Went out a Skouting yesterday. We got to one house where there were five secessionist they brok & run and Arch holored out to shoot the ornery suns of biches and we all let go at them. Thay may say what they please but godamit Pa it is fun."

Some of the choicest remarks made by soldiers in their letters were in disparagement of unpopular officers. A Mississippi soldier wrote: "Our General . . . is a vain, stuck-up, illiterate ass." An Alabamian wrote: "Col. Henry is [an ignoramus] fit for nothing higher than the cultivation of corn." A Floridian stated that his officers were "not fit to tote guts to a bear."

On 9 December 1862, Sergeant Edwin H. Fay, an unusual Louisianan who held A.B. and M.A. degrees from Harvard University and who before the war was headmaster of a private school for boys in Louisiana, wrote his wife: "I saw Pemberton and he is the most insignificant puke I ever saw. . . . His head cannot contain enough sense to command a regiment, much less a corps. . . . Jackson runs first and his Cavalry are well drilled to follow their leader. He is not worth shucks. But he is a West Point graduate and therefore must be born to command."



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As it always has been to soldiers, mail call was a great morale factor and every effort was made to get letters to men, as here in a trench before Petersburg.

Similar comments about officers are to be found in the letters of Northern soldiers. A Massachusetts soldier, who seems to have been a Civil War version of Bill Mauldin, wrote: "The officers consider themselves as made of a different material from the low fellows in the ranks. . . . They get all the glory and most of the pay and don't earn ten cents apiece on the average, the drunken rascals." Private George Gray Hunter of Pennsylvania wrote: "I am well convinced in My own Mind that had it not been for officers this war would have ended long ago." Another Yankee became so disgusted as to state: "I wish to God one half of our officers were knocked in the head by slinging them against [the other half]."

No group of officers came in for more spirited denunciation than the doctors. One Federal soldier wrote: "The doctors is no a conte . . . hell will be filde with do[c]ters and offersey when this war is over." Shortly after the beginning of Sherman's Georgia campaign, an ailing Yank wrote his

homefolk: "The Surgeon insisted on Sending me to the hospital for treatment. I insisted on takeing the field and prevailed—thinking that I had better die by rebel bullets than [by] Union quackery."

THE attitudes which the Rebs and Yanks took toward each other were very much the same and ranged over the same gamut of feeling, from friendliness to extreme hatred. The Rebs were, to a Massachusetts corporal, "fighting madmen or not men at all but whiskey & gunpowder put into a human frame." A Pennsylvania soldier wrote that "they were the hardest looking set of men that Ever i saw they Looked as if they had been fed on vinegar and shavings. . . ."

Writing from the opposite side, Thomas Taylor, a private in the 6th Alabama Volunteers, in a letter to his wife, stated: "You know that my heart is with you but I never could have been satisfied to have staid at home when my country is invaded by a thievin foe By a set of cowardly

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Skunks whose Motto is Booty. . . . No No let me undergo the toils the privations & self denials of a Soldiers life & then return to my family to live in peace and pleasure." Another private, from Virginia, asked in wonder: "Will god answer the prayers of such a people when offered in behalf of such a war." And a Mississippi private writes to his mother: "It is my Honest wish that my Rifle may Draw tears from Many a Northern Mother and Sighs from Many a father before this thing is over yet."

Yet the men did talk with each other across the picket lines, and even fraternized with each other. Jerome Yates, a private in a Mississippi regiment, wrote to his sister: "our skirmishers are in 150 yds of their line of Battle and 100 v from their Sharpshooters fireing has been agreed to by parties as a useless waste of Ammunition and we boldly shout and look each other in the face from day light until night and then listen for each other to advance we read Each others papers in 15 minutes after the news Boys Bring them from the Office the Boys deal Considerable with them for various little articles such as Coffee Knifes Pipes writing Paper and Envelopes."

And, from the other side, in a letter to his mother, Private Edward Louis Edes of the 33rd Massachusetts Regiment, wrote: "Our pickets are on one bank of a creek and the rebel pickets on the other. And for a long time, since we agreed not to shoot at each other we have gone down the bank and talked and traded with them a great deal. . . . "

IF THEY hated each other, both Reb and Yank could yet recognize each other's courage. On hearing of Stonewall Jackson's death, a Wisconsin sergeant wrote: "Rebel though he was, he was gallant and manly, and was admired, by every one that ever had anything to do with him, for his noble qualities. He was one of those

many instances recorded in the worlds history, of a good man, being deceived into lending himself to a bad cause."

Captain Charles E. Willis of the 103rd Illinois Infantry recorded in his diary: "I was never so affected by the Sight of dead & wounded before. Old gray haired weakly looking men and little boys certainly not over 15 yrs. old lay dead or writhing in pain, I did pity those poor boys. They almost all who could talk said that the rebel cavalry gathered them up & forced them in. We took all inside our skirmish line that could bear moving to our hospital & covered the rest with the blankets of the dead. I hope we will never have to shoot at such men again."

"Dashing, brave, impetuous, but doomed to destruction"—so a Union soldier wrote of the enemy at Chancellorsville.

THE letters of Johnny Rebs and Billy Yanks are fascinating social documents. They are especially valuable for the light which they throw on the character of the plain people of a century ago. These letters show, for example, that most of the lowly people were ambitious for their children. However lacking they themselves might be in culture, they wanted their children to have an opportunity to rise in the social scale and to become honorable, useful citizens.

To their wives the lowly soldiers wrote: whatever happens to me, be sure to keep the children in school. A favorite message to their children was: be good, mind your mother, don't neglect your books. This advice reflected the most earnest longing of these humble fathers for their sons and daughters.

The letters also reveal that the humble folk were people of integrity. It is not meant to suggest, of course, that all were admirable, for both the Northern and the Southern armies had their quotas of shirkers, cowards, and knaves. But for the most part,

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Johnny Rebs and Billy Yanks were respectable men. Their worth is suggested by the notable recurrence in their letters of such words as honor and duty.

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In the third place, the common soldiers were men of courage. Time after time they marched into a hell of fire and lead without flinching. Even more staunch and more courageous were the lowly wives and mothers at home who held their families together during the absence of their men folk, plowed the fields, harvested the crops, cut and hauled the fire wood, nursed the sick, buried the dead, endured the gnawing anxiety about soldier husbands or sons, and had the stamina and moral strength to write cheering letters.

A Virginia woman, who by her resourcefulness and toil was able to sustain several children, wrote her soldier husband on 20 November 1864: "donte be uneasy about us. We will try and take care of [our] selves the best we can. I donte mind what I have to do [just] so you can get back safe." A stalwart Georgia woman whose soldier husband had written that he could not send her any money, owing to failure to receive his pay, replied: "John don't disfurnish your self to send me mony for I will make out som way. . . . I hope you will chire up and not study [i.e., worry] too much for it onle mak bad wors. . . . Dont be onese about me." Her response is the more magnificent in view of the fact that she had recently been forced to sell home and small farm and was having enormous difficulty in supporting herself and baby.

The common soldiers and their folk at home were people of generosity. Rebs and Yanks, living often on reduced rations, did not hesitate to share their meager provisions with comrades more needy than themselves. And the letters and diaries of soldiers and civilians traveling through the South during the Civil War indicate that when they needed a meal or shelter they could almost always find hospitality in the homes of the yeomen. The same cannot be said of the reception accorded by the more privileged.

In sum, the letters of Johnny Reb and Billy Yank indicate that the common people, both North and South, were the bedrock of their respective causes. Their conduct during the momentous crisis of the American Civil War reflected great credit on them and their class, and justified the faith reposed in them by their dedicated champion, Thomas Jefferson.

One of the persons who recognized the solid worth of the common folk while the war was still in progress was A. T. Davidson, a member of the Confederate Congress from North Carolina. On 4 March 1863, Davidson wrote his brother, a lieutenant in the Confederate army: "This revolution has brought to the surface no great looking heroes but thousands and tens of thousands of heroes in the ranks and the country in coming years will be bound to acknowledge it."



Amid the clamor, confusion, and mounting casualties, a new voice was heard. The working reporter who dug, scratched, surmounted rebuffs, earned for his breed this noted historian's



Civil War Newsmen

Bruce Catton

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N 1861 the United States of America knew very little either about war or about newspaper reporting—in the modern sense. Americans then were amateurs in both fields.

Until a very short time before the Civil War began there were no reporters, in the modern sense of the word. The newspaper was an organ of opinion. Its editorial page slopped over into all the other pages; the editor was advancing a point of view, and what he printed depended pretty largely on what his point of view was. A newspaper was primarily an institution that argued a cause. If you believed in that cause, as a reader, you subscribed to that paper; if you believed in some other cause you subscribed to some other paper, which would show you the world as you wanted to see it.

Then the Civil War came along, and suddenly things were very different.

The people . . . wanted desperately to know what was really going on with the sons and brothers and husbands they had said goodbye to. They wanted to know what was happening. They wanted unvarnished facts, and the American newspaper suddenly discovered that from now on the emphasis was going to be on news.

At that point the Reporter, in the modern sense of the word, began to come into his own.

He had a hard row to hoe, because the United States Army could not quite get the idea. The reporter had no tradition back of him. (In a good many cases he did not have much of an editor back of him either.) The Army had all it could do to get used to the



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fact that it was fighting a war that was bigger, more complex and more savage than anything it had ever dreamed of: the reporter was simply a nuisance, and if he could not be turned into a press-agent for some deserving general he was usually looked upon as a sort of fifth wheel that somehow could not quite be discarded.

Without premeditation on anybody's part, the modern reporter suddenly came into being. When I say "the modern reporter" I mean the man who was, for that day, a new breed of cat—the reporter who was not out to support a point of view or uphold a cause but who simply wanted to get the best and most detailed story possible about what was actually going on around him. That man—the spiritual ancestor of all of us here today—began to come into being during the Civil War.

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The Civil War reporter had to fight for everything he got. There were no hand-outs; he had to get out and scratch, on his own hook. Nobody in the army was responsible for him. If there was a battle he had to prowl around the field as best he could—often enough, in imminent danger of life and limb—and pry out the facts for himself. Then he had to make his own arrangements for getting the story back to the office. This frequently involved spending 24 hours in the saddle.

Along with everything else, the Civil War reporter had to have a horse, and know how to ride it, and make arrangements for having the beast fed and stabled. There were not many telegraph offices then, and the ones within easy range of army headquarters were usually tied up with army messages. Reaching the wire so that he could file his story might involve a very long, wearing ride. If the battle had gone badly-which, on the Union side, in the Virginia theater, was not unusual -the army authorities were apt to do everything they could to keep him from filing his story at all.

On top of everything else, if the reporter's story as finally printed of-

fended the commanding general, which very often happened, the reporter might get bodily thrown out of the whole theater of operations, or even sent off to prison for a few weeks.

The Civil War reporter surmounted very great handicaps and by and large did a job which was of immense service to the country; a job, furthermore, which permanently raised the reporter's own status, expanded his professional horizon, and did a great deal to improve the standards of news-gathering all across the country.

Throughout the four years of the Civil War the reporters saw to it that the flow of news was unchecked. The American public was never pampered or spoon-fed. There were no elaborate public relations set-ups in government to shield the people from unpleasant facts. Nobody had to rely on handouts cooked up by timid officials who felt that the unvarnished truth might be "bad for the war effort." The unpleasant truths kept coming out. All of the blunders, the miscalculations and the military snafu's were recorded as they occurred; by and large the general public knew the worst all the way through, and there were times when

But the point is that this did not harm the war effort. On the contrary it helped it; in the long run it made its victorious conclusion possible. The people did the job they had to do, paying a heavy price for it, enduring right to the end-and they thereby justified the faith which lies at the bottom of every reporter's creed: the faith that our democracy is perfectly willing to face the facts, that it will bear up under any crisis so long as it knows the truth about everything, that it is wise enough and adult enough to find its own way if the press will give it the proper light—the clear light of day.

the worst was very bad indeed.

The Civil War newspaperman had to fight to win acceptance, and he won his fight by doing his job. The war would never have been won without him. The state of public information in the Civil War—

Correspondents



N APRIL 1862 the mighty Army of the Potomac, some 90,000 strong, lay in the thickets, swamps and slashes of the lower Peninsula region of Virginia.

The war was then a year old. In the Western Theater the Federals had scored resounding successes—among them the capture of Island No. 10, Forts Donelson and Henry. In bloody engagements at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, and Pittsburg Landing (Shiloh Church), Tennessee, the Confederate States had been all but cut off from everything west of the Mis-

sissippi and north of the Tennessee Rivers.

But in the East the war had been very different. Since the previous July, when the ill-starred General Irwin McDowell had clashed with General P.G.T. Beauregard along a sluggish little creek called Bull Run, in a wild and awkward mob scene between two untrained armies, no major engagements had been fought.

From the United States point of view the war had gone well in the west, but it had hardly moved at all in the east.

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Cover the Battle

Now General George Brinton Mc-Clellan, who had rebuilt the Army of the Potomac from the wreckage left after Bull Run, was poised to deliver the Union's Sunday punch. He was to take Richmond, by the back door, and end the war.

If "The Young Napoleon" had been able to fight an army as well as he could train and equip one he might have ended the Civil War that summer. But audacity and cold nerve were not a part of McClellan's military make-up. He was an engineer and a logistician with few peers. He insisted that there be a 100 percent safety factor in every plan. And he was up against, in succession, two of the most pugnacious military gamblers America has ever produced—Generals Joseph E. Johnston and then R. E. Lee.

With somewhat more than half of McClellan's strength under their command, they fought him and fooled him in the bloody Seven Days' Battle. The Federals repulsed the Confederates at Malvern Hill and then, to the pleased astonishment of General Lee, General McClellan withdrew toward his transports, to the disgust of some of his own Corps and Division commanders.

Though there were no fewer than 40 newspaper reporters, or "special

correspondents" as they were called, representing almost every major paper in the North, the public got only fragmentary, and often unreliable, news of the country's greatest undertaking in that spring of 1862. The Army of the Potomac was already evacuating the Peninsula of Virginia before Northern citizens learned the sad fact that McClellan was not still advancing on the Confederate capital.

This was not the fault of the war correspondents. McClellan had so restricted their movements, and had clamped them into an almost air-tight censorship, that a factual reporting of the campaign was virtually impossible.

One of the ablest of the Corps Commanders, and a close personal friend of McClellan, was General Fitz John Porter, scion of a distinguished family that had provided high ranking officers in the Army and Navy. Porter was a real scrapper. He had most of the qualities his friend McClellan lacked. But both Porter and his boss had the same blind spot: neither could, or would, understand that almost undefinable thing which, for lack of a more precise term, now passes under the title of public information.

General Porter had a contempt for politicians; that wispy thing called public opinion was something about which he understood little if anything; and he didn't like reporters. It was mutual: they did not like him either.

As an intimate friend and a close and trusted adviser of McClellan, he had urged the Commander of the Army of the Potomac to exclude all war correspondents from the Peninsular Campaign. Though the cautious McClellan was hardly willing to go that far, he did order a strict censorship on the reporters for Northern newspapers. They were forbidden to write anything of major news value. The telegraph was closed to them and their personal mail was censored. The reporters were forbidden to write their own editors and tell them they were operating under rigid censorship, hence the innocuous stories about camp life, and the heavily editorialized pieces about the prospective "glorious march on Richmond" which never came off.

General Porter Goes Aloft

IT IS slight wonder that the newspapermen who accompanied the Army of the Potomac in the wet spring of 1862 were a disgruntled lot. Nor that they took a special glee in writing about the misadventure that happened to Major General Fitz John Porter on 11 April.

On that date the Union Army was still slogging around in its encampments near Yorktown. Its great tests in fire were yet to come.

A young man, answering to the improbable name of Dr. Thaddeus Sobieski Constantine Lowe, had been attached to the Army of the Potomac

to make aerial observations for the Union artillery. In addition to providing some accurate information concerning the Confederate positions, his balloon ascensions served another most useful purpose; they gave the war correspondents something to write about that was not forbidden by the censors. The scribes made the most of it.

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Strangely enough, the hot-tempered Fitz John Porter appreciated the potential value of Dr. Lowe's balloon and made frequent flights with the daring young aeronaut.

By all accounts 11 April 1862 was a dull, rainy day. Fitz John Porter thought the Rebs were much too quiet, and decided to go up and have a look for himself.

Dr. Lowe was off somewhere trying to scrounge rations and supplies for his balloon crew. General Porter was ruffled by the absence of Dr. Lowe; he ordered the balloon inflated and announced that he would go up alone.

During preparations for the ascension the testy Corps Commander got more impatient by the minute, and the crewmen handling the operation were somewhat rattled. So, when the bag was filled and Porter climbed into the basket, they lost control of the balloon and let go the guy lines. The wind carried the precious balloon, and General Porter, straight toward the Confederates. The ground crew raced along trying to grab the ropes. Porter jumped up and down like a mad monkey, shouting orders and pleading for advice on what to do



COLONEL JOHN M. VIRDEN, USAF-Ret., is Associate Editor of the Army-Navy-Air Force Register.

to get the contraption under control.

His voice carried clearly into the opposing lines and the soldiers, being what soldiers have always been, set up a howl of laughter. Just as the balloon, carrying the thoroughly angry Major General over the Rebel positions, had commenced to settle, a sudden gust of wind picked it up and blew it back into the Union camp. Crewmen finally grabbed the trailing lines and hauled it down.

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Three reporters witnessed this incident, and others soon learned of it. All of them had a field day writing about it. Nearly everybody who could read, North and South, had a good laugh at General Porter's expense.

Orders are Orders

JUST one month later the war correspondents with the Unionists saw nothing funny about General Orders 123. It read:

Camp at Roper's Meeting House, Va. May 12, 1862

I. Hereafter no newspaper correspondent or other citizen will be allowed to go to the front beyond General Headquarters or to accompany the advance guard of any of the advanced divisions on the march. II. All passes to newspaper correspondents to accompany the Army will be signed by Brig. Gen. R. B. Marcy, Chief of Staff. No other will be recognized.

By order of George B. McClellan Major General, Commanding

This order, however, did not cut the correspondents off from all sources of hard news. For the Civil War reporters were ingenious free-wheelers. General Headquarters was sometimes "hard to find" and there were always side roads by which they could ride up to where the real show was going on.

On one occasion General George Stoneman, Chief of Cavalry, surprised the whole press corps enjoying a snack of fried chicken in a Virginia planter's home, well forward of the most advanced Union outposts. With Mc-

Clellan's General Orders 123 fresh in his mind, Stoneman placed them under arrest and marched them seven miles through the mud to the rear and placed them in the guardhouse. The next morning McClellan listened gravely to the charges, delivered them a reprimand, admonished them to obey orders in the future, and dismissed them.

Although General Orders 123 applied only in the Army of the Potomac, it set the tone of orders governing the control of press relations in all the Union armies. None of these efforts at restricting what could and could not be printed worked very well. The enterprising reporter could, and often did, ride out of the area occupied by the military and file his copy in some post office with reasonable assurance it would reach the home office safely.

The fact that the report would be days late didn't prevent it being eagerly read by a public hungry for every scrap of news about the war. More often than not, such first-hand reports emanating within the Northern armies were picked up, in whole or in part, and reprinted in the newspapers of the South. Reports from the Army of Northern Virginia, as printed in the newspapers, were about Southern equally often reprinted in the Northern journals, and were always read by intelligence officers in the Federal forces. Frequently these news stories were a good deal more informative and dependable than reports sent to General Headquarters by Union or Confederate spies and other secret agents.

Press Relations

IN MANY WAYS, the American Civil War was the first of the modern wars not only in terms of the introduction of modern weapons, organized medical service, an efficient signal corps and the intelligent use of railroads for rapid troop and supply transport, but also in the scope of

press coverage that was given it.

Contrasting with the way newsmen are handled by all branches of the military service these days, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Civil War correspondents were sometimes treated like the proverbial skunks at the May party. They provided their own rations, transportation, shelter—and, in all but rare cases, managed to write a reasonably good account of the war in spite of, rather than because of, the military attitude toward them.

Some of them were drummed out of camp to the tune of the "Rogue's March." General George Gordon Meade, victor at Gettysburg, Commander of the Army of the Potomac, once ordered a correspondent of the highly-respected *Philadelphia Inquirer* paraded through the Army lines wearing a sign around his neck inscribed "Libeller of the Press." This scribe, who had written something that displeased General Meade, was then expelled from the camp.

General "Old Brains" Halleck evicted all correspondents en masse as he advanced on Corinth "by inches" after Shiloh, and General William T. Sherman court-martialed those who accompanied his Yazoo expedition against his orders. Later in the war, in the devastating Georgia campaign, Sherman just "vanished" by the simple expedient of effectively muzzling all newsmen or chasing them out of the area under his control.

These were extreme cases, of course, and perhaps the overriding need for security justified some of the restrictions placed on the men who were covering the war for the hundreds of journals hungry for every scrap of news concerning America's great struggle.

Evolving Press Coverage

THERE were outstanding commanders, both in the Federal and the Confederate forces, who fully understood the importance of keeping the "folks back home" fully informed to insure continued support of the grinding war. Among these were U. 3. Grant, R. E. Lee, W. T. Rosecrans, George Thomas and Phil Sheridan.

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In fact, General Grant was downright friendly with the war correspondents, some of whom told fantastic lies about him, until the Wilderness Campaign. His silence there was dictated by obvious need for secrecy of his movements rather than by any change of heart. After Grant reached Petersburg, the reporters were free to report just about anything they felt was news—even including the awful fiasco in the "Battle of the Crater."

Most of the hundreds of war correspondents, artists and photographers—and the latter generally did a better job than the scriveners—are only names of long-forgotten men on the yellow and brittle pages in old newspaper and magazine files now. But it is worth remembering that the reputations of some of our greats and near-greats were established by these same faceless men who shared the hardships of the Civil War.

They ranged in character and ability from near geniuses, like Whitelaw Reid, of the Cincinnati Gazette, and W. H. Russell of the London Times, on down to outright hacks. Some were paid handsome salaries and afforded unlimited expense accounts and others wrote for niggardly space rates that netted them no more than the pay of an Army private.

A number of Civil War correspondents were killed in battle; the exact number is hard to determine since the military forces on both sides kept no records of these civilians. At one time the New York Herald had five "specials" in Confederate prisons, and during the course of the war lost seven correspondents as the result of enemy action, disease and exposure. That paper, which spent more than a half million dollars to gather the war news, also listed 78 horses "killed, wounded, and missing." By 1864 the Herald had 40 correspondents scattered through

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"NOT long since, General Sherman, in conversation, alluded to a correspondent of the New York Herald whom he had threatened to hang, declaring that had he done so his 'death would have saved ten thousand lives.' It seems that one of our Signal officers had succeeded in reading the code of the enemy, and had communicated the same to his fellow-officers. With this code in their possession, the corps was enabled to furnish valuable information directly from Rebel headquarters, by reading the Rebel signals, continuing to do so during the Chattanooga and much of the Atlanta campaign, when the enemy's signal flags were often plainly visible.

"Suddenly this source of information was completely cut off by the ambition of the correspondent to publish all the news, and the natural result was the enemy changed the code. This took place just before Sherman's attack on Kenesaw Mountain (June 1864), and it is to the hundreds slaughtered there that he probably refers. General Thomas was ordered to arrest the reporter and have him hanged as a spy; but old 'Pap' Thomas' kind heart banished him to the north of the Ohio for the remainder of the war instead."

> From "Hardtack and Coffee" by John D. Billings, 1887.

the Army of the Tennessee, Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the

While the *Herald* made the greatest, and most expensive, effort to present a well-rounded account of the war, day by day, including regular reports from the Deep South and from within the Confederate Army, it was by no means alone. Competition for war news was a keen and cut-throat affair from first to last.

Close on the heels of the New York Herald came the New York Times and the Tribune. Although they could not compete with the giant New York papers in the scope of their coverage, the papers in St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Washington and Boston maintained fulltime correspondents with the Federal armies throughout the war. Some of the reports written by representatives of the papers in those smaller cities made up in excellence what they were denied in circulation.

Coverage of the war by the press improved vastly in 1863 and 1864. The restrictions on the correspondents, written in the first and second years of the conflict, still stood—on paper but were only rarely enforced to the letter. For one thing, veteran correspondents had learned, perhaps too well, how to avoid censorship, and the commanders had finally accepted the fact that the Civil War was the people's war, fought by uniformed and armed civilians, with only a sprinkling of professionals among them, and that the war correspondents could, and generally did, perform a useful service, for without a steady flow of information from the fighting forces to the home communities the burden and sacrifice of the war would become intolerable in short order. It was very nearly unbearable anyway.

THE American Civil War found the press unhampered by any legal or traditional restrictions while the military leaders had no experience whatever in the handling of war news, or the men who wrote it. The rules were made up on both sides as they went along. Before the end of the conflict the relationship between the armed forces, their political superiors, and the public information media, had reached a rather satisfactory working arrangement, if not agreement.

Considering that everything had to start from scratch in that first of the modern wars, the surprising thing is not that public information as practiced in the Civil War was spotty and sometimes irresponsible and erratic. The astonishing thing is that it worked

as well as it did.

In every battle and campaign, combat intelligence—or lack of it exerted a decisive influence as a



NTELLIGENCE is a broad term applied to the complex of activities involved in the collection and evaluation that discovers opportunity in war.

Military historians have always recognized that there existed what has been termed a "fog of war." The movement of one's own troops on the battlefield, the difficulties of transmitting orders, the confusion of movements caused by terrain, and above all the actual location and intention of the enemy have created great difficulties for the commander.

It is to pierce this fog that intelligence has always been aimed. To deEc

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Edward Steere

termine the intent of the enemy, spies and informers have been utilized since earliest times. To determine the actual movements and dispositions of the commander's own troops, close observation has always been necessary. Today trained personnel piece together all available information and prepare for the commander an estimate of the situation which helps him reach his decisions. But such staff assistance was not provided during the Civil War.

The rudimentary type of staff organization provided for intelligence operations during the 1860's is vividly illustrated by the Confederate council of war held shortly after dark on 1 May 1863, in a pine copse near Chancellorsville. Lee and Stonewall Jackson sat on upturned cracker boxes, tracing Hooker's dispositions on a hastily drawn sketchmap. His left and center, it appeared, were strongly entrenched on high ground. Both agreed that a frontal attack would be suicidal. Then opportunity came with a clatter of hoofs.

Jeb Stuart, Chief of Cavalry, rode up to report that Fitzhugh Lee's brigade had located Hooker's right in a position that invited attack. Lee's evaluation was made in a flash of genius. He ordered Jackson to march the next day by a circuitous route across Hooker's front and hit his vulnerable flank.

Hooker, on his part, shunned opportunity. Lee had divided his army in the presence of a superior enemy force.

A Federal signal station observed Jackson's marching column. The Federal commander construed the report as evidence that the Confederate army was falling back toward Richmond. Hooker was withdrawing troops from his center to spearhead a pursuit when his right crumpled under Jackson's flank attack.

The use and misuse of intelligence at Chancellorsville may have been characteristic of the period. The vast body of Civil War literature is, in the main, devoted to feats of the combat arms. Staff functions receive scant attention. Nothing can be found that will identify a staff member devoted exclusively to the supervision of intelligence.

The Army provost marshal general, it appears, served as a part-time intelligence officer. In connection with his duties as security officer, he directed within his army area the activities of civilian secret agents and "scouts"—generally detailed from the ranks—as well as the interrogation of prisoners and deserters. He reported on such matters to the chief of staff.

A product of routine procedure inherited from times when battles partook more of the nature of a formalized duel than a contest of skill between rival commanders, the data funneled through the office of the provost marshal was deficient in combat intelligence.

There was no real integration of command and staff functions, as now

provided by an association of planning experts and the high command in the Army General Staff. Nor was there any group of trained specialists that suggests comparison with the General Staff Corps, as presently constituted.

Famed as an organizer and trainer of troops, Major General George B. McClellan sought a quick solution by delegating the intelligence function to a civilian agency. He authorized Allan Pinkerton, the famous detective and director of a widely known investigative service, to establish the organization now known as the Secret Service.

Pinkerton staffed the service with operatives drafted from his detective agency, and confidently undertook responsibilities as both intelligence officer of the General in Chief and as chief of intelligence in the Army of the Potomac.

SOME spectacular feats in counterespionage won quick applause. Pinkerton's men moved in on the swarm of Confederate spies infesting Washington and shadowed guileless Union officers who frequented sumptuous salons maintained by gracious ladies in the pay of the Confederacy. The sleuthing that put Mrs. Rose Greenhow's place at 13th and I Streets out of business was conducted in the best cloak-anddagger tradition.

However proficient in the detection of crime, Pinkerton's professionals did not make good military observers. In preparing an estimate of Confederate strength that would oppose McClellan in his advance up the peninsula of Virginia on Richmond, Pinkerton

added up the figures assigned by different agents in the field to the various units comprising the Army of Northern Virginia. The 200,000 total thus derived was twice the strength of McClellan's effective force and nearly three times the actual count of Lee's disposable troops.

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Believing that he faced the odds indicated in Pinkerton's faulty estimate, McClellan operated with a caution that invited disaster. Boldly accepting the invitation, Lee won a triumph in the Seven Days' Battle that gave the Army of Northern Virginia an endowment of a victorious elan.

Persistence of the obsession as to Lee's great superiority in numbers haunted McClellan throughout the Maryland campaign. Mistrust of the hesitant commander's sincerity in constantly pleading his own want of strength to strike a decisive blow finally persuaded President Lincoln to remove him from command and appoint Major General Ambrose E. Burnside in his place.

Much-maligned Burnside deserves credit for restoring the intelligence function to military control. Pinkerton was sent to a remote Western department, and the provost marshal general resumed his accustomed duties in connection with intelligence.

Intelligence Factors

FROM the start, the Confederacy enjoyed an immense advantage that endured throughout the war. Most of the fighting occurred on Southern soil. In addition to facing armed opposition, the invader contended against every



EDWARD STEERE is author of The Wilderness Campaign (Stackpole, 1961), Final Disposition of World War II Dead (Government Printing Office, 1957), and articles in Encyclopedia Britannica and Americana Ecyclopedia. obstacle imposed by a hostile population employing all the devices of passive resistance.

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Again, the South had in its abundance of fine saddle horses and expert riders a ready-made mounted arm that for a time rode unopposed as the eves and ears of the army. During the Peninsular campaign, Jeb Stuart leaped to fame by leading a small detachment around the Army of the Potomac. His report on enemy dispositions contributed to Lee's victory in the Seven Days' Battle. Stuart shortly repeated the feat, riding around Pope's army and reporting information that Lee utilized in the turning movement he brought to a brilliant culmination at Second Manassas.

The supremacy of Confederate cavalry waned as the supply of remounts approached exhaustion and Northern horsemen appeared in greater masses under dashing young brigadiers. But the compeers of Stuart were late arrivals on the battlefield.

The first serious challenge came in the famous cavalry clash at Brandy Station during June 1863. Although Northern horsemen quit the field, they accomplished their mission by locating enemy infantry in numbers that disclosed Lee's plan to launch his second invasion of the North.

The balance struck at Brandy Station steadily inclined in favor of the North as its cavalry, equipped with magazine rifles, attained overwhelming superiority in numbers and fire-power. It seems doubtful, however, that the Federal cavalry ever acquired the skill in reconnaissance evinced by Stuart's horse (Gettysburg excepted) in the days of its primacy.

Advantages contributing to the service of intelligence were not entirely on the side of the South. As attested by its superb artillery and a superior corps of engineers and topographers, the North took an early lead in all those phases of military organization that depend upon the ability to produce large supplies of technical equipment.

Bearing directly on the intelligence problem was a wealth of materiel and technological competence that enabled the North promptly to create a matchless signal service, combining field telegraphy with visual signalling by flag to serve an interior area that could not be conveniently reached by wire and that lay beyond the range of mounted couriers.

Even before Stuart made his first ride around the Army of the Potomac, McClellan's signalmen established telegraphic communications between army headquarters and the major subordinate commands. It was McClellan's misfortune that his cavalry gave him little of importance to transmit. Superior technology, it would seem, does not always prevail over human qualities of native intelligence, resolution and bravery.

THE press of both North and South cannot be overlooked in an analysis of causes that influenced the services of intelligence. Newspapers and periodicals of opinion played a highly important role in the molding of mass attitudes that sanctioned the relentless prosecution of hostilities. At the same time, these media of expression were reckless in the dissemination of intelligence that should have been shrouded in secrecy.

Moreover, disregard of security precautions was inadvertently abetted by both governments. Important policy measures under consideration at Washington or Richmond were reported by an uncensored press and subjected to editorial discussion. One side had only to read the newspapers of the other for fairly complete coverage of policies and plans of its adversary.

The apparent indifference of authorities in Washington and Richmond toward the disclosure of state secrets * may be attributed to a compulsion felt by both governments to consult public

^{*} Secretary of War Stanton was roundly abused for proposing a mild form of press censorship during a later phase of the war.



President Lincoln and Gen. McClernand visit famed detective Allan Pinkerton who headed Union spy activities.

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opinion during the step-by-step advance into a war of unprecedented magnitude — the struggle Professor Beard calls the Second American Revolution and Mr. B. A. Botkin aptly terms the American Iliad.

AS the winter months of 1864 gave way to spring, Confederate strategists sought an answer to a single question: where would the enemy direct his main attack? For a time Grant's powerful concentration at Chattanooga, the mountain gateway to Central Georgia, indicated that the Federals would continue their victorious march in the West.

Lee had no great difficulty in recognizing the signs that indicated a reorientation of Federal strategy. He read the Northern newspapers. Upon Grant's elevation to the supreme command in March and the establishment of general headquarters on the Rapidan front, Lee concluded that the principal effort would be made in Virginia. It followed that Meade's Army of the Potomac would push overland toward Richmond, while Butler's Army of the James, based on Fortress Monroe and possibly reinforced by Gilmore's troops from the South Carolina coast, would threaten the Confederate capital from the sea. The Northern papers obligingly informed Lee of General Gilmore's arrival in Hampton Roads.

Another piece in the strategic puzzle became a source of perplexity to Lee. He knew that Burnside's depleted IX Corps had moved from East Tennessee to Annapolis, Maryland, and that it was intended to serve as the nucleus of a new formation, numbering 50,000. Wide publicity was given the recruiting program designed to gather new levies for the command. General Burnside personally directed activities in the New England states as well as in New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, conferring with the state governors and making frequent public appearances. His magnetic presence and courtly manner made good copy for the newspapers of those states. But Burnside's recruiting effort-conducted in competition with recruiting programs for more celebrated corps—fell short of his allotted figure.

General Lee, giving close attention to Northern press reports, inclined to a belief that Burnside's force of 50,000 would go by sea to reinforce Butler's army at Fortress Monroe.

A flagrant disregard of ordinary security precautions gave Lee everything he had failed to glean from Northern

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newspapers. On 28 April the IX Corps marched in broad daylight through Washington on its way to the Rapidan front. Stringfellow, a famous agent in Lee's employ, joined the cheering throng as Burnside's divisions, colors flying and bands blaring, swung down 14th Street. At a convenient point near Willard's Hotel, where the President and General Burnside reviewed the parade from a second story balcony, Stringfellow made a careful count of Burnside's effective strength. The next day Lee knew that the new formation mustered 20,000 rather than 50,000 and, contrary to his original assumption, would reinforce Meade instead of Butler.

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Role of Spies and Agents

STRINGFELLOW was only one of a myriad of spies and agents who served both sides. As in all civil disturbances where there is no language barrier, and where divided loyalties existed on both sides, spying was on a grand scale. It ranged all the way from amateur attempts to networks run by beautiful women. Some spies were patriotically motivated individuals; others were double agents selling their information to both sides. Some of the feats performed far outpaced the imaginative episodes of today's turgid television dramas. Some became national heroes. Many remained unknown except to the commanders who hired or recruited them. Several of the women spies married captors who had been assigned to guard them.

One beautiful Confederate sympathizer, Mrs. Rose Greenhow, maintained an elaborate salon in Washington, where she or her agents infiltrated the highest governmental circles. She sent word of General McDowell's movement on Manassas to Confederate General Beauregard in such detail that he knew almost to the man where McDowell would dispose his troops. Later General McClellan complained that she knew in hours what had transpired at his most secret conferences.

Even after her capture by Allan Pinkerton, she continued her work from her prison.

While Pinkerton has been widely criticized for his reports of Confederate strength that he gave to McClellan, the network which he organized supplied much valuable information. The work of one of his operatives— Mrs. E. H. Baker-is typical. Posing as a Southern sympathizer, she visited Richmond, saw the work on a Confederate secret weapon which turned out to be a submarine, and was able to get back word that allowed the Federal Navy to sink the machine. (Later a Confederate submarine actually sank a Federal warship—the first such feat in military history.)

Pryce Lewis, an Englishman who maintained his foreign citizenship and posed as a friend of the Confederacy, gathered information on troop dispositions which allowed Union troops to push to Charleston (West Virginia) virtually unopposed.

Big Tim Webster, another Pinkerton agent, became a messenger for Judah Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of War, and returned to Union lines carrying messages for Benjamin's agents in Maryland. Eventually, he was captured and hanged.

Different from Pinkerton's methods were those of Lafayette C. Baker, who worked his way to head the newly established Secret Service. An enigmatic figure, he got his start by demonstrating his spying ability, making his way through Southern lines to the office of President Jefferson Davis and returning to Union territory after numerous arrests and narrow escapes.

After thus "proving" himself, he was named a "special provost marshal" by the Secretary of War himself. Soon he and Superintendent Wood of the Old Capitol Prison were exerting great power in Washington. With Pinkerton's departure, Baker stepped into the existing power vacuum as chief of the detective organization of the War Department.



Two women spies who capitalized on their wartime activities—Pauline Cushman was made a "Union major" while Belle Boyd, at right, went on to become a lecturer.



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Belle Boyd—another of the beautiful Southern women spies who became famous—was just 17 when the war broke out. Her most famous exploit was a dash through Union lines, with bullets whizzing about, to carry a message to Stonewall Jackson that allowed him to sweep into Front Royal and save the bridges that the Federals had planned to burn on their retreat.

Even when captured, she managed to continue her spying activities. Confined in Old Capitol Prison under Baker and Wood, she continued to agitate, and finally was sent South, where she was hailed as a heroine in Richmond with military honors.

Totally different from these glamour girls was the Richmond spinster, Elizabeth Van Lew, who aided the North by visiting captured Federal prisoners in Richmond hospitals, and finally had a wide network of agents. She turned her home into an asylum for escaped Federal prisoners, whom she sent along with messages. When Grant entered captured Richmond, her greatest reward was a visit to tea by the General and Mrs. Grant.

If Miss Van Lew managed to keep her activities secret, things were quite different with the actress Pauline Cushman. She launched her spy career by offering a toast to the Confederacy from the stage of a Louisville, Kentucky, theater amid a throng of Union soldiers and officers. Her main contribution to the Northern cause was counter espionage, by turning in the names of Southern spies who got in touch with her after she became a "Confederate agent."

Antonia J. Ford, of Fairfax Courthouse, is reputed to have provided information to the famed raider, John Mosby, that led him to capture Union General Edwin H. Stoughton in his bed at Fairfax Courthouse.

Such exploits by individuals provide a colorful backdrop to the changing panorama of civil war. But not all the information for the military effort was supplied in this fashion. On 13 September 1862, during Lee's first invasion of the North, two enlisted men of McClellan's army picked up a large brown envelope while rummaging through D. H. Hill's abandoned camp near Frederick, Maryland. The envelope contained several cigars wrapped in an operations order drafted by Lee and detailing a risky division of force, one Confederate wing going north to Hagerstown, the other under Jackson swinging south to reduce Harpers Ferry.

Lee's calculated risk became dire peril when he learned that the lost order was in McClellan's hands. A forward lunge by the Federals, Lee realized, would compel him to recon-



Miss Van Lew visited sick prisoners held in Libby prison, Richmond, then organized a spy ring, aided escapees.

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e lcentrate his scattered masses. But Mc-Clellan did not lunge; he moved with his habitual caution. Jackson captured Harpers Ferry and rejoined Lee on the Sharpsburg ridge.


Here McClellan reluctantly accepted Lee's offer of battle on terms dictated by his adversary rather than those he himself could and should have imposed. The bloody battle ended in a tactical draw. In brief, McClellan lacked the bold enterprise that exploits luck in war. However gifted, he

wanted that attribute of leadership Napoleon had in mind when he exclaimed, "Give me generals who are lucky!"

Wilderness Campaign

QUITE a different example of the use—or misuse—of combat intelligence on the battlefield, however, was the Battle of the Wilderness, 5-6 May 1864, when Grant and Lee first met in combat. Lee enjoyed an initial advantage, in that he was fighting in the

Even while held in the Oid Capitol Prison in Washington, Belle Boyd and Mrs. Greenhow kept up spying activities.



midst of a friendly population, and had early identified all the units comprising Grant's army group.

In contrast, the intelligence provided by Meade's provost marshal general was incomplete, failing to locate either Pickett's Division of Longstreet's I Corps and a large force under Beauregard, known to be in movement from South Carolina toward Virginia. Persistent rumors placing both formations in Lee's army area could not be confirmed or dismissed.

Within the Wilderness, Meade's superior cavalry force fumbled its most important reconnaissance missions. Faulty reconnaissance enabled Ewell's Confederate Corps to march unobserved during the late afternoon, 4 May, and early the next morning toward where Warren's V Corps was forming in column.

Completely surprised, Meade ordered Warren to attack. Warren's attack on Ewell precipitated the battle that Grant intended to fight on open ground beyond the Wilderness. Confused fighting followed, with the Federal troops being saved from disaster when Meade's signal service transmitted several wig-wag messages reporting progress of Hill's III Confederate Corps. However. the transmission of messages carried by staff gallopers contributed to misunderstanding at army headquarters of the difficulties that General Hancock was facing in reversing his column and forming his four divisions in line of battle. Hancock was ordered to throw in his entire force when two of his divisions were still in column of march. As a result, his attack was delivered piecemeal. Even so, he was pounding Hill to bits when darkness intervened. Lee then ordered Longstreet to cancel his proposed turning movement and march directly to Hill's relief.

By next morning the field telegraph was placed in operations between headquarters of the army and Hancock. Yet this advantage—one that might have served as the catalyst of victory the day before-could not offset the faulty intelligence that had failed to locate Pickett's Division. That unit actually was in the vicinity of Richmond, vet belief that this faraway, phantom division was available to Lee caused the commander of the Union reserve to stay in check when ordered to reinforce Hancock's attack.

An excellent example of the "fog of war" occurred at this juncture. A noisy horse battery and a handful of venturesome Confederate skirmishers created so much confusion that Hancock believed he was facing a major threat. He detached troops from his assault column to meet it. Soon Longstreet actually was launching a fullscale counter-offensive that wrested from Grant the initiative that he had held the previous day.

Longstreet's skillful reconnaissance had found the cleared right of way of an unfinished railroad. Over this route he sent the turning force that demolished Hancock's massive attack

column.

The same route might have been used with similar results by Hancock. Indeed, the Federal army in the Wilderness paid a high price for defective intelligence, faulty reconnaissance and failure to employ its field telegraph during the afternoon of 5 May when rapid communications could have spelled the difference between victory and a draw.

Longstreet, the great tactician who saved Lee's army in the Wilderness, emerges from this battle as an eloquent advocate of the doctrine that tireless enterprise in quest of accurate combat intelligence during the fluctuations of battle offers the best antidote to misinformation that breeds panic.

Implications for the Future

LESSONS derived from Civil War intelligence are many. Two have been thoroughly digested and put into practice-namely, better methods of re-



Raids like this one of Mosby's troopers about to ambush a Union courier were often staged as result of information supplied by spies within Federal lines.

leasing news, and the improved organization which provides the staffs of field armies with sections devoted exclusively to intelligence, together with a central coordinating agency lodged in the Army General Staff.

Approval of measures designed to cure abuses and repair deficiencies in one situation, however, holds no promise of a permanent solution. In the first place, unreasonable restrictions imposed on the press during wartime might well impair a potent instrument that is indispensable in any war dependent upon popular support. The line of division between the news that should be disseminated without restriction and matters, the disclosure of which would assist the enemy, can be intelligently drawn only with reference to changing situations.

Again, an elaborate table of organization is no guarantee of efficient performance. The rudimentary staff forms of Civil War days should not be overlooked by enthusiasts of the

modern school of scientific management. During the historic council of war at Chancellorsville, which in present-day terms would be called a huddle, Lee's decision was taken after he had made his own examination of the raw material in Stuart's report. There were no intermediaries in the process of evaluation.

THIS contrasts markedly with modern-day situations where army commanders sometimes may be virtually compelled to accept, as a basis for their decisions, evaluations that are the product of a process of filtration and overrefinement inherent in staff procedures.

The problem today involves a paradox, being as simple as it is difficult. Should Army commanders be brought closer to the raw materials on which their decisions must be based—as close, if possible, as Lee was in making the decision that won his greatest battle?

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
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


Revolution in Technology

Eugene F. Hart

ANY concepts and theories have been advanced on the nature of decisive influences at work in the Civil War—even including the bizarre notion that beards played an important part, in the sense that the generals with the biggest beards often won the most decisive battles.

Regardless of the merits of the various theories propounded, two factors are unmistakably evident in any review of this bloodiest conflict in our Nation's history. First, the service forces—early forms of today's Army Technical Services — contributed greatly to the successes of the Civil



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War. Second, many of the techniques and even materiel of that period bore the real seeds of today's advanced techniques and exotic equipment.

Quartermaster Logistics

A KEY ROLE was played by logisticians of the Quartermaster's Department. This Department was primarily a transportation agency in 1861, responsible for the movement of men and supplies, as it had been ever since its establishment in 1775. It was

also responsible for sheltering, equipping, and clothing the troops. It therefore procured clothing, shoes, blankets, tents, knapsacks, haversacks, camp kettles, and canteens; it furnished ambulances, wagons, horses, mules, harness, and forage; it purchased stationery, straw, wood for fuel, and hundreds of items used in construction projects and repairs. It chartered and purchased steamboats, tugs, barges, ferry boats, and gunboats; and it not only contracted for railroad transportation of troops and supplies but it procured engines, freight cars and supplies needed for operating and repairing military railroads.

Before the war ended, the Quarter-master's Department was to acquire additional responsibilities in the maintenance of burial records and national military cemeteries. Feeding and clothing the troops was at that time a function of the Subsistence Department, but since that agency was many years later merged with the Quarter-master's Department, its contribution to the war effort is included.

It was June, two months after the Civil War began, before the post of Quartermaster General—vacated by General Joseph E. Johnston who resigned to join the Confederate forces—was filled by the appointment of General Montgomery C. Meigs. He had the administrative skill needed to develop an effective organization for supplying the Army. The Subsistence Department, too, organized its work effectively.

While many of today's wonders of Technical Service materiel can be traced back to their beginnings a hundred years ago, Quartermaster rations of today bear little resemblance to those provided in the Civil War. Though abundant, the Civil War ration offered a monotonous diet, for it was largely of meat and bread. Fresh meat was supplied on the hoof, beef cattle being driven along with the armies. Potatoes, beans, rice, hominy, and onions, and dessicated potatoes and

vegetables were provided, when practicable. The soldiers derisively called the latter "desecrated vegetables." In the course of some military operations—for example, the siege of Chattanooga—temporary scarcities existed. But no compaign or expedition failed for want of subsistence.

On any shift in position where speed was essential, the men were given "marching rations"—a three-day supply of salt pork, hardtack, coffee and salt—all carried in haversacks.

Even so, during most of the war, the authorized daily allowance of the soldier was a generous one. It was about one-fifth more than that of the British Army of the time, almost twice that of the French, and compared even more favorably with that of the Prussians, Austrians, and Russians. This was true of both Union and Confederate rations early in the war. It was the South's inability to maintain this standard, in food as in other supplies, that contributed to its ultimate defeat.

Hardtack was the great staple. Like salt pork, it had a hundred different names—all soldier inspired—and tales about it have survived to this day. It was a solid cracker or pilot biscuit made of flour and water. Derisive references ranged from "tooth busters" to "sheet-iron biscuits" and others even more uncomplimentary. One joker wrote: "All the fresh meat we got came in the hard bread."

Supply Via Wagon Train

FOR the supply of troops in campaigns, Quartermaster officers in the

field operated a system of wagon trains. In any forward movement, the trains followed the troops on the march, forming an "indispensable. movable magazine of supplies." The Department operated a highly effective system of depots that stretched from the general depots in the rear. such as those at New York and Philadelphia, through advance depots that took on the proportions of secondary base depots, such as the Nashville Depot that supplied Sherman's campaign. Temporary depots moved with the Army. The net effect was to place a preponderance of resources at the disposal of the commanders of the northern forces and insure victory for the Union.

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As the war progressed, transportation of men and supplies was placed on a more economical and efficient basis than during the first months of the war when a schedule of railroad rates had permitted profiteering. Reforms were introduced by Meigs so that all rail movements of troops and of supplies were arranged on the basis of competitive bids. Middlemen and brokers were eliminated in the chartering or purchasing of vessels for water transportation.

A quartermaster officer, based at St. Louis, effectively supported operations in the Mississippi Valley by controlling river traffic and moving men and supplies on the Ohio, Mississippi, and Cumberland Rivers. The Department was equally successful in supporting Sherman's march from Georgia by the delivery of supplies at ports en route.



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Role of Railroads

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THE Civil War has become known as the "first real railroad war." The present-day Military Railway Service of the U. S. Army Transportation Corps is a direct outgrowth of the transportation lessons learned from that war.

At the outbreak of war, Confederate railroads were immediately pressed into service to reinforce General Beauregard's Army in Virginia. In an unprecedented show of mobility, troops were rushed by rail across the Blue Ridge Mountains over the Manassas Gap Railroad in time to outflank the Union line and win the first Battle of Bull Run in July 1861.

Though a bitter pill for the North to swallow, the Confederate victory at Manassas proved a blessing in disguise. President Lincoln, a former lawyer whose clients included railroads, quickly recognized their military value. Early in 1862, he quietly created his secret weapon—"The U. S. Military Railroads."

Lincoln's strategy in organizing the first military railroad service in history helped give the Union Armies unmatched mobility. In contrast, the South had failed to develop its railways as an effective instrument of war. In the end, the breakdown of the system proved a significant factor in the South's defeat.

A former railroad executive, General D. C. McCallum, directed the Union's gigantic military railroad operation which at its maximum strength comprised almost 25,000 men serving in Virginia, North Carolina and the military divisions of the Mississippi.

One of McCallum's most spectacular transportation achievements was the move in the fall of 1863 of some 23,000 troops from Virginia to Tennessee, by way of Indianapolis, Indiana, a trip of 1,233 miles completed in 14 days. Again, during Sherman's march on Atlanta in 1864, General McCallum and his men delivered the unprecedented daily total of 1,600



A regimental commissary makes ready for the daily issue of fresh meat that came from beef herds.

tons of war supplies. Utilizing 10 train loads of 160 tons each, they were able to keep pace with Sherman's fast-moving army of 100,000 men.

Lincoln's secret weapon of the Civil War proved no less formidable in the wars fought in the century which followed.

Portents of Chemical Warfare

MODERN chemical warfare could have started in 1862 instead of World War I in 1915. Only the failure of the War Department to grasp the suggestion offered by one John W. Doughty of New York City prevented this. Mr. Doughty recommended to the Secretary of War a practical scheme for using gas—actually the same gas the Germans used so successfully at Ypres some 50 years later.

Wigwag and Flying Telegraph

FROM wigwag to space signals in a hundred years pretty well measures the progress of the Army Signal Corps since the Civil War. A year before the outbreak of fighting, the Corps had been set up as both a combat arm and a technical service, a dual role which it still holds. Among the many new techniques of modern warfare that were to have their first test in the conflict were battlefield communications, battlefield intelligence, photography and meteorology.



Coopers made barrels in the field to store required foodstuffs aboard ships preparing for overwater maneuver.

Battlefield communications were achieved on an unprecedented scale. Two methods were used: visual signaling by flag and torch, and wire telegraphy.

Early in 1861, Major Albert J. Myer, founder of the Army Signal Corps, began courses of instruction for signalmen in his patented signaling system called wig-wag. This method proved effective in directing Union fire from Fort Wool, Hampton Roads, Virginia, against Confederate works at Sewell's Point—the first use of signaling to direct a gun battery. A month later, Confederate forces used wig-wag to help them gain victory at Bull Run.

But inclement weather could render wig-wag useless. As the war progressed, greater use was made of wire telegraphy, notably the Beardslee magneto-electric telegraph utilized by Myer's "flying telegraph trains."

Battlefield intelligence — today known as combat surveillance—also had its beginnings in that conflict. Signalmen from their towers, and from balloons, observed enemy movements, battle progress, and supply depots, and relayed the information to headquarters. Confederate General E. P. Alexander, a former colleague of Myer's, commented that even if the Union observers saw nothing the balloons were worth their cost "for the annoyance and delay they cost us in trying to keep our movements out of their sight."

Limited use of balloons by the Signal Corps in this era presaged two fields in which the Corps was later assigned direct responsibility—aviation (until 1918), and meteorology (from 1870 to 1891).

Photography—another present-day

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Quartermaster General supplied not only food and clothing but the ships that carried Union troops, as these of Ninth Army Corps embarking at Aquia Creek Landing, 1863.



Wagon Trains on the March

THE standard Army wagon was 10 feet long, 43 inches wide, 22 inches deep, and carried between 2,536 and 4,000 pounds—authorities vary. The front wheels were smaller than the rear ones to shorten the turning radius, and it was drawn by four horses or six mules. Army trains carried forage for the "prime movers" and also portable forges and boxes of blacksmith's, wheelwright's and saddler's tools.

Of necessity, wagon trains were large and might extend along a road for 25 miles. To march 100,000 men overland for 10 days without rail or waterborne supply might require 10,000 wagons and 60,000 mules.

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In the Peninsular Campaign, the Army of the Potomac (80,000 men) required 3,100 wagons, 350 ambulances, 17,000 horses, 8,000 mules, or about 40 wagons per thousand men. When Sherman advanced from Chattanooga he had 60 wagons per thousand men, but on the march from Atlanta to Savannah he reduced this to 40 per thousand.

Signal Corps mission—had its beginnings in the Civil War. Although the photographers were civilians, principally Brady and Gardner, the pictures taken were the first in any American conflict, and the Civil War was the most photographed war to that time.

Advances in Weaponry

PRESIDENT Lincoln—eager to utilize the North's superior mechanical ability in winning the war—made Ordnance his special concern. Ordnance supplied a variety of weapons such as small arms, light and heavy artillery, rockets, explosives, flame throwers, naval armor, mines and even submarines. Through his influence, machine guns and breech-load-




One of great engineering feats of the war was building of the canal that bypassed Confederate guns at Vicksburg.


ing rifles were introduced into the Union Army.

Ordnance problems were complicated by the shortage of trained Ordnance officers in the early years of the struggle. Even in 1863, the Department did not have sufficient officers to command efficiently all the arsenals. to procure, inspect and deliver the arms, to serve in the field, and consider the numerous new proposed weapons. Some of the field generals privately ordered arms for their troops in violation of existing regulations. The clamor of the governors for a fair share of arms for troops of their respective states further complicated the supply problems. In spite of all this, Union troops seldom went into battle without a fair number of arms and a good supply of ammunition.

Smooth-bore muskets were used initially but several different types of breech-loading rifles, including the Spencer repeating rifle, were later introduced. The war's devastation accentuated the supply problem of weapons and ammunition. With the destruction of the Harpers Ferry Arsenal in April 1861, only one small arms manufacturer—at Springfield Armory—remained in government hands.

During the war a new small-arms factory was built at Rock Island, Illinois. But in 1861-62, government-made rifles came only from Springfield. In





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For first time in warfare, railroads played an important part, both in moving troops and equipment, left, and in initial use of railroad guns in siege operations.

those years many of the regiments were armed with foreign rifles and muskets.

Progress in Medical Aid

EFFECTIVENESS of present-day Army procedures for collection, evacuation and care of the sick and wounded owes its inception to the vision, foresight, and dedication of Dr. Jonathan Letterman and his associates in the Medical Department nearly a hundred years ago.

When in July 1862 Letterman succeeded Charles S. Tripler as Medical Director of the Army of the Potomac, he found 20,000 sick and wounded in the hospitals at Harrison's Landing, following the fighting on the peninsula below Richmond.

Letterman asked the Surgeon General for 200 ambulances and a thousand hospital tents. On 3 August the evacuation of sick and wounded from Harrison's Landing was begun, with as many as 5,000 moved in one day. By 15 August the Army had cleared out the sick and wounded. The task of evacuating so many in this short time would appear overwhelming enough, but, in the midst of it, Letterman found time to consider the ambulance problem and to work out a swift, successful solution.

The fact that ambulances were jointly controlled by medical officers

and quartermasters often resulted in their employment for other than transport of the disabled. Letterman noted:

"The system I devised was based upon the idea that they (ambulances) should not be under the immediate control of medical officers whose duties, especially on the day of battle, would prevent any proper supervision; but that other officers, appointed for that especial purpose, should have direct charge of the horses, harness, ambulances, etc., and yet under such regulations as would enable medical officers at all times to procure them with facility when needed for their legitimate purpose."

Letterman formulated a complete and effective ambulance plan for the Army of the Potomac which was put into effect by a general order. He next turned his attention to devising medical supply and field hospital plans to insure prompt, efficient medical care of the wounded from the battlefield to well-equipped general hospitals.

The Letterman Plan placed the responsibility for ambulance corps employment under each army corps. In September 1862 the plan had its first real trial. Two hundred ambulances had joined the Army at Frederick, Marylana, just before the battle of Antietam (17 September 1862) and, although the line of battle was six miles long, all the wounded were collected within 24 hours and placed under shelter.

Four months later, at the Battle of Fredericksburg, Letterman's completed scheme of organization weathered its first main test. As soon as night came the ambulances moved forward, and in spite of occasional shots, all the wounded were brought in before dawn.

More than 10,000 wounded were sheltered in tents, moved to the north side of the Rappahannock River by 15 December, and by Christmas Day all had been evacuated to Washington. Fredericksburg was the first great battle in which the work of the medical service at the front proved reasonably satisfactory.

At the Battle of Gettysburg, Letterman's ambulance organization operated so efficiently that on 4 July 1863, the day after the battle ended, not one of the wounded was left on the field. Following this battle, some 15,000 wounded were evacuated within two weeks to Baltimore, York, Harrisburg, and New York City. After the bloody battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, the distribution of the wounded was even more rapidly effected; within a few days they were sheltered in hospitals at Alexandria, Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York.

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
Letterman's three-fold plan formed the basis of the U. S. Army's field organization of the Medical Department. In today's Army the most forward installation of an evacuation system in a theater of operations is usually an aid station, and the rearmost installation a general hospital. The theater logistical command surgeon has the responsibility of forecasting the requirements for land, rail, air, and water evacuation so that coordination for its procurement may be effected sufficiently in advance of need. All this complex operation was set in motion by Letterman a hundred years ago.


Fortifications and Bridging

BEFORE the Civil War, the United States Military Academy at West Point was a responsibility of the Army Corps of Engineers, and its graduates were trained as engineers. This in large part accounts for the fact that so many command positions on both sides were held by Army Engineer officers.

At the outbreak of the war, the Army Engineers consisted of ninety-three officers. Fifteen resigned to join the Confederate Army and one other took no part in the war. During the war years, fifty-five of the ninety-three, serving on both sides, rose to the rank of general and fifteen died or were killed.

Throughout the war, engineering troops kept busy rebuilding destroyed trestles in order to keep the all-important trains running with food and materiel.





Torches sent messages by night as early Signal Corps proved its value in rapid transmission of information.


The Civil War has special significance to the Corps of Engineers not only because of the large number of Engineer officers who gained high rank and distinction as commanders, but because of the engineering tactics and techniques that were perfected during the war. These tactics and techniques were forerunners of modern military technology.

Field fortifications, wire entanglements, mines and booby traps were developed and skillfully used. In World Wars I and II these techniques as well as the use of railroad and ponton bridging were improved upon, but basically remained quite similar. Even the whirlwind German and American

The "Flying Telegraph"

PERHAPS the greatest communications achievement during the war was the adapting of the electric telegraph into the field service of the Army. Gen. Myer wanted tactical electric telegraph which could be moved about in the field when visual signals could not be used. With civilian inventors, he developed the Army's first electrical communication device, the Beardslee magneto-electric telegraph set. Readily portable, it could signal over several miles of insulated field wire, which soldiers laid rapidly over the ground or strung on lance poles.

From atop high towers where wig wag flags were used for visual signalling, or through use of the field telegraph, military communications were carried on rapidly.



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ALTHOUGH observation from balloons was certainly limited, and hardly as effective as observation from towers and mountaintops, this form of surveillance was practiced on several Civil War fronts. Among the better known aeronauts were John Wise, John La Mountain, James Allen, and the best known and most active aeronaut of the Civil War, Thaddeus S. C. Lowe.

These Signal Corpsmen made numerous balloon ascensions during the war and signalled the intelligence gathered to headquarters, by both telegraph and flag. Besides helping to introduce combat surveillance to the U. S. Army, the balloons obviously were the beginnings of military aviation in the United States.

By 1862 T. S. C. Lowe had constructed seven balloons, the two largest being the "Union" and "Intrepid," and had achieved success in gaining official recognition for his balloon corps. A few months earlier he had achieved an American "first" by directing Union fire from a balloon by te!egraph. Although this artillery direction was successful, the main role of the balloon throughout the war continued to be observation.

blitzkrieg was fashioned on the lightning thrusts of Forrest, Jackson, Stuart, Sheridan, Wilson and Sherman.

The importance of maintaining railroad communications was shown early in the war when the Confederates used railroads to transport troops to the first Battle of Bull Run.

After that battle the fear of a mortal blow against Washington led to the build-up of a fortification system around the city under the direction of a former engineer officer, now General in Chief, George B. McClellan.

As he moved on Richmond in the Peninsular Campaign, McClellan's position astride the Chickahominy River was maintained by bridging the river.



Use of balloons presaged later responsibilities for aviation and meteorology which were assigned to Signal Corps.

Corduroy roads were especially useful in marshy bottom lands and kept engineers busy building and maintaining them.

On the Confederate side, Lee soon earned the title of "the King of Spades" by putting his army to work digging field fortifications before Richmond.

It is well to remember that before the Civil War, warfare in North America was largely a matter of battlefield decisions, won not by massed divisions and corps, but by companies and regiments. For the most part defensive positions consisted not of intricate field fortifications, but of log or stone forts

Visual Signals

"The rapidity with which messages were sent by experienced operators was something wonderful to the uneducated looker-on. An ordinary message of a few lines can be sent in ten minutes, and the rate of speed is much increased where officers have worked long together, and understand each other's methods and abbreviations.

"Signal messages have been sent twenty-eight miles; but that is exceptional. The conditions of the atmosphere and the location of stations were seldom favorable to such long-distance signalling. Ordinarily, messages were not sent more than six or seven miles.

"Signalling was carried on during an engagement between different parts of the army. By calling for needed reenforcements, or giving news of their approach, or requesting ammunition, or reporting movements of the enemy, or noting the effects of shelling—in these and a hundred kindred ways the corps made their services invaluable to the troops."

From "Hardtack and Coffee" by John D. Billings, 1887.

Industrial might of North turned out heavy Ordnance, which gave preponderance of power over agrarian South.



manned by men on parapets. It was during the Civil War that the methods of field defense used in World Wars I, II and the Korean War were devised.

During the Union's Peninsular Campaign, Engineer troops worked on the trenches and communications in addition to furnishing instructions for fortification of the battle line. With the increasing necessity for road-building and river-crossing equipment to keep such a huge army in the field, dependence on engineer know-how became more and more pronounced.

General Ambrose E. Burnside employed his Engineers in the attack against Fredericksburg. After throwing ponton bridging across the Rappahannock in the face of Confederate sharpshooters, Burnside commented on the Engineers: "No more difficult feat has been performed during the War than the throwing of these bridges in the face of the enemy by these brave men. It was a gallant work."

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Construction Feats

IN THE West, General Ulysses S. Grant had proved his ability as a relentless and aggressive general as well as practitioner of Mahan's theory of strategic maneuver and principles of engineering. It was under Grant's command that Captains Pike and Rudnity, of the Engineer Corps, constructed a floating bridge, 4,620 feet long, across the Ohio River at Paducah, Kentucky.

In his later movements that resulted in the capture of Vicksburg, Grant dug a canal behind the beleaguered city in order to allow his ships and supplies to by-pass the big guns guarding the Mississippi. Although the Mississippi refused to cooperate by receding at the wrong time, this does not detract from the ingenuity of the idea. Another canal dug behind Island No. 10 in the Mississippi for the same purpose proved successful.

One of the greatest construction feats in the annals of the U. S. Army was recorded in the support of General Sherman's advance from Chattanooga



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Preferred by many artillerymen of the time, the Napoleons, left, were bronze field pieces. At right, captured Confederate ordnance at Richmond in 1865.

to Atlanta. Of the 136 miles of railroad between the two cities, 130 miles of track was relaid, while blockhouses and other defensive positions were installed along the line to keep Confederate raiders from disrupting the supply line.


Although defensive positions were effective, they could not prevent raiders from destroying sections of track and bridges. For example, the Chattahoochee, Etowah and Resaca bridges—all over 600 feet long—were rebuilt twice, while others were rebuilt as many as five times. A 780-foot bridge nearly 100 feet high was built in four and a half days.


Sherman's drive from Atlanta to Savannah, carrying only the essentials for combat, crossing rivers and marshlands, is a tribute to his reliance on engineer improvisation as well as to the mettle of his men. A similar expedition on a smaller scale was General James H. Wilson's spectacular drive through Alabama. It was the prototype of a modern armored task force complete with bridging equipment. He defeated the outstanding Confederate, General Nathan Bedford Forrest, to capture the Confederate supply point of Selma. He then threw his floating bridge across the Alabama River and did not stop until news of Appomattox caught up with him at Macon, Georgia.

The final stages of the war in the East, although part of the vast pincer movement against the Confederacy, was a relentless grind forward. At times, especially before Petersburg, it was a yard-by-yard approach reminiscent of World War I trench warfare.

Modern military medical practice owes much to Dr. Letterman who devised the procedures for removing wounded, left, and established hospitals in rear areas.







these bridges in the face of the enemy."

Called "the greatest bridge since the days of Xerxes," part of ponton structure across James River is shown, right.



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Wooden arches resting on wooden cribs distinguish this piece of engineering skill spanning the Cumberland River.

Ordnance Oddity

IN THE Springfield, Massachusetts, Armory Museum is a gun that has two bullets in it which met head-on in the barrel-a million-to-one shot. At the moment of firing, a Southern bullet entered the barrel of the Northern piece and met the bullet coming out of the chamber.



Men like officers of 15th Engineers of New York, at field headquarters, built the bridges and rail lines.

112



Prominently used for first time in military history, the "iron horse" demanded maintenance in yards like this one in shadow of the still unfinished Capitol.

It was during this period that the Union Engineers flung what Confederate General Alexander termed, "the greatest bridge since the days of Xerxes," across the James River. This bridge, 2000 feet long, spanned a river half a mile wide and 85 feet deep at its rapidly flowing center. It had a draw 100 feet wide in the channel so that shipping could utilize extemporized wharves supplementing the bridge. This huge bridge, utilizing more than 100 ponton boats, was built in seven hours. In addition, between 4 May and 14 June, Union Engineers built 34 bridges totalling 6,078 feet.

ALTHOUGH the four-year conflict was ended formally at Appomattox Court House, the lessons learned in that first modern war are just as applicable today.

The military successes of the United States through the ensuing years are directly attributable to the tactics, strategy, techniques, experiences and bitter lessons learned in the course of this bloodiest of Civil Wars. Although this titanic struggle tore our Nation asunder a hundred years ago, it contributed enormously to the heritage, tradition and greatness of today's proud United States Army.

The four-footed horse required maintenance, too. This is part of a crew that is estimated to have shod a million horses during the war.

2000 ARMY HORSES WANTED!

I want to purchase immediately at the Government Stables at this station.

TWO THOUSAND ARMY HORSES!

or which I will pay the prices named below, IN CASH. Horses must pasinspection under the following regulations, to wit:

FOR HORSES

Sound in all particulars, well broken, in full flesh and good condition, from filten (15) to sixteen (16) hands high, from five (5) to nine [9] years old, and well adapted in every way to Cavalry purposes—price

160 DOLLARS!

FOR HORSES

of D. RK Color, sound in all particulars, strong, quick and active, well broken, square trotters in harness, in good fiesh and condition, from six [6] to ten [10] years [d], not less than fiftee and one half [15] 1-2] hands high, weighing not loss than ten hundred and fifty [1050] pounds each, and adapted to Artillery

170 DOLLARS!

N. B. VAN SLYKE,



British, French and Prussian observers failed to reckon with the long-range



TODAY, with the insight provided by a hundred years, the Civil War emerges as the first of the modern wars. It was the first great war fought with the products of the industrial revolution; the first in which steam and iron were utilized by both sides to transport and supply armies over rails and to replace ships of wood and sail.

It was also the first great war to be waged by modern democratic states, and as such it raised many of the chronic problems which time and again have plagued a democracy at war. Where is that faint dividing line between civil and military power? Who is to be the final authority in determining strategy? How does a democratic society mobilize industry, manpower, and public opinion for war?

The Civil War also represented a prophetic departure in tactics. Neither the column utilized by Continental infantry nor the traditional "thin red line" of the British could meet the requirements in America, where relatively untrained troops, many of them armed with rifles of unprecedented range and accuracy, grappled with

each other over uneven and often heavily wooded terrain.

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The Civil War soldiers discovered that unless surprise could be achieved, massed infantry attacks no longer were feasible in the face of modern firepower, and so gradually the column yielded to looser and more extended fighting formations and to advance by rushes. After 1863, field entrenchments played a significant role in most Civil War battles.

The transformation in cavalry tactics was equally striking. No longer did the terrain and the increased fire-power permit the massed assaults of Seydlitz and Murat in which dense formations of horsemen had charged knee to knee, breaking through the enemy lines and hacking to pieces infantry as their formations evaporated.

Contrary to the illustrations on many a dustjacket, Civil War cavalry fought for the most part dismounted, using carbine and rifle rather than the traditional lance and saber. The horse became essentially a means of conveyance, enabling enterprising men like Forrest to "get there first with the most."

Influences on Foreign Army Tactics And Strategy

Jay Luvaas

In the use of artillery the Civil War represented a period of transition. The smoothbore was still valued because it was more effective against infantry at close ranges, although the greater range and accuracy of rifled artillery forced the armies to maintain more or less an equal number of both types. The real revolution occurred in siege artillery, where the new rifled guns rendered obsolete overnight the coastal defense system constructed of brick and mortar.

To what extent were these changes noticed in Europe? At first most professional soldiers looked upon the clumsy efforts of the improvised Civil War armies with contempt, and if Moltke did not actually dismiss the Civil War as a matter "of two armed mobs chasing each other around the country, from which nothing could be learned," this attitude would have been prevalent among European soldiers in 1861-62.

Gradually, as the war progressed and as the new armies learned their grim trade, European soldiers became attentive and then curious, and after 1862 military observers were sent to America by most of the major armies in Europe.

These military missions represented primarily a desire to learn more about the performance of new weapons. Their official reports contained useful if not always new information about

the strength of various metals, ballistics, the power of rifled artillery, and new wrinkles in fortifications, but this knowledge was of value only for the moment and much of it merely confirmed experiments that had already been conducted in Europe.

Occasionally specific pieces of equipment were recommended to the authorities in London, Berlin, or Paris for consideration, and had there been no major war in Europe for the next decade or so the value of the Civil War as a testing ground would have been greatly enhanced. But the wars for German unification offered still better opportunities to observe the effects of rifled artillery and breechloaders, and naturally these campaigns took precedence over events in America in the minds of most European soldiers.

Each army in Europe found something to be learned from Civil War military organizations. The Prussians were directly influenced by the accomplishments of the Union engineers in

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repairing and maintaining rail communications, and in 1866 they created a Field Railway Section (Feldeisenbahnabteilung) modeled directly on the Union Construction Corps.

The British, who looked to the day when they themselves might have to raise a large army of volunteers, probably increased their understanding of the capabilities of their own auxiliary forces by observing the American volunteers in action.

The French seem to have been favorably impressed by some aspects of the organization and administration of the Union army, and nearly all foreign observers expressed admiration for the quality of instruction at West Point.

But contrary to popular belief, there never was a time when the Civil War exerted a direct influence upon tactical developments in Europe. Prussian cavalry in 1866 and French cavalry in 1870 failed to employ the dismounted techniques of Forrest, Sheridan and Stuart, and if the British developed an effective force of mounted infantry during the Boer War, it was in response to local conditions rather than as a result of any lessons from the Civil War.

Nor were the European armies convinced that the use of intrenchments in 1864-65 carried lessons for the future. Earthworks reappeared at Plevna in 1877-78, in South Africa in 1899-1900, and in Manchuria in 1904-05, yet the number of military writers in Europe who appreciated this phase of the Civil War could be numbered on the fingers of one hand.

Probably the most perceptive soldier

of the period to view the America a campaigns was Colonel G. F. R. Herderson, author of the classic Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Even before the Boer War, Henderson deplored the fact that the importance of the spade and the potentialities of dismounted cavalry were being overlooked, but most European soldiers of his day were inclined to discount the experiences of a war fought before 1871, when breech-loading firearms and rifled artillery first came into general use.

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Reactions Abroad

BUT if foreign soldiers failed to take advantage of the exemplary tactical lessons, it is not quite correct to conclude that they learned nothing of value from the Civil War. The nineteenth century was an industrial age and military conditions were constantly changing as new weapons appeared and as transportation and communication facilities improved. Every war was likely to indicate probable trends.

After 1862 is was apparent to all that railroads had given new dimensions to strategy and that rifled artillery would make obsolete many existing fortifications. In this sense the Civil War did not go unnoticed even though few American practices were imitated in detail.

The Civil War was also rich in examples of how not to wage war. Time and again foreign soldiers cited the American campaigns to illustrate the evils of inadequate preparation, the dangers of political interference, the need for a regular replacement



DR. JAY LUVAAS, Associate Professor of History at Allegheny College, Meadville, Pennsylvania, is the author of The Military Legacy of the Civil War (University of Chicago Press, 1959). system, the folly of electing company officers and of depending upon political appointments to fill the higher positions, and the necessity for a general staff to manage armies that appeared to have grown too bulky to lead. Bismarck is credited with the saying: "Fools say that they learn by experience. I prefer to learn by other people's experience."

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Whether or not they did learn what to avoid from our experiences in creating a vast army overnight, foreign writers invariably stressed the inadequate training in the American armies and the lack of anything resembling a European general staff.

Failure to take advantage of the positive lessons in tactics cannot be attributed to false or insufficient information. There were many military observers—official and otherwise—who accompanied the Union and Confederate armies, and their published reports mentioned the general developments in tactics, strategy and logistics. Moreover, information of even the most specialized and technical nature was obtainable and could be had for the asking.

In one sense the European view of the Civil War was distorted, for practically all foreign military visitors spent their time in the east and ignored the fruitful campaigns in the west. But the fact remains that the necessary information for a correct appraisal of the military lessons of the Civil War was available—it simply was ignored or misinterpreted.

Reasons for this vary. In the first place, the major innovations in infantry and cavalry tactics were not repeated in the wars of 1866 and 1870-71, which induced many soldiers either to dismiss altogether or at least to minimize the tactical lessons of the Civil War.

Then, too, while European soldiers were quick to sense the new importance of railroads as lines of supply, with the exception of the Construction Corps there was not much that



Count Zeppelin of Prussia, later famed as developer of dirigibles, is in center of U.S. officers and foreign observers.

they could learn from the logistics of the Civil War that could be applied directly in Europe. There geography and the density as well as distribution of population created problems of a different sort altogether from those which had plagued American strategists. In Europe railroads were of vital importance in mobilizing armies, and in this regard the Civil War failed to yield any useful military lessons.

Nor did the Civil War occur at a time when the major armies of Europe were particularly receptive to new ideas. Prussia was much preoccupied with the wars for German unification, which also captured the attention of Austrian soldiers. France was still impressed by the accomplishments of French arms under Napoleon, and as a consequence French soldiers were in no mood to follow the example of "armed mobs" of civilians fighting each other in uncleared forests across the Atlantic, particularly when it was known that both the Union and Confederate armies had been trained according to modified French drill regulations.

British soldiers were still disturbed by shortcomings in their own organization which recently had been revealed in the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny, but these defects were peculiar to the British army and could not be remedied by borrowing from American military organizations.

Finally, foreign soldiers were inclined to believe that the Civil War was unlike any war which they had seen, or were likely to see for that matter, in Europe. It had been fought entirely by armies composed of volunteers, militia, and some hastily raised conscripts, and while it was often recognized that the volunteers of 1861 had become hardened veterans by 1864, there was no way for European soldiers to judge how the American armies would have compared with their own.

Before 1870 the French were committed to the idea of a long-service professional army; the Prussians were building a national army based on the principle of universal service and trained reserves; and only the English had reason to show interest in armies of untrained volunteers and militia. Even those who maintained that the American armies by 1864 could have held their own against an army from the Continent were quick to point out that few nations in Europe could afford to spend the first two years of a war training new soldiers.

IN THE decade following the Franco-Prussian War, the Germans were the most active in studying the American campaigns. Their military journals contain numerous articles about Civil War subjects. But because it was generally accepted that "when it becomes a question of obtaining practical hints for our own strategy and tactics... we must not go further back than 1866," most of these studies were barren of military lessons of any intrinsic value.

In time the Germans turned their attention to the more pressing problem of preparing for a possible war on two fronts, and with this in mind they looked to the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon for guidance. Because it was assumed that

the next great war would be short, the Germans were most concerned about how to achieve the most efficient mobilization and how to win a quick, decisive victory in the field. They recognized that the Civil War had been a war of attrition, but this was precisely what they were anxious to avoid.

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Later the French, still searching for explanations for their failures in 1870, grew mildly interested in the Civil War. Some of the French tactical studies of the American Civil War showed prophetic originality in predicting that the next war would be fought by mounted infantry and by troops sheltered behind earthworks, but such views never crept into official doctrine and no attention was paid to the warnings of those few who saw in the Civil War a prototype of the wars of the future.

After 1870 the English lost interest in the Civil War completely. Absorbed in their own Cardwell Reforms, they were also blinded by the stunning victories of the Prussians in 1866 and 1870. Not until Henderson produced his tactical study of Fredericksburg in 1886 did English soldiers take a second look at the Civil War. By this time a reaction against the imitation of German methods had set in, and Henderson rapidly became a leading spokesman for a new and vigorous group of military writers and theorists. Through his teaching at the Staff College and his immensely popular writings, the Civil War acquired new significance and by the turn of the century it was the war most often cited to illustrate official doctrine.

Until the first World War most European students of the Civil War seemed interested primarily in tactics, but after 1918 the emphasis shifted to more general problems of military policy and grand strategy. Looking back, the postwar generation could see many lessons of value in the war that earlier soldiers had missed, thanks to the fresh insight provided by the experiences of 1914-18. Some writers,

notably General J. F. C. Fuller and Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, even found in the Civil War clues to the solution of problems arising from the trench warfare of 1914-18 and its impact upon tactics and strategy.

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It is pointless to list the names of those foreign soldiers who learned from the study of the Civil War. Considering the large number of soldiers who wrote about the war, it seems surprising that the lessons it taught were appreciated by so few.

The fact of the matter is that nine out of every ten soldiers who wrote about the Civil War simply carried into their books doctrines carefully instilled by years of training. This is why the Germans, opposed in principle to improvised armies, invariably stressed the lack of training in the American armies and why it was not until after 1870, when their own doctrines had proved faulty, that the French were prepared to admit that something could be learned from a war waged by amateurs.

It is perhaps significant that virtually every soldier who did see something new and valuable in the American campaigns was himself a maverick who had strayed beyond the pale of military orthodoxy. Perhaps this is one reason why the tactical lessons of the Civil War were rejected by most European soldiers and by every General Staff before 1914.

IS THERE a lesson for our own time in the failure of European armies to capitalize upon even the most obvious military lessons of the Civil War? In every instance when the experience of the Americans conflicted with popular opinion or vested interests at home, or with the lessons of more recent wars, the Civil War lost.

Most of those who studied the Civil War after 1870 were in reality merely seeking to confirm accepted principles rather than discover new information that might contribute to a change in doctrine. For this reason the tactical lessons of the Civil War went unheeded, proving again the wisdom of Bronsart von Schellendorf's observation: "It is well known that military history, when superficially studied, will furnish arguments in support of any theory or opinion."

The same might apply to other fields of history as well, but in military history, unfortunately, more than an academic reputation is often at stake.

The Civil War Soldier—As Foreign Observers Saw Him

COLONEL (later General) Francois DeChenal and Captain Pierre Guzman of the French Artillery were official observers of the Civil War in 1864. Following is part of the report they submitted to Marshal Randon on their return to France.

"Character of the Soldier.—It is difficult to compare the American soldier with any of the soldiers of Europe. He possesses the good qualities of some, together with the most opposite faults of others. He is tireless on the march, is contented even amidst great hardships, and is resolute in the attack, although dispassionate. He does not require the urging of drum-beat or bugle call; his battles have a somewhat sombre and sinister character. If he thinks his efforts useless, he halts and neither orders nor exhortations can induce him to advance. Once engaged, he is tenacious even to rashness and disobedience; he neither wishes nor knows how to retire, and thousands of lives have been lost when a quietly executed order for retreat would have limited the loss to several hundred. Neither complaints nor groans are heard in the long columns of ambulances bearing the mangled and as yet unbandaged wounded from the field of battle. The death of the American soldier is always stoical; he may ask you to give him a little water or to place him in a more comfortable position, but he will wait patiently."

Translated by 1st Lt. M. J. O'Brien of the 5th U. S. Infantry and published by George A. Spooner, Leavenworth, Kansas, 1894.

Throughout the Army School System, in term papers, horseback rides over battle sites, and intensive background readings, the Civil War for many years exerted an

Impact on the U.S. Army Educational System

George J. Stansfield

TOR some seventy-five years, up to the eve of World War II, the Civil War exerted a continuing influence in the education of American military leaders. While its impact was felt directly and indirectly at all levels, perhaps its greatest influence was evident in the years from the Spanish-American War to World War I.

Initially, the experience of officers who had served was a dominant influence; it was apparent in the actions of these veterans on boards revising regulations and manuals, and by those on the staff and faculty of the newly established Army schools.

FOLLOWING the close of the Civil War the Army was pared down from 56,641 in 1866 to 27,422 in 1876 at which figure it remained until 1898. Promotion was slow and grey-bearded lieutenants were common in the units comprising the skeleton forces scattered throughout the West. The relatively small regular American Army remained in this situation during most

of the peace time years. During this era, military schooling increased greatly in importance, for problems of large units could thus be studied under peacetime conditions.

The Army schools established during the period 1866-1898 form the keystones of the present education system. In 1865, the two Army schools were the U. S. Military Academy and the Artillery Corps for Instruction, better known as the Coast Artillery School, established in 1824 at Fort Monroe, Virginia.

In 1866, the Engineer School of Application was established at Willets Point, New York, under General Duane, former Chief Engineer Officer, Army of the Potomac.

A School of Application, established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1881, was later to be designated The Army Command and General Staff School in 1922.

In 1887, a Mounted Service School was founded at Fort Riley, Kansas, but did not become fully established

urtil 1891 under Colonel James W. Forsyth, 7th Cavalry. The Army Medical School was established at Washington, D. C., in 1893 with Major Walter Reed as its first Professor of Clinical and Sanitary Microscopy.

In 1891, "Officers' Lyceums," later designated troop schools for officers, were established at the various military posts. Here instruction in current regulations and manuals was given to lieutenants without war experience.

The most important pertinent school text during the period was *Organization and Tactics*, the first edition of which appeared in 1895 when the author, Captain (later Colonel) Arthur L. Wagner, was instructor in the Art of War at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School. It included many examples based upon the Civil War and was used at West Point after 1899. Its last edition, the seventh, was edited in 1906 by Captain (later Chief of Staff) Malin Craig, Captain Herbert J. Brees and First Lieutenant Leslie Chapman.

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From 1898 to 1901, almost all normal military education was suspended in the Army. In that year, General Orders 155 established the Army War College as the capstone of an Army educational system, as envisaged by Secretary Elihu Root. While many schools were established in the periods 1901-1917 and 1919-1940, the most important schools reflecting the influence of the Civil War were the Army War College and the revitalized two-year course at the Army Service Schools started in 1904.

In 1904, Major Eben Swift in his Remarks Introducing the Course in Military Art at the Infantry and Cavalry School and Staff College briefly explained the educational value of map problems, map maneuvers and "staff rides" retracing the terrain of famous Civil War actions on horseback. These were used at Fort Leavenworth and later at the Army War College, where Major Swift became a member of the faculty and later its Director.

Military history as a special study at the Army War College was begun in the fall of 1906 with lectures on "Tactics and Military History" by Major Swift, then Director, who continued the program until 1910. These lectures were tied to the writing of historical papers by the class. Various Civil War battlefields were visited on the spring "rides" so that the development of a battle and campaign on paper could be coordinated by actually traversing on horseback the terrain which had been studied previously. The first ride covered the Antietam Campaign and gave training akin to actual work with troops at a high command level and in the duties of the General Staff with troops in campaign. It also enabled participants to better perform duties of directors and umpires in the autumn maneuvers usually attended prior to return to regular duties.

On these "rides" officers were given tactical-strategical problems encountered in the battle situation and, following a general inspection, they prepared solutions based upon the known



GEORGE J. STANSFIELD, Acting Librarian of the National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., is an Associate Editor of *Military Affairs* and Librarian, American Military Institute.

battle development. This was followed by the solution as modified by current conditions. These were announced and discussed on the actual terrain involved. From 1907 to 1913, following the study of map problems and the military history of Civil War campaigns, longer historical and staff rides took place in May and June of each year.

In the 1912-13 course, the study of military history included the concept of a War College history of the Civil War. At the 1912 American Historical Association Meeting at Boston, at the first session devoted wholly to a discussion of Military History, an Army War College student, Major James W. McAndrew (later General Pershing's Chief of Staff, AEF), was designated to give a paper on "Military History." As one result, Professor R. M. Johnson of Harvard joined the 1913 "ride" and gave lectures to later Army War College classes. This association may be considered as the origin of the concept of the establishment of military history as a part of the Army which led to the creation of the Army War College Historical Section after World War I.

Prior to the field experience of the "rides," students at the Army War College prepared papers on various aspects of the Civil War. For example, there is one by the future AEF Lieutenant General R. L. Bullard of the 1911-12 class on "Lee's Campaign against Pope" and Major (later AEF General) James W. McAndrew of the 1912-13 class on the "Gettysburg Campaign." The 1913-14, 1914-15 and 1915-16 classes all wrote papers covering campaigns of the Civil War. In this endeavor they were assisted by the volumes of the War Department Library transferred to the Army War College in 1914.

Events prior to United States entrance into World War I prevented the "rides" from being taken during the years 1914-16. However, the nu-

merous texts on Civil War actions written for use at the military schools attest to the importance of study of military aspects of the Civil War during this period. As one example, the Campaigns of the American Civil War, by Colonel G. J. Fiebeger, published at the U. S. Military Academy in 1914, reflects the continued interest of the Academy in Civil War strategy and tactics.

Following World War I, the lessons to be learned in that great conflict received increasing emphasis, but the influence of thinking about problems faced in the Civil War continued to be part of the Army educational system and thus exerted an impact on the military leaders of World War II.

The "Reading Course for Officers" prepared by the Army War College and issued as a War Department Bulletin in 1928 included many Civil War books as a basis for the officer's professional reading.

The Army War College during this period conducted strategical and tactical studies on the Civil War with "rides" to various campaign sites as part of the 1935-36 and 1936-37 courses; also included were lectures by Douglas Southall Freeman.

World War I developments tended to overshadow the utilization of the Civil War in military education during the years from 1919 until June 1940 —at which time operations at the Army War College were suspended.

However, the impact of the Civil War remained important nonetheless. Reflecting both the heritage of family tradition and the influence of esteemed teachers in the Army School System, American military leaders have kept a corner in their thinking for the lessons and examples stemming from this war. The study and interest devoted to the Civil War by General George S. Patton, Jr., of World War II combat fame, illustrates how officers have applied many of its lessons to military problems faced in combat operations of the modern era.

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The Impact on Today's Army

Colonel T. N. Dupuy, USA-Ret.

OST of us take for granted the oft-repeated assertion that the Civil War was the first modern conflict. If asked to explain why this is so, the average American military man would probably list a number of modern weapons and techniques first employed in the Civil War. Amongst these he would probably mention such things as trench warfare, aerial observation (from balloons), infantry rifles, repeating small arms, the electric telegraph, railroad troop move-

ments, ironclad warships, and amphibious operations.

Each of these examples would be incorrect. All of these weapons and techniques had been seen before the Civil War, and some of them were literally centuries old. Yet paradoxically the answer, so wrong in its specifics, would be essentially right in its overall implications. Because in the Civil War these instruments and methods of warfare—and many others beside—were first used in combination

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as integral elements of a total, technological, imaginative scheme of war, and as such established precedents which have remained valid into the nuclear era.

The underlying cause of the proliferation of weapons, and of their adaptation to new concepts of warfare, was the flowering of the Industrial Revolution to maturity. Technology had become the basis of economic development and expansion in all parts of the country, though Southern industrial progress lagged behind that of the Northern states. Keys to this development were the twin giants -Iron and Steam. Their combined significance was symbolized and dramatized by the sudden, fantastic nationwide growth of railroads. Sturdy, reliable and versatile machinery was available to perform missions undreamed of two decades earlier.

Weapons, Tactics and Techniques

THIS new machinery was adapted to warfare in three different ways. Improved weapons could be manufactured in hitherto-unheard-of quantities; machines could deliver the weapons more efficiently and more quickly to the soldier in the field; the machines provided the motive power for weapons, as in the steam warship and railroad artillery.

The principal effect of the new, improved and more numerous weapons was to introduce an entirely new order of firepower on the battlefield. This in turn produced a far-reaching tactical revolution.

Neither infantry nor cavalry could

attack frontally in the face of the combined firepower of artillery and small arms. There were four immediate effects. First was dispersal; battlefield formations became more spreadout and more flexible. Next, maneuver became the order of the day as men sought for decision without suicidal frontal assaults. Cavalry shock action practically disappeared from the battlefield. Field fortifications—heretofore reserved for siege operations—became an integral aspect of infantry tactics.

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Trench warfare was the most obvious manifestation of this tactical revolution. Troops under fire immediately dug in. Fox holes and rifle pits were soon expanded into trench systems which became the bases for maneuver by both sides. It was in the utilization of improvised field fortifications that Robert E. Lee surpassed all of his contemporaries; most of his victories were the result of his ability to use hasty entrenchments as a base for aggressive employment of fire and movement.

The best known of many examples of Lee's technique of using entrenchments as a basis for bold maneuver were his especially brilliant triumphs at Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville. Stonewall Jackson, who contributed to these victories, had already established his undying reputation as a master of maneuver in his brilliant Shenandoah Valley campaign.

No less memorable were the exploits of maneuver of Nathan Bedford Forrest, universally acknowledged as the outstanding cavalry leader of the war. His successes were based mainly



COLONEL T. N. DUPUY, USA-Ret., as co-author—with his father, Col. R. E. Dupuy, USA-Ret.—of the Compact History of the Civil War (Hawthorn, 1960) recently received the Fletcher Pratt Memorial Award of the New York Civil War Round Table for the best book in this field in 1960. This article is based on materials in that book. He is also author of The First Book of Civil War Land Battles (Watts, 1960) and The First Book of Civil War Naval Actions (Watts, 1961).

upon his ability to throw his mounted men in wide sweeping maneuvers against vulnerable spots in the Union flanks, or along the Northern line of communications, there to fight on foot. His succinct prescription for victory—"Git the mostest men thar fustest"—is the summation of all of the principles of war.

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Other Southerners, like Longstreet, Early and Wheeler, were equally aware of the combined significance of firepower, entrenchments and maneuver. So, too, were Northerners like Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and James Wilson. But the Union men had different missions, objectives and problems, and so they never developed the insouciant finesse of tactical maneuver which became a Confederate trademark.

Northerners, however, made a substantial contribution to development of the techniques of amphibious warfare. The best-known examples were Grant's river operations in the West, and the succession of landings along the Atlantic seaboard, culminating in the bitterly contested assault on Fort Fisher in January 1865.

Strategy and Policy

DENNIS HART MAHAN. West Point's brilliant soldier-professor—father of Alfred Thayer Mahan-had provided the philosophical background for the strategic combinations of the military leaders of both sides. His was a doctrine of boldness, speed and concentration, peculiarly suited to the new weapons and the resources being made available by the Industrial Revolution. Mahan and Lee had been fellow-faculty members at West Point; Jackson, Grant and the other leading soldiers of the war had been Mahan's students. All knew well his dictum that "celerity is the secret of success."

Jackson's victories in the Valley, Grant's Vicksburg Campaign, and Lee's brilliant operations are all consistent with such Mahan precepts as the following: "Attack the enemy

suddenly when he is not prepared to resist. . . . An army that throws itself by a strategical movement between several fractions of an enemy army beyond supporting distance of each other, may, by superior activity, defeat them all in succession."

Because it was the first war in which the Industrial Revolution had achieved its full impact, it was the first total war of history, and the first in which military strategy had to encompass the most effective utilization of all of the resources of the opposing nations.

There were two basic policy problems—creating the conditions which would permit the maximum mobilization of resources; and providing a framework of political objectives within which the strategic employment of resources would make sense. Serious mistakes in strategy and policy were made on both sides. But on balance the lessons learned were invaluable in America's war crises during the following century.

At the outset the opposing Presidents—Lincoln and Davis—hampered their military subordinates by meddling in military details. Davis caused less trouble initially because his meddling reflected considerable practical experience as a soldier and as a former U. S. Secretary of War. But unlike Lincoln, he did not learn from his mistakes.

The Northern President soon developed a sound concept of strategy, as well as an awareness of his own inadequacies in matters of military tactics and techniques. He therefore applied his brilliant intellect and unswerving determination to major issues of policy, while seeking a soldier capable of coping with the intricacies of military strategy and administration. In Grant he discovered a man of equal determination, whose grasp of the strategic essence of modern, total war has never been surpassed, and who had sufficient tactical skill to fight on equal terms with Robert E. Lee. The relationship of Lincoln and





Tactical revolution was wrought by improvements in weapons and trench warfare which ranged from improvised breastworks to bombproofs and fascine trenches.

Grant is an unexcelled example of civil-military relations in a democracy at war.

ORGANIZING ability and skill in improvisation were shown on both sides. But if (to make a risky and unprovable generalization) the Southerners had an edge in their flair for bold tactics, this was offset by Northern genius in organization. The greatest weakness of the Southern armies was their lack of staff coordination and surveillance. This was least serious in the Army of Northern Virginia where Lee's instinctive reactions were almost invariably sound, and where the major subordinates were attuned to the tactical genius of their But in the Western commander. armies, and on those occasions where Lee essayed the strategic offensive, lack of adequate staff planning and operational coordination had disastrous consequences.

The North, on the other hand, steadily improved its staff operations. Not a little of this progress was due to the influence and example of two early generals-in-chief — McClellan

and Halleck—though their battlefield leadership could not match their organizing skill. It was Grant who brought the Northern command and staff system to a standard of comprehensive excellence which had never been seen before in warfare, and which was at least the equal of the later vaunted Prussian General Staff system. loc

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
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Grant's staff system disappeared after the war, when the Army was demobilized, but it provided the example which prompted the influential writings of General Emory Upton, and thus led directly—if belatedly—to our present military staff system.

The telegraph was a vital instrument of the Northern command system. Grant was usually in direct wire communication with each of his subordinate commanders, and, through the exertions of Signal Corps wire crews, was in touch with front-line commanders in the middle of battle and on the march.

Coordinated with this communications network was an aerial observation system—with air-ground telegraph link—utilizing observation bal-



Development of twin gignts, Iron and Steam, created a new dimension in war as the dramatic nationwide growth of railroads allowed rapid movement of troops.

loons. Although the Southerners also used the telegraph and other communications instruments such as heliograph and semaphore, their communications were never as good as those of the Union armies.

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The most important single element of the administrative systems of both sides was the railroad. Though essentially a logistical tool, it was on numerous occasions used by both sides to provide strategic mobility. The first such use in warfare was the movement of Joseph Johnston's command from the Shenandoah Valley to the First Battle of Bull Run. Southern railroadmen performed miraculous feats in keeping their over-worked, overloaded system going, and in shuttling supplies and men between the main armies, right up to the very end. But the South probably could have made better strategic use of the railroads than they did, by moving larger forces between the western and eastern theaters of war, as both Longstreet and Beauregard recommended. The railroad virtuoso of the war was Union General Herman Haupt, whose railhead supply organization was the genesis of modern logistical support in the field.

Professionalism

THE effectiveness of weapons and machines is entirely dependent upon the men who use them, and in particular upon the quality of the leadership which directs their employment. Leadership is a quality too ephemeral and too subjective to permit easy definition, but a study of a number of case histories of good and bad leadership in the United States Army enables us to determine that professional skill and competence is a prime ingredient.*

Born in 1802 with the establishment of the United States Military Academy at West Point, military professionalism had come of age in the United States Army in the war with Mexico. But it proved itself in the

Civil War.

Obviously, personal qualities are of the utmost importance in leadership. Both North and South discov-

^{*}These case histories are presented in *Brave Men and Great Captains* (New York, Harper, 1959) written by Col. Dupuy in collaboration with his father, Col. R. Ernest Dupuy, USA-Ret.

ered through sad experience that professional military background cannot, of itself, make a man a good general. And Forrest provided an example of the very rare natural genius of warfare who can excel without professional training.

But both sides paid dearly for a number of early failures in utilization of their professionals; both came to rely practically entirely upon Regulars (mostly West Point graduates) to organize, train and lead in combat the vast armies they assembled for this first of modern total wars.

THE American military professional has good reason to ponder the reasons for our current celebration of the Civil War Centennial—not only as a citizen, but as a soldier of the Republic.

It is well for us to remember that the Civil War brought about important changes in America's social and economic way of life, and in the role our government could and would play in international affairs. It would be ridiculous to suggest that the Civil War, with its terrible toll of lives, was a good thing for the United States. A peaceful solution of the differences that split our country asunder would have been infinitely better. But a peaceful solution was probably impossible. Unlike most wars, this one settled the issues for which it was fought. Its end product was a nation undivided; its history a monument to our national rebirth.

As soldiers, we can appreciate how the military lessons learned and paid for in blood, tears and treasure have been utilized in combat overseas by the sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons of the men who wore the Blue and the Gray.

The Civil War was the first conflict of the technological age, pointing the way to subsequent developments affecting the art and drudgery of war. It has provided us a professional legacy, not only in tradition and in its examples of leadership, but in its direct contribution to the fundamentals of our proud profession.

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I believe it to be the duty of everyone to unite in the restoration of the country and the establishment of peace and harmony.

General Robert E. Lee



The war is over.
Officers may keep
their baggage and sidearms.
The men may have their horses
and return to their homes,
not to be disturbed by
United States authorities.

General Ulysses S. Grant

The U.S. Army in the Civil War...

1861 -

1865



